Tuesday, September 1, 2026

परिष्कृतः पितृस्तवः

 




परिष्कृतः पितृस्तवः

श्लोक १ (नामश्लोकः — दीर्घनाम्नः कारणात् प्रथमपादः स्वभावतः विस्तृतः, इति परम्परासम्मतमेव)
मन्दगड्डि-पद्मनाभाचार्यः कर्मयोगी महायशाः ।
श्रीशैले शिवाजी-स्फूर्तिकेन्द्रसेवापरायणः ॥

श्लोक २ (क्रियापद-द्वयं भिन्नीकृतम् — स्थितः/अभवत्, न तु द्विवारं समाचरत्)
अन्त्यश्वासावधिं यावत् कर्मण्यविरतः स्थितः ।
निष्कामस्नेहसंपन्नः जनसेवारतोऽभवत् ॥

श्लोक ३ (अन्त्यपादद्वयं पुनर्घटितम्, अर्थपुनरुक्तिं त्यक्त्वा)
शुचिजीवनसंपन्नः स्वावलम्बी निरामयः ।
परार्थे न्यस्तमखिलं जीवनं प्रेमपूरितम् ॥

श्लोक ४ (छन्दःसाम्यार्थं "देहान्तेऽपि" → "देहावसाने")
देहावसाने तन्नाम्ना यशो दीप इवोज्ज्वलम् ।
स्मृतौ जीवति नित्यं सः पितृरूपेण शाश्वतः ॥

श्लोक ५ ("तस्मै" पदं निराकृत्य छन्दः पूर्णतया साधितम्, "श्री" स्थाने प्रत्यक्षनामैव)
श्रीपद्मनाभाचार्याय पित्रे पुण्यात्मने नमः ।
यस्य कर्मसु कीर्तिः स्यात् सेवायां यस्य जीवितम् ॥

श्लोक ६ (अपरिवर्तितम् — पूर्वमेव सुगठितम्)
तस्य पुण्यस्मृतिः नित्यं हृदयेऽस्माकमस्तु वै ।
आत्मनस्तस्य शान्तिश्च शाश्वती परमात्मनि ॥

తెలుగు ఉచ్చారణ

మందగడ్డి-పద్మనాభాచార్యః కర్మయోగీ మహాయశాః ।
శ్రీశైలే శివాజీ-స్ఫూర్తికేంద్రసేవాపరాయణః ॥

అంత్యశ్వాసావధిం యావత్ కర్మణ్యవిరతః స్థితః ।
నిష్కామస్నేహసంపన్నః జనసేవారతోఽభవత్ ॥

శుచిజీవనసంపన్నః స్వావలంబీ నిరామయః ।
పరార్థే న్యస్తమఖిలం జీవనం ప్రేమపూరితమ్ ॥

దేహావసానే తన్నామ్నా యశో దీప ఇవోజ్జ్వలమ్ ।
స్మృతౌ జీవతి నిత్యం సః పితృరూపేణ శాశ్వతః ॥

శ్రీపద్మనాభాచార్యాయ పిత్రే పుణ్యాత్మనే నమః ।
యస్య కర్మసు కీర్తిః స్యాత్ సేవాయాం యస్య జీవితమ్ ॥

తస్య పుణ్యస్మృతిః నిత్యం హృదయేఽస్మాకమస్తు వై ।
ఆత్మనస్తస్య శాంతిశ్చ శాశ్వతీ పరమాత్మని ॥

तस्मै श्रीपद्मनाभाचार्याय पित्रे पुण्यात्मने नमः ।

“ఆ పుణ్యాత్ముడైన నా తండ్రి శ్రీ పద్మనాభాచార్యులకు నమస్కారం.”

Monday, April 12, 2021

 


Wishing you all

a happy & prosperous 

Plava nama UGADI new year 

God bless you all

with great health & wealth & prosperity

                                     with regards

                                        advocatemmmohan

Sunday, September 1, 2013

M. Padmanabhacharlu - Great Father

Passing Night  released the life from Great Journey of 85 years 
My Father's soul rest in Great Peace 
Great Personality stands for his words and Deeds - Great Father 
My father left behind him adorable Works & adoptable Life Style
  • Work till last breathe ;
  • Never be burden for yourself ;
  • Save your health & life with clean habits ;
  • Extend your Love & Affection  to the needy with out expectations ;
His life time Achievement as Organizing Secretary  - 
"Sri Shivaji Spurthy Kendram " Srisailam        http://shivajikendra.wordpress.com/

God is great  " may his Soul rest in GREAT PEACE "
                                                                                                      With regards
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     yours
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Advocatemmmohan

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

My views on sec. 53 of Insolvency Act = whether the court can directly annul the sale deed while adjudging debtor as insolvent or after adjudging insolvent only, a petition under sec. 53 is maintainable for annuling the sale deed ?

53. Avoidance of voluntary transfer:-- 
Any transfer of property 
not being a transfer made before and in consideration of marriage or 
made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration 
shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on a petition presented within two years after the date of the transfer, be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the Court.”

6. Acts of insolvency:-- (1) A debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following cases, namely:
(a)      If, in India or elsewhere, he makes a transfer of all or substantially all his property to a third person for the benefit of his creditors generally;
(b)      If, in India or elsewhere, he makes a transfer of his property or of any part thereof, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors;
(c)      If in India or elsewhere, he makes any transfer of his property or of any part thereof, which would, under this or any other enactment for the time being in force, be void as a fraudulent preference if he were adjudged an insolvent.”

7. Petition and adjudication:-- Subject to the conditions specified in this Act, if a debtor commits an act of insolvency, an insolvency petition may be presented either by a creditor or by the debtor, and the Court may on such petition make an order (hereinafter called an order of adjudication) adjudging him as insolvent.

Explanation:--The presentation of a petition by the debtor shall be deemed an act of insolvency within the meaning of this section, and on such petition the Court may make an order of adjudication.”
9. Conditions on which creditor may petition:--
(1) A creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor unless,--
(a)      the debt owing by the debtor to the creditor, or, if two or more creditors join in the petition, the aggregate amount of debts owing to such creditors, amounts to five hundred rupees; and
(b)      the debt is a liquidated sum payable either immediately or at some certain future time, and
(c)      the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition:
         
Provided that where the said period of three months referred to in Clause (c) expires on a day when the Court is closed, the insolvency petition may be presented on the day on which the Court re-open.

          (2)      if the petitioning creditor is a secured creditor, he shall in his petition either state that he is willing to relinquish his security for the benefit of the creditors in the even of the debtor being adjudged insolvent, or give an estimate of the value of the security.  In the latter case, he may be admitted as a petitioning creditor to the extent of the balance of the debt due to him after deducting the value so estimated in the same way as if he were an unsecured creditor.” 
whether the court can directly annul the sale deed while adjudging debtor as  insolvent 
or 
after adjudging insolvent only, a petition under sec. 53 is maintainable for annuling the sale deed  and as court has no power to annul directly?

the words employed in sec. 53 is to be taken into consideration.

53. Avoidance of voluntary transfer:-- 
Any transfer of property 
not being a transfer made before and in consideration of marriage or 
made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration 
shall, 
if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on a petition 

presented within two years after the date of the 

transfer, 
be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the Court.”
any transfer of property
one is =  ---if transferor is adjudged insolvent on petition [under sec. 7 to 9 on the grounds of sec.6 (b)]
another is  = if transferor is adjudged insolvent ......
on petition presented with in 2 years after the date of the transfer , ---
shall be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the court.
Doubts lingering in mind :- 
1. whether it  is 
"if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on petition under sec.7 etc.,"
Or 
"after the transferor adjudged as insolvent "
2.  "on a petition under sec. 53 - with in two years after the date of sale"..... 
for example 
if the I.P. Proceedings takes time more than two years for adjudicating him as insolvent on the ground of sec. 6 (b). 
How this petition under sec. 53 is maintainable after two years of the sale date as per former version.

My view = 
with great respects to the decisions of various High courts, 
i am of the view that the words employed clearly shows that if the transferor is adjudged as insolvent on a petition filed by the creditor under sec. 6 (b) (c) , 
automatically all transfers of properties except exempted , made with in 2 years of the insolvency petition , shall be voidable against the receiver and may be annulled by the court simultaneously. 
No separate petition is necessary. 
if separate petition is necessary 
and if it is to filed only after adjudication of insolvency petition as insolvent, 
the time clause with in two years comes in to play and  no court at any time can not annul the sale as void because no court dispose the insolvency petition with in two years .

Thursday, May 30, 2013

Order 38 Rule 5 of C.P.C.-Order 21 Rule 46A and 46C Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, =This application under Order XIV Rule 8 of O.S. Rules read with Sec.9(ii)(a),(b) (c) & (e) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the applicant, for issuance of prohibitory order restraining the Garnishees from making the payment upto a limit of Rs.2,73,11,000/- (Rupees two crores seventy three lakhs and eleven thousand only) and consequently, direct the Garnishees to deposit the amount so withheld into this Court, pending enforcement of the award that may ultimately be passed by the sole Arbitrator =The provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A and 46C cannot apply to proceeding under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as underlying principle of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C can be invoked after passing the decree, as the words used are judgment debtor and not debtor or parties. = Even on the admitted facts pleaded in this case, it can safely be said that this application is nothing but misuse of process of Court, as application framed under Sec.9 of the Act, is not competent in this Court for want of jurisdiction and for the reason that order against Garnishee can be passed to execute a decree. " The argument that the power under Section 9 of the Act is independent of the Specific Relief Act or that the restrictions placed by the Specific Relief Act cannot control the exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act cannot prima facie be accepted. The reliance placed on Firm Ashok Traders & Anr. Vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja & Ors. [(2004) 3 S.C.C. 155] in that behalf does not also help much, since this Court in that case did not answer that question finally but prima facie felt that the objection based on Section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act may not stand in the way of a party to an arbitration agreement moving the court under Section 9 of the Act. The power under Section 9 is conferred on the District Court. No special procedure is prescribed by the Act in that behalf. It is also clarified that the Court entertaining an application under Section 9 of the Act shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it. Prima facie, it appears that the general rules that governed the court while considering the grant of an interim injunction at the threshold are attracted even while dealing with an application under Section 9 of the Act. There is also the principle that when a power is conferred under a special statute and it is conferred on an ordinary court of the land, without laying down any special condition for exercise of that power, the general rules of procedure of that court would apply. The Act does not prima facie purport to keep out the provisions of the Specific Relief Act from consideration. No doubt, a view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by the Specific Relief Act has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by Order XVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a view taken by the High Court of Bombay. But, how far these decisions are correct, requires to be considered in an appropriate case. Suffice it to say that on the basis of the submissions made in this case, we are not inclined to answer that question finally. But, we may indicate that we are prima facie inclined to the view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act must be based on well recognized principles governing the grant of interim injunctions and other orders of interim protection or the appointment of a receiver."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 01/04/2013

CORAM

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE VINOD K.SHARMA

A.No.5314 of 2012




M/S. L & T FINANCE LIMITED
REP BY ITS ASST MANAGER
MR C BALASUBRAMANIAN

vs

C.T. RAMANATHAN INFRASTRUCTURE  PVT LTD
FLAT NO.4/3
II FLOOR SK ENCLAVE 47
NEW NO.4 SNOWROJI ROAD
CHETPET
CHENNAI 31

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER
SOUTHERN RAILWAYS
ERNAKULAM

GENERAL MANAGER (ACCOUNTS)
SOUTHERN RAILWAYS CONTRACT
CHENNAI 3





ORDER


This application under Order XIV Rule 8 of O.S. Rules read with Sec.9(ii)(a),(b) (c) & (e) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the applicant, for issuance of prohibitory order restraining the Garnishees from making the payment upto a limit of Rs.2,73,11,000/- (Rupees two crores seventy three lakhs and eleven thousand only) and consequently, direct the Garnishees to deposit the amount so withheld into this Court, pending enforcement of the award that may ultimately be passed by the sole Arbitrator.

2  The applicant is a non Banking Finance Company having  its registered office at Mumbai with branches all over India.  In the course of its business, the applicant advanced unsecured loan for its working capital requirements of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crores only) which was repayable in 24 monthly instalments, together with interest @ 9.04% p.a.

3  It is pleaded that the respondent was irregular in making payment of instalments and committed default from third instalment which fell due on 5.5.2012. In exercise of powers conferred under the agreement, the agreement was terminated, and notice was issued to recall the amount.  Notice was also issued to the guarantor.  In reply to notice it was stated that amount is recoverable from Garnishee,  therefore, the respondent was unable to pay the amount.

4  The case of the applicant, is that on the date of filing this application, a sum of Rs.2,73,11,000/- (Rupees two crores seventy three lakhs and eleven thousand only) was due along with future interest @ 36% p.a.  The agreement  also contains arbitration clause.  In the notice, it was stated that in the event of failure to pay the amount, one Mr.Bharat B.Jain shall be appointed as Arbitrator. On the pleadings referred to above, this application has been filed.

5  Reading of provisions of C.P.C. shows, that the order of Garnishee can be passed in case of recovery from the judgment debtor meaning thereby that the provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C are applicable only after passing of decree.
Furnishing of security pending arbitral proceedings therefore will be governed by underlying principle of  Order 38 Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure.
It is only in rarest of rare cases that provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C can be invoked pending arbitral proceedings, and not in a routine manner.  
The reason being that the relationship of Garnishee with the debtor or creditor is  not governed by arbitration clause between the parties to the dispute.  
In case of any dispute with regard to claim, the Garnishee cannot approach the Arbitrator for want of arbitration agreement.  
Though under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it is open to the Court to pass interim order against a party who is not a party to arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings, but it can be with regard to subject matter of arbitration and not otherwise.  
The Court can pass order against third party in exceptional cases in the interest of justice to protect the property from being transferred or becoming vested with third party illegally.  

6  The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Firm Ashok Traders vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja (A.I.R. 2004 SC 1433) was pleased to lay down that
since remedy under section 9 flows from arbitration agreement, a third party who is not a party to the arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings, cannot seek any relief  in this section, nor he can be pleaded as party in any application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.  Therefore, it is in the rarest of rare case, that the relief against Garnishee would be competent under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and not otherwise.  It is also well settled law that unsecured loan cannot be converted into a secured loan, by invoking Order 38 Rule 5 of C.P.C.

6 Furthermore, in the agreement executed between the parties, stipulated as under:
"This agreement shall be governed and construed in all respects with the Indian laws, and the parties hereto agree that any matter or issue arising hereunder or any dispute hereunder shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at Mumbai."
7 In view of the agreement between the parties the  exclusive jurisdiction vests with Courts at Mumbai, therefore, this application is not maintainable in this Court.  It is settled law that parties by consent cannot give jurisdiction to a Court which does not have jurisdiction, but can restrict jurisdiction to particular Court if more than one Court has jurisdiction.  In this case, exclusive jurisdiction vests with Mumbai Courts.
8  The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Garlapati Ramanaiah Naidu and another vs. L & T Finance Ltd. (2012(5) CTC 172) to contend that this Court also has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present application.  The Hon'ble Division Bench in this case was pleased to lay down that:
"40  The execution of the Loan-cum-Hypothecation Agreement and the Deeds of Guarantee is not in serious dispute.  As per Clause 19, no exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the Courts of the State of Mumbai and it has been clearly indicated in the said clause that the Non-Exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Mumbai shall not, however, limit the rights of the lender (Respondent herein) to take appropriate proceedings in any other Court of competent jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the respondent has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court and filed the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
41  It is also pertinent to point out at this juncture that the Deeds of Guarantee were executed at Chennai and one of the clauses of the Letter of Guarantee also states that nothing contianed in Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, shall in any way, affect the right of any of or preclude the parties  to/from seek/seeking such interim relief/s in any Court of competent jurisdiction, including the interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and Rules framed thereunder.
42  Clause (e) of the letter of guarantee also reads that the venue of Arbitration shall be Mumbai or such other place as the lender may in the sole discretion determine and the Courts in Mumbai or such other place shall have exclusive jurisdiction."
9  The contention on the face of it is misconceived.  The Hon'ble Division Bench rejected the objection to the jurisdiction, firstly on the ground that it was not open to the appellant to raise plea of territorial jurisdiction first time in appeal.  Secondly that, the parties had not given exclusive jurisdiction to the Mumbai Courts alone.

10  But in the case in hand, exclusive jurisdiction is given to Mumbai Courts.

11 It may also noticed that Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, cannot be used to convert this Court into Recovery Agents to pass an order against Garnishee, even before serving notice.

12 The provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A and 46C cannot apply to proceeding under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as underlying principle of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C can be invoked after passing the decree, as the words used are judgment debtor and not debtor or parties.  The security or attachment pending proceedings are governed by provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 of C.P.C.

13  The Hon'ble Supreme Court in  Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Kalinga Mining Corporation and others ((2007)6 SCC 798) was pleased to lay down as under:
"15. The argument that the power under Section 9 of the Act is independent of the Specific Relief Act or that the restrictions placed by the Specific Relief Act cannot control the exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act cannot prima facie be accepted. 
The reliance placed on Firm Ashok Traders & Anr. Vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja & Ors. [(2004) 3 S.C.C. 155]
in that behalf does not also help much, 
since this Court in that case did not answer that question finally 
but prima facie felt that the objection based on Section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act may not stand in the way of a party to an arbitration agreement moving the court under Section 9 of the Act. 
The power under Section 9 is conferred on the District Court. 
No special procedure is prescribed by the Act in that behalf. 
It is also clarified that the Court entertaining an application under Section 9 of the Act shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it. 

Prima facie, it appears that the general rules that governed the court while considering the grant of an interim injunction at the threshold are attracted even while dealing with an application under Section 9 of the Act. 
There is also the principle that when a power is conferred under a special statute and it is conferred on an ordinary court of the land, without laying down any special condition for exercise of that power, the general rules of procedure of that court would apply. 
The Act does not prima facie purport to keep out the provisions of the Specific Relief Act from consideration
No doubt, a view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by the Specific Relief Act has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by Order XVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a view taken by the High Court of Bombay. But, how far these decisions are correct, requires to be considered in an appropriate case. 

Suffice it to say that on the basis of the submissions made in this case, we are not inclined to answer that question finally. 
But, we may indicate that we are prima facie inclined to the view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act must be based on well recognized principles governing the grant of interim injunctions and other orders of interim protection or the appointment of a receiver."

14  Even on the admitted facts pleaded in this case, 
it can safely be said that this application is nothing but misuse of process of Court, 
as application framed under Sec.9 of the Act, is not competent in this Court for want of jurisdiction and for the reason that order against Garnishee can be passed to execute a decree.

No merit, dismissed with costs, which are assessed at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only).








vaan

Order 14 Rule 2 r/w. Section 151 C.P.C., and Section 12(2) of the Court Fees Act with a prayer to decide the court fees as a preliminary issue. The contention in the affidavit is that the suit property is a house site and the property ought to have been valued not on the basis of the tax assessment, but on the basis of market value.= It is not enough for the revision petitioner to contend that the worth of the property is in crores without showing how the properties can be construed as house site, when the chitta and patta has been filed to show that the suit properties are ryotwari lands. Hence, the order passed by the trial Court did not suffer from illegality or irregularity and therefore, the civil revision petition is dismissed.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED:    08/05/2013

CORAM
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE S.VIMALA

C.R.P.(PD) MD.No.924 of 2012
AND
M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012

1.Syed Ahamed Kabir
2.Ms.Mohamed Seeni Fathima
3.Ms.Mohamed Mariam Beevi
4.Md.Syed Saheera Hasana . Petitioners/Defendants

Vs

Naina Mohamed Sahib    ... Respondent/Plaintiff

PRAYER

Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, to call for the records relating to the fair and decretal order dated
13.02.2012 passed in I.A.No.13 of 2011 in O.S.No.137 of 2010 on the file of
District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram, and set aside the same.

!For Petitioners            .. Mr.R.Sundar Srinivasan
for M/s.AL.Ganthimathi
^For Respondent    .. Mr.S.Ramesh


:ORDER

The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.137 of 2010 seeking the
relief of declaration and injunction.

2. The defendants filed I.A.No.13 of 2011 under Order 14 Rule 2 r/w.
Section 151 C.P.C., and Section 12(2) of the Court Fees Act with a prayer to
decide the court fees as a preliminary issue.  The contention in the affidavit
is that the suit property is a house site and the property ought to have been
valued not on the basis of the tax assessment, but on the basis of market value.
This petition was dismissed and as against which,  the present revision petition
has been filed.

3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that
the trial Court did not frame proper issues for consideration and without
affording sufficient opportunity has decided the issue.  This contention does
not appear to be correct.

4. A perusal of the order passed by the trial Court would reveal
that the trial Court has taken note of the following facts:-
a) It is nowhere contended by the defendants that the suit
properties are not ryotwari lands.
b) Just because the suit properties are located in and around
the residential area, it will not lead with the conclusion that the suit
properties would also be used as a house site and that the property ought to
have been valued as a house site.
c) No document has been filed by the defendants to show that
the suit properties are house sites, when the plaintiffs have raised a specific
contention that the suit properties are ryotwari lands.

5. Based on these reasoning, the trial Court has come to the
conclusion that the valuation of the property and the consequent Court fee paid
is also correct.

6. It is not enough for the revision petitioner to contend that the
worth of the property is in crores without showing how the properties can be
construed as house site, when the chitta and patta has been filed to show that
the suit properties are ryotwari lands.  Hence, the order passed by the trial
Court did not suffer from illegality or irregularity and therefore, the civil
revision petition is dismissed.

7. After this case was heard on merits, the issue regarding
maintainability of revision in respect of matters governing petitions under
Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C., was raised in C.R.P.(MD)Nos.1085 to 1088 of 2005 and
1068 of 2006 wherein it has been decided that Revision Petition is not
maintainable. The learned counsel appearing on both sides agreed that the
decision taken in those cases would be applicable to this case also.  Therefore,
on the question of maintainability also, this Civil Revision Petition is
dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.
No costs.


smn2

To

The District Munsif Court,
Ramanathapuram.

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

issue the passport by using the name of the step father S.Ravisankar in the passport.= writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to receive the passport application of the petitioner viz., R.Gayathirir daughter of Padmini S.Ravisankar and process of the application and issue the passport by using the name of the step father S.Ravisankar in the passport.- the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application on online in view of the fact that the petitioner's birth certificate reflect the name of the biological father as M.Rangarajan, but the school records reflect the name of the step father viz., S.Ravishankar. Since the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application through E.Mail, she met officials of the respondent office on 06.05.2013. The said officials informed the petitioner's mother that unless they get a direction from this Court to use the name of the step father in the passport, it will not be possible for them to issue passport to the petitioner, because the name of the father differs in school records from that of the birth certificate. -This Court taking note of the fact that the petitioner's educational prospect should not be affected and also that the petitioner is to furnish the passport number within 27.05.2013, so as to enable her to admit in the course in Astro Physics in National University of Singapore, on the basis of fair play, equity and even as a matter of prudence, direct the respondent/Regional Passport Officer, Chenai to receive the passport application of the petitioner and process the said application and to proceed further in regard to the issuance of passport by using the name of step father viz., S.Ravishankar in the passport, in the manner known to law and in accordance with law. Further the said exercise is to be done within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Dated: 16.05.2013

Coram:

The Honourable Mr.Justice M.VENUGOPAL
                   
W.P.No.14182 of 2013
and
M.P.No.1 of 2013






R.Gayathiri
Minor
Rep. By mother and natural guardian
Padminisi S.Ravisankar .. Petitioner

.vs.

The Regional Passport Officer
The Regional Passport Office
Mount Road, Chennai .. Respondent






Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to receive the passport application of the petitioner viz., R.Gayathirir daughter of Padmini S.Ravisankar  and process of the application and issue the passport by using the name of the step father S.Ravisankar in the passport.




        For Petitioner     :   Mr.R.Raman Laal

For respondent   :   Mr.C.Kanagaraj
Standing counsel




O R D E R

Heard Mr.R.Raman Laal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.C.Kanagaraj, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent.

2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner's mother's first husband name is M.Rangarajan and the said marriage was performed on 22.05.1983 at Chennai.  Later, due to divergence of opinion, the petitioner's mother along with her husband filed H.M.O.P.No.134 of 2000 on the file of the learned III Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai and on 18.04.2001, a decree of divorce was passed in the aforesaid matrimonial proceedings.  The custody of the petitioner was given to the wife i.e., Padmini.  It is not in dispute that the petitioner was born to her mother (Padmini) and her erstwhile husband viz., M.Rengarajan.  It comes to be known that after divorce being granted in H.M.O.P.No.134 of 2000 by the trial court on 18.04.2001, the petitioner's mother got remarried and her husband's name is S.Ravishankar.  At the time of admission of petitioner's daughter in school, the step father's name was given and all school records unerringly point out the name of the father or guardian viz., S.Ravishankar.  

3. According to the petitioner's mother, her daughter viz., the petitioner herein completed +2 at DAV Girls Senior Secondary School at Chennai.  The school is having an arrangement with National University of Singapore to select meritorious student for placement at National University of Singapore.  The staff of National University of Singapore came to the school of petitioner and conducted an interview of meritorious students and analysed the grade obtained in the 10th Standard and provisionally selected the petitioner to admit in a course in Astro Physics in National University of Singapore.  The National University of Singapore will issue admission slip only on production of passport number.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner urges before this Court that the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application on online in view of the fact that the petitioner's birth certificate reflect the name of the biological father as M.Rangarajan, but the school records reflect the name of the step father viz., S.Ravishankar.  Since the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application through E.Mail, she met officials of the respondent office on 06.05.2013.  The said officials informed the petitioner's mother that unless they get a direction from this Court to use the name of the step father in the passport,  it will not be possible for them to issue passport to the petitioner, because the name of the father differs in school records from that of the birth certificate. 

5. The petitioner has to furnish the passport number within 27.05.2013. Therefore, there is very much urgency in moving this Court during vacation.  If the passport number is not furnished, the petitioner's selection will be cancelled, which will affect her future educational career.


6. This Court taking note of the fact that the petitioner's educational prospect should not be affected and also that the petitioner is to furnish the passport number within 27.05.2013, so as to enable her to admit in the course in Astro Physics in National University of Singapore, on the basis of fair play, equity and even as a matter of prudence, direct the respondent/Regional Passport Officer, Chenai to receive the passport application of the petitioner and process the said application and to proceed further in regard to the issuance of passport by using the name of step father viz., S.Ravishankar in the passport, in the manner known to law and in accordance with law. Further the said exercise is to be done within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 

7. The writ petition is disposed of with the above direction. No costs. Consequently, connected MP is closed.








nvsri

To

The Regional Passport Officer
The Regional Passport Office
Mount Road
Chennai

it is well settled that only the reasons recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings u/s 147 of the Act are to be looked at or examined for sustaining or setting aside a notice issued u/s 148 of the Act. The reasons are required to be read as they were recorded by the AO. No substitution or deletion is permissible. No addition can be made to those reasons. Therefore, the details of entries or amount mentioned in the assessment order and in respect of which ultimate addition has been made by the AO, cannot be made a basis to say that the reasons recorded by the AO were with reference to those amounts mentioned in the assessment order. The reasons recorded by the AO are totally silent with regard to the amount and nature of bogus entries and transactions and the persons with whom the transactions had taken place. In this respect, we may rely upon the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictionalITA 608-609/2012 Page 9 of 9 Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Atul Jain (2000) 299 ITR 383, in which case the information relied upon by the AO for initiating proceedings u/s 147 of the Act did indicate the source of the capital gain and nobody knew which shares were transacted and with whom the transaction has taken place and in that case there were absolutely no details available and the information supplied was extremely scanty and vague and in that light of those facts, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional Delhi High Court held that initiation of proceedings u/s 147 of the Act by the AO was not valid and justified in the eyes of law. The recent decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court of Delhi in the case of Signature Hotels (P) Ltd. (supra) also supports the view we have taken above.” 9. We do not see any reason to differ with the view expressed by the Tribunal. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

ITA 608-609/2012 Page 1 of 9
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 20.05.2013
+ ITA 608/2012
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - IV ... Appellant
versus
M/s INSECTICIDES (INDIA) LTD. ... Respondent
+ ITA 609/2012
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - IV ... Appellant
versus
M/s INSECTICIDES (INDIA) LTD. ... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant : Mr N. P. Sahni with Mr Ruchesh Sinha
For the Respondent : Mr K.V.S Gupta
CORAM:-
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
JUDGMENT
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
1. These appeals by the revenue are directed against the order dated
12.10.2011 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in
ITA Nos. 2332-2333/Del/2010 relating to the assessment years 2002-03ITA 608-609/2012 Page 2 of 9
and 2003-04 (respectively).
 In both these appeals the issue relates to the
validity of the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 of the Income
- tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”).
2. Insofar as assessment year 2002-03 is concerned, the original
assessment under Section 143(3) of the said Act was completed on
29.11.2004. The notices under Section 148 were issued on 21.09.2006.
As regards, assessment year 2003-04, there was no assessment under
Section 143(3) of the said Act, however, an intimation under Section
143(1) thereof had been issued. The notice under Section 148 seeking to
re-open the assessment was issued on 17.10.2006.
3. The reasons indicated behind the re-opening of the assessments
were identical in both the cases. We are setting out below the reasons
given in respect of the assessment year 2002-03. They are as under:-
“It has been informed by the Director of Income-tax
(Inv.), New Delhi vide letter dated 16.6.2006 that the
above named company was involved in giving and taking
bogus entries/transactions during the F.Y. 2001-02.
From the information gathered by the DIT(Inv.)-1,
New Delhi that the assessee was involved in giving and
taking accommodation entries only and represented
unsecured money of the assessee company is actually
unexplained income of the assessee company. The assessee
company has failed to disclose fully and truly all theITA 608-609/2012 Page 3 of 9
material facts and source of these funds routed through
bank accounts of the assessee company. I, therefore have
reasons to believe that the income has escaped assessment
within the meaning of section 147 of the I.T. Act, 1961 for
the asstt. Year referred above.
Hence notice u/s 148 is issued.”
The respondent / assessee had filed objections against the said notices
under Section 148 of the said Act. However, without disposing of those
objections by reasoned order, the Assessing Officer framed reassessment
orders on 15.10.2007 in respect of both the years. By virtue of the
reassessment orders, the Assessing Officer made an addition of ` 30 lakhs
in respect of the assessment year 2002-03 and an addition of ` 35 lakhs in
respect of the assessment year 2003-04. Essentially, the Assessing
Officer held that the said sums of money represented income of the
assessee from undisclosed sources which had been shown as share
application money. In other words, the Assessing Officer held the said
sums to be bogus entries.
4. Being aggrieved by the said orders passed by the Assessing
Officer, the respondent / assessee preferred appeals. Those appeals were
allowed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) by a common
order dated 06.01.2011. Insofar as the assessment year 2002-03 was
concerned, the CIT (Appeals) held that the reassessment proceedings
were bad inasmuch as it amounted to a mere change of opinion. The
findings of the CIT (Appeals) to this effect were as under:-ITA 608-609/2012 Page 4 of 9
“The submissions made on behalf of the appellant
company and reasons recorded by the Ld AO have been
carefully perused. On consideration, I find that the issue
of share capital and share application money has come up
in the regular assessment proceedings and the appellant
company, vide its letter dated 09.11.2004, had submitted
detailed written reply along with necessary details of
share capital, share holding pattern and confirmation of
the persons contributing to share capital along with proof
of filing of their income tax return, PAN nos.
Ward/Circle/Range etc. Further, this fact was again
brought to the notice of Ld AO, vide appellant’s letter
dated 28.08.2007, while filing the objections to the
reopening the assessment for the assessment year under
consideration. On a perusal of the said letter it is seen
that not only the issue was examined by the AO but also
the claim of the appellant company was accepted in the
original assessment. In this factual position, it cannot be
held that the issue of share capital of ` 30 lacs was not
examined and decided by the Ld AO at the time of the
regular assessment. I also find myself in agreement with
the Ld counsel that no fresh material, let alone tangible
material, has come to his possession so as to
empower/enable the AO to take recourse to the
provisions of section 147 of the IT Act, 1961. Therefore,ITA 608-609/2012 Page 5 of 9
the reopening of assessment is based merely on change of
opinion, which I am afraid, is not sustainable in law.
Therefore, in the light of the judgment relied upon by the
ld counsel, I have no hesitation in holding that the
reopening of assessment in terms of section 147 of the
Act is not sustainable in law.”
5. In respect of both the assessment years, the CIT (Appeals) held in
favour of the assessee on merits also.
6. Being aggrieved by the deletion of the addition made by the CIT
(Appeals), the revenue preferred the above mentioned appeals before the
Tribunal. As mentioned above, the Tribunal rejected those appeals and
that is how the revenue has filed these appeals before us.
7. We may point out at this juncture itself that the Tribunal did not go
into the question of merits. It only examined the question of the validity
of the proceedings under Section 147 of the said Act. The Tribunal, in
essence, held that the purported reasons for reopening the assessments
were entirely vague and devoid of any material. As such, on the available
material, no reasonable person could have any reason to believe that
income had escaped assessment. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the
proceedings under Section 147 of the said Act were invalid.ITA 608-609/2012 Page 6 of 9
8. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for concluding that the
proceedings under Section 147 were invalid. Instead of adding anything
to the said reasons, we think it would be appropriate if the same are
reproduced:-
“In the case at hand, as is seen from the reasons recorded
by the AO, we find that the AO has merely stated that it
has been informed by the Director of Income-tax (Inv.),
New Delhi, vide letter dated 16.06.2006 that the above
named company was involved in giving and taking bogus
entries/transactions during the relevant year, which is
actually unexplained income of the assessee company.
The AO has further stated that the assessee company has
failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts and
source of these funds routed through bank account of the
assessee company. In the reasons recorded, it is nowhere
mentioned as to who had given bogus entries/transactions
to the assessee or to whom the assessee had given bogus
entries or transactions. It is also nowhere mentioned as to
on which dates and through which mode the bogus
entries and transactions were made by the assessee. What
was the information given by the Director of Income-tax
(Inv.), New Delhi, vide letter dated 16.06.2006 has also
not been mentioned. In other words, the contents of the
letter dated 16.06.2006 of the Director of Income-tax
(Inv.), New Delhi have not been given. The AO hasITA 608-609/2012 Page 7 of 9
vaguely referred to certain communications that he had
received from the DIT(Inv.), New Delhi; the AO did not
mention the facts mentioned in the said communication
except that from the informations gathered by the DIT
(Inv.), New Delhi that the assessee was involved in
giving and taking accommodation entries only and
represented unsecured money of the assessee company is
actually unexplained income of the assessee company or
that it has been informed by the Director of Income-tax
(Inv.), New Delhi vide letter dated 16.06.2006 that the
assessee company was involved in giving and taking
bogus entries/transactions during the relevant financial
year. The AO did not mention the details of transactions
that represented unexplained income of the assessee
company. The information on the basis of which the AO
has initiated proceedings u/s 147 of the Act are
undoubtedly vague and uncertain and cannot be
construed to be sufficient and relevant material on the
basis of which a reasonable person could have formed a
belief that income had escaped assessment. In other
words, the reasons recorded by the AO are totally vague,
scanty and ambiguous. They are not clear and
unambiguous but suffer from vagueness. The reasons
recorded by the AO do not disclose the AO’s mind as to
what was the nature and amount of transaction or entries,ITA 608-609/2012 Page 8 of 9
which had been given or taken by the assessee in the
relevant year. The reasons recorded by the AO also do
not disclose his mind as to when and in what mode or
way the bogus entries or transactions were given or taken
by the assessee. From the reasons recorded, nobody can
know what was the amount and nature of bogus entries or
transactions given and taken by the assessee in the
relevant year and with whom the transaction had taken
place. As already noted above,
 it is well settled that only
the reasons recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings
u/s 147 of the Act are to be looked at or examined for
sustaining or setting aside a notice issued u/s 148 of the
Act. 
The reasons are required to be read as they were
recorded by the AO. No substitution or deletion is
permissible. No addition can be made to those reasons.
Therefore, the details of entries or amount mentioned in
the assessment order and in respect of which ultimate
addition has been made by the AO, cannot be made a
basis to say that the reasons recorded by the AO were
with reference to those amounts mentioned in the
assessment order. The reasons recorded by the AO are
totally silent with regard to the amount and nature of
bogus entries and transactions and the persons with
whom the transactions had taken place.
In this respect,
we may rely upon the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictionalITA 608-609/2012
Page 9 of 9
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Atul Jain (2000)
299 ITR 383, in which case the information relied upon
by the AO for initiating proceedings u/s 147 of the Act
did indicate the source of the capital gain and nobody
knew which shares were transacted and with whom the
transaction has taken place and in that case there were
absolutely no details available and the information
supplied was extremely scanty and vague and in that light
of those facts, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional Delhi High
Court held that initiation of proceedings u/s 147 of the
Act by the AO was not valid and justified in the eyes of
law. The recent decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High
Court of Delhi in the case of Signature Hotels (P) Ltd.
(supra) also supports the view we have taken above.”
9. We do not see any reason to differ with the view expressed by the
Tribunal. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration.
The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
MAY 20, 2013
SU

Monday, May 27, 2013

cruelty - by filing numerous false complaints against Sanjay and his family members with the police and in the office of Sanjay that Sanjay and his family members used to demand dowry from her and treated her with cruelty when she failed to fulfill their demands and that Sanjay was having an illicit relation with his colleague, Suman has caused ‘mental cruelty’ to Sanjay thereby entitling him to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. =The failure of the Respondent/her counsel, in not putting forward her case in cross-examination of the Petitioner/husband and failure to give suggestions in rebuttal of his deposition constitute and are deemed, to be admissions on her part.

FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 1 of 21
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: May 09, 2013
Judgment Pronounced on: May 23, 2013
+ FAO 108/2013
SUMAN SINGH .....Appellant
Represented by: Ms.Padmini Gupta, Advocate
versus
SANJAY SINGH ..... Respondent
Represented by: Respondent in person
FAO 109/2013
SUMAN SINGH .....Appellant
Represented by: Ms.Padmini Gupta, Advocate
versus
SANJAY SINGH ..... Respondent
Represented by: Respondent in person
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
1. On February 26, 1999, respondent Sanjay and appellant Suman got
happily married and the two were blessed with a daughter born on June
15, 2002 followed by another bundle of delight, another daughter born on
February 10, 2006.
2. Unfortunately, relations soured with passage of time. Sanjay
sought dissolution of the marriage alleging cruelty and Suman sought
restitution of her conjugal rights. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 2 of 21
3. Both Sanjay and Suman reached the Court on July 19, 2010. It
appears both were aware of the action proposed to be taken by the other.
Petition filed by Sanjay under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage
Act was filed on July 19, 2010, which was the date when Suman’s
application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was also filed.
4. Whereas Suman alleged that within a few days of the marriage
Sanjay’s behaviour changed because he was aggrieved of insufficient
dowry brought by her notwithstanding her family members having spent
lavishly when the two got married; but she bore him. His behaviour
turned rude and he started picking up quarrel on trivial matters and
additionally he would even turn physical, but she continued to suffer to
maintain the family bond but realized that Sanjay have developed
intimacy with another woman and had left the matrimonial house
compelling her to seek restitution of her conjugal rights. Sanjay pleaded
that the marriage was a dowry-less marriage and during 10 years
thereafter he was regularly harassed and tortured by Suman who degraded
and insulted him at the drop of the hat and even would misbehave with
his parents. To save the marriage he left his parents and since January
2005 started living separately from his parents. But Suman’s attitude did
not change. In the year 2006 he purchased Flat No.91, Pocket IV, Sector-
2, Rohini in Suman’s name hoping that she would improve. But she did
not. She even started visiting his office and created ugly scenes by
abusing him. She not only threatened but lodged false complaints with
the police alleging false facts against him and his parents. She repeatedly
threatened to commit suicide and leave a note recording false facts to
teach him and his parents a lesson. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 3 of 21
5. Sanjay’s written statement to Suman’s petition is his version
pleaded in the petition filed by him seeking dissolution of the marriage;
of course he denied the insinuations against him, and as regards Suman,
she denied the insinuation against her but pleaded that theirs was a love
marriage solemnized on March 22, 1997 without telling the parents and
that subsequently, in front of her parents she and Sanjay performed the
rituals of marriage on February 26, 1999. For 3 years after the marriage
she and Sanjay lived with a friend and shifted to the house of Sanjay’s
parents in May 2002 but since they never approved of the marriage she
and Sanjay shifted to a residential accommodation before Sanjay
purchased a flat in her name in Rohini part sale consideration whereof
was paid by her mother; but would continue to harass and misbehave with
her. He developed intimate relations with a lady named Jyoti and
therefore wanted Suman to divorce her and that Sanjay was pressurizing
her mother to transfer ownership of her property situated in Sultanpuri in
his favour.
6. In HMA No.527/2010 filed by Suman, following issues were
settled:-
“1. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the restitution of
conjugal rights as prayed? OPP
2. Relief.”
7. In HMA No.685/2010 filed by Sanjay, following issues were
settled:-
“1. Whether after solemnization of marriage, the Respondent
has treated the Petitioner with cruelty? OPP
2. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the decree of divorce
as prayed? OPPFAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 4 of 21
3. Relief.”
8. Evidence was led by the parties in HMA No.685/2010 filed by
Sanjay. In support of his case, Sanjay examined himself as PW-1. In his
examination-in-chief, Sanjay PW-1 deposed on the lines of averments
made in the divorce petition filed by him. He was cross-examined, and
being relevant, a part of the cross-examination is being noted as under:-
“I was married with the respondent about 13 years back but I
do not remember the date. Our marriage was love marriage.
My parents were not agree for the marriage but the parents of
the respondent were agreed for the marriage….After marriage I
resided with the respondent at rental accommodation at P-
2/401-402, Sultanpuri, Delhi. Presently, I am posted at
Directorate of Family Welfare, Metcalfe House, Delhi, as
UDC….I always resided with the respondent at rental
accommodation. For two years after the marriage, we resided
at rented accommodation but I do not remember the exact
period and thereafter. I along with the respondent shifted to my
parental home. I along with the respondent resided at my
parental home for about 6 years…Presently, I am residing
separately from the respondents since 1 ½ years…I know Ms.
Jyoti Sharma as she was earlier my colleague. Ms. Jyoti
Sharma never met me after the year 2007. Again said, she met
me 2-3 times in the year 2007 in connection with official work.
It is wrong to suggest that I used to meet Ms. Jyoti Sharma after
the year 2007….It is wrong to suggest that my father in drunken
condition has thrown out the respondent after quarrelling with
the respondent. It is correct that after throwing out the
respondent from the matrimonial home, after some time we
lived together in a rented accommodation…. It is wrong to
suggest that I have not purchased any flat in the name of the
respondent in the year 2006. It is wrong to suggest that I had
purchased the said flat in the name of the respondent in the
year 2005 with the contribution of money given by the mother
of the respondent. I used to come home after 12 midnight. I
used to come home between 9 PM to 10 PM. It is wrong to
suggest that I used to come home after 12 midnight. (Vol. I used
to come late due to the nature of work assigned to me by the
department as I was appointed as a caretaker). It is wrong to FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 5 of 21
suggest that I used to spend time with one Jyoti after close of
working hours at 5.00 PM…I have no liability except the
petitioner and my two minor children… It is wrong to suggest
that we are residing separately since January 2007 or that
there is no cohabitation since September 2008. It is wrong to
suggest that I am deposing falsely.”
9. Suman examined herself as RW-1 and deposed in harmony with
the averments made in the written statement filed by her to the petition
seeking divorce filed by Sanjay. She proved a complaint, Ex.RW-1/1
dated July 28, 2010, submitted by her to Deputy Commissioner of Police,
Outer District, Delhi, which complaint records that Sanjay and his father
used to harass Suman for dowry. She was cross-examined and being
relevant, a part of the cross-examination is being noted as under:-
“It is correct that I have filed a petition against the respondent
(petitioner in the HMA No.685/10). It is also correct that I have
also filed a complaint against the respondent (petitioner in the
HMA No.685/10) and his other family members under Section
498A/406 IPC. The complaint was filed by me in August, 2010
but the complaint was made earlier to DCP, Outer. It is correct
that the petition filed by me under Domestic Violence Act has
been dismissed from the court of Ms. Rachna Tiwari
Lakhanpal, the ld. M.M., Delhi. The respondent (petitioner in
the HMA No. 685/10) has committed cruelty towards me in the
year 1999 at the time of Raksha Bandhan. I have not made any
complaint in the year 1999. I have also not made any complaint
since 1999 to 2010. It is correct that all the complaints have
been made by me after August, 2010. I have not mentioned any
incident in my affidavit Ex.PW1/A.
I am graduate. It is correct that I have not mentioned in
my affidavits Ex.PW1/A regarding demand of dowry and
beatings and cruelty by the respondent (petitioner in the HMA
No.685/10) and his other family members. It is correct that I
have mentioned in my domestic violence petition that I had
purchased the flat bearing No.91, Second Floor, LIG Flat,
Pocket-4, Sector-2, Rohini, Delhi after selling my jewellery. I
have not filed any petition against the respondent (petitioner in FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 6 of 21
the HMA No. 685/10) in respect of demand of dowry as well as
cruelties during the period 1999 to 2010. It is correct that I
have no matrimonial relations with respondent (petitioner in
the HMA No. 685/10) for the last about 3 and a half years…I
have not told about my cruelty as well as demand of dowry to
my mother and other family members…It is correct that I made
so many complaints against my husband. It is correct that all
the complaints have been made by me after August, 2010 as I
came to know about Ms. Jyoti Sharma. It is wrong to suggest
that the respondent (petitioner in the HMA No. 685/10) is not
having any relations with Ms. Jyoti Sharma….I have seen Jyoti
Sharma with the respondent (petitioner in the HMA No. 685/10)
at C-1, 368, Third Floor, Muskan Apartment, Sector-17,
Rohini, Delhi. (Vol. The said property is in the name of Jyoti
Sharma and mentioned as Jyoti Sharma, W/o Sanjay Sharma). I
have not filed any documents regarding the said property as I
have approached the concerned authority through RTI but still,
I have not received any information. It is wrong to suggest that
the respondent is not having illicit relations with Ms. Jyoti
Sharma.
It is correct that the complaints dated 30.06.2010,
01.07.2011, 18.05.2011, 21.07.2011, 25.10.2011, 01.06.2011,
28.10.2010, 13.08.2010 and 28.07.2010 have been filed by me
and the same are Ex.RW-1/PX (Colly). It is correct that I had a
few differences with the respondent like not giving me quality
time….It is correct that I am also filed a petition under
Domestic Violence Act and the same was also dismissed by Ms.
Rachna Tiwari Lakhanpal, the ld. M.M. I did not file any
appeal against the said order of ld. MM since we have got our
house property back. After the marriage, my father-in-law and
two brothers-in-law raised demands of dowry. I never lodged
any complaint against the said in-laws with police or any other
authority.
It is correct that I have stated in my affidavit that my
husband had illicit relation with one Ms. Jyoti Sharma his
colleague. It is also correct that I want to stay with my husband
despite his having illicit relationship with the said Jyoti
Sharma. It is correct that I have not cohabited with my husband
for last 4 years. I made several efforts to stay with my husband.
I even suggested that he may continue with his illicit FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 7 of 21
relationship but stay in the house with us. It is wrong to suggest
that I am deposing falsely.” (Emphasis Supplied)
10. By a common judgment dated December 14, 2012, the learned
Additional Principal Judge, Family Courts, Rohini, Delhi has allowed
petition seeking dissolution of the marriage filed by Sanjay being HMA
No.685/2010, and has dismissed HMA No.527/2010 re-numbered as
HMA No.273/2011 filed by Suman. The learned Judge has held that
Sanjay has successfully established cruelty as pleaded by him at the
hands of Suman.
11. In so concluding, it has been held by the learned Trial Judge that:-
(i) In spite of being cross-examined on material points no
contradictions to render unreliable Sanjay’s testimony were brought out;
(ii) Sanjay was not found wavering on material points;
(iii) On may material points Suman’s lawyer had not cross-examined
Sanjay i.e. had not even dared to challenge Sanjay’s sworn testimony;
(iv) Complaints lodged by Suman alleging dowry harassment at the
hands of Sanjay and his parents were ex-facie false;
(v) Suman had failed good to establish Sanjay having illicit
relationship with another lady and said allegations would cause immense
mental pain and agony;
(vi) Sanjay’s testimony that whenever he visited Suman’s parental
house he was treated badly could be rebutted by Suman by examining her
family members, whom she did not requiring an adverse inference to be
drawn against her. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 8 of 21
12. It would be most apposite to note the following portion of the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge:-
“39. The failure of the Respondent/her counsel, in not putting 
forward her case in cross-examination of the 
Petitioner/husband and failure to give suggestions in rebuttal of 
his deposition constitute and are deemed, to be admissions on 
her part. The Petitioner, has thus, clearly brought over the
record that the Respondent started harassing and torturing him
just a few days after the marriage. She pressurized him to get
separated from his family members. She was brought to the
matrimonial home by the parents of the Petitioner but due to
her nature/conduct, she (with the Petitioner), was asked to
leave the house, after staying for a few days. The Petitioner
has, also, brought over the record that the Respondent did not
like him talking to his parents and other family members. She
did not like him to sit with them even when they were unwell.
She never wanted him to help them financially, to whatever
little extent he could.
45. It is a general rule that one who asserts a fact or claim
has to prove it. The burden of proof is on him, who asserts it
and not on him who denies. [Reliance placed on 1 (2005) DMC
397 (DB)]. The nature of proof required in the matrimonial
matters is different. The facts alleged by a spouse about their
private intimate life are not supposed to be known to any other
person and no corroboration can be expected in such case. To
seek a corroboration to a fact alleged by a spouse to a
marriage regarding the healthy or unhealthy character of their
intimate relation which belongs to the sacred and secrets
precincts of marital life, and which are known only to the
spouses and which are not supposed to be known to any other
living soul on the surface of the planet, would amount to
shutting one‟s eye towards the facts of life and reality.
Corroboration, therefore, to the version of either spouse can
hardly be expected to come from any other independent source.
Such matters are always decided on preponderance of
probabilities. (Reliance placed on A versus B- 1985
Matrimonial Law Reporter 326).
46. It is, also, well settled law that where accusations and
allegations have been leveled by the parties against each other, FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 9 of 21
the court has to consider the context in which such accusations
etc. have been made. the court, also, has to keep in mind the
physical and mental condition of the parties, as well as their
social status and has to consider the impact of the personalities
and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing
all the incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that
point of view. The conduct of a spouse has to be examined in
the light of the other spouse‟s capacity for endurance and
extent to which that capacity is known to the spouse. (Reliance
placed on 151 (2008) DLT 341- Surender Pal vs Kanwaljeet
Kaur).
47. The parties are well-educated and come from middle
class section of the society…
48. The values that middle class section of our Indian society
holds, are well known. The in-laws and other relations expect
due regards from the newly-wed wife. In fact it is expected that
she gets-up early, prepares breakfast, lunch and dinner for the
entire family herself or with the assistance of other family
members. It is, also, expected that such a newly-wed greets the
guests and visitors to the house respectfully. It is, also, expected
that she serves lunch or dinner to them and if it does not
happen, they feel disgraced in the presence of others. If the
newly-wed does not behave in such manner as expected from
her, they are bound to suffer mental pain and agony. The
Respondent, in the instant case, remained indifferent towards
the feelings of the Petitioner‟s parents and other family
members. She did not care for any visitor (s), any guest (s) or
any relation (s) of the Petitioner or even his friend (s). The
Petitioner, therefore, would have suffered mental pain and
agony, due to such acts of omission and commission on the part
of the Respondent.” (Emphasis Supplied)
13. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated December 14, 2012
passed by the Trial Judge granting decree of divorce to Sanjay and
dismissing HMA No.527/2010 filed by Suman seeking restitution of
conjugal rights, Suman has filed the above captioned appeals.
14. Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 prescribes that
any marriage, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 10 of 21
wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other
party „has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner
with cruelty‟.
15. A matrimonial dispute is not just a legal dispute, but more
importantly it is a family problem and a social concern. Matrimonial
disputes should not be viewed from the glasses of legal technicalities.
They should be appreciated at the human level of being a conflict
between a husband and wife. Such issues should be dealt with sensitively
rather than mechanically. Thus, a pragmatic approach and not a pedantic
one is required while dealing with matrimonial disputes.
16. While dealing with the concept of ‘cruelty’, in the decision
reported as AIR 2005 SC 534 A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, the Supreme
Court observed as under:
“The expression „cruelty‟ has not been defined in the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. The said expression has been used in
relation to human conduct or human behavior. It is the conduct
in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and
obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is
adversely affecting the other. It may be defined as willful and
unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to
life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a
reasonable apprehension of such a danger, The question of
mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of
marital ties of the particular society to which the parties
belong, their social values, status, environment in which they
live.”
17. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of the spouse
same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the
treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind
of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare, then such conduct FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 11 of 21
amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one
has to see the probabilities of the case.
18. Cruelty may be mental or physical. Mental cruelty may consist of
verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to
constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. If the cruelty is
physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question
of fact and degree. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct
evidence, but in case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be
direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are
required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents
that are brought out in evidence. The concept, proof beyond the shadow
of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and
certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those, of
husband and wife. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel
treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse,
whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or
injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be
drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on
the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct
complained of itself is bad enough and per-se unlawful or illegal. Then
the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired
into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the
conduct itself is proved or admitted.
19. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be ‘grave
and weighty’ so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse
cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be
something more serious than ‘ordinary wear and tear of married life’. It FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 12 of 21
is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct
was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be
considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure it as
a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may
cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial
irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married
life, would not amount to cruelty. The foundation of a sound marriage is
tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each
other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every
marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exaggerated
and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All
quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what
constitutes cruelty in each particular case, keeping in view the physical
and mental condition of the parties, their character and social status. A
too technical and hypersensitive approach would be counter productive to
the institution of marriage. Conduct has to be considered in the
background of several factors such as social status of parties, their
education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is
difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description
of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the
type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between
the parties had deteriorated to such an extent, due to the conduct of the
other spouse, that it would be impossible for them to live together without
mental agony, torture or distress, entitling the complaining spouse to
secure divorce.
20. In the backdrop of above legal position, we proceed to examine the
present case.FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 13 of 21
21. In the instant case, it is the claim of Sanjay that Suman treated him
with cruelty after their marriage was solemnized. On the other hand,
Suman claims that it was Sanjay who treated her with cruelty and that she
is ready to forgive Sanjay and lead a matrimonial life with him.
22. As already noted hereinabove, the Trial Judge has accepted the
case set up by Sanjay that Suman had treated him with cruelty after
solemnization of their marriage. The mainstay of the decision of the Trial
Judge is that the failure of counsel appearing for Suman to put forward
the case of Suman to Sanjay in his cross-examination and giving
suggestions to him regarding number of the allegations leveled against
her by him in his examination-in-chief goes to show that Suman had
‘admitted’ as correct the allegations of cruelty leveled against her by
Sanjay.
23. The aforesaid approach adopted by the Trial Judge is too narrow
and pedantic. It is true that the cross-examination of Sanjay by the
counsel acting for Suman is most unsatisfactory because with respect to
numerous incidents deposed to by Sanjay the counsel has not even
bothered to even suggest that the same are untrue. But, human relations
have not to be severed due to level of advocacy falling below acceptable
standards. In an adversarial litigation, which we follow in India, if a
Judge were to find that a counsel’s standard has not reached the desired
level and the litigation ceases to be adversarial, the Judge must step in.
We often use the phrase that a Judge is a match referee. We do not use
the phrase that the Judge is an umpire. Now, an umpire has a static
position as in the game of cricket. But a referee, as is to be found in a
game of football, runs up and down in the field keeping a hawk’s eye on
the football to ensure that nobody fouls. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 14 of 21
24. A closer look at the impugned judgment would reveal that the
learned Trial Judge had adopted different yardsticks while appreciating
the evidence led by the parties. In case of Sanjay, his sole testimony has
been held to be sufficient by the leaned Trial Judge on the ground that „to
seek a corroboration to a fact alleged by a spouse to a marriage
regarding the healthy or unhealthy character of their intimate relation
which belongs to the sacred and secrets precincts of marital life, and
which are known only to the spouses and which are not supposed to be
known to any other living soul on the surface of the planet, would amount
to shutting one‟s eye towards the facts of life and reality.‟ On the other
hand, an adverse inference has been drawn against Suman for not
examining her family members to disprove allegations leveled by Sanjay
that he was not treated properly by family members of Suman whenever
he went to her parental house. One of the allegations leveled by Suman
against Sanjay was that the family members of Sanjay used to misbehave
with her and instigate Sanjay to treat her with cruelty since they did not
approve of their marriage. The learned Judge has not drawn an adverse
inference against Sanjay who has likewise not produced his parents to
rebut the same.
25. As observed by us in the preceding paras, a pragmatic approach
and not a pedantic one is required while dealing with matrimonial
disputes. The Trial Judge has dealt with the evidence led by the parties in
a very superficial manner.
26. We take upon ourselves the task of examining the evidence led by
the parties in order to arrive at a just decision in the present case.
27. A careful analysis of the evidence led by the parties brings out the
following: Sanjay and Suman had a clandestine love affair because both FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 15 of 21
knew that their family members would be against their relationship. They
probably solemnized a secret marriage and two years thereafter on
February 26, 1999, with the blessings of Suman’s parents the two got
officially married, but without any approval from parents of Sanjay. For
about 2 years after their marriage, Sanjay and Suman stayed in a rented
accommodation. Thereafter they shifted to the parental house of Sanjay.
On June 15, 2002 Sanjay and Suman were blessed with a baby girl
Shriya. For the next 5 years Sanjay and Suman stayed at the parental
house of Sanjay, during which period they were blessed with another
baby girl, Harleen on February 10, 2006. In the year 2007 Sanjay and
Suman along with the two daughters shifted to a rented accommodation
and finally to a house purchased in Suman’s name by funds partly made
available by Sanjay and partly by Suman’s parents.
28. The city of Delhi is a costly place to live. Family budgeting and
especially when a child is born is becoming a herculean task even for the
financially well-off and even they come under financial stress and the
same burdens and causes stress on the matrimonial bond.
29. From the fact that Sanjay and Suman, as admitted by Suman
herself, got secretly married on March 22, 1997 without informing their
parents and for 2 years hid the marriage till when the two officially got
married on February 26, 1999; but only in presence of her parents, we
have sufficient proof that the marriage was a dowry-less marriage and
Sanjay’s parents never reconciled to their son marrying a girl not of their
choice. Thus, ex-facie, Suman’s allegations that her in-laws harassed her
for dowry from the inception of the marriage is incorrect. Admittedly, for
another three years the couple lived with a friend of Sanjay. They shifted
to the house of Sanjay’s father, where Sanjay’s parents resided in May, FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 16 of 21
2002 and the reason appears to be the fact that Suman was in the family
way. Shriya was born on June 15, 2002. It appears that by said time the
anger of Sanjay’s parents had vanished. The couple resided in the house
of Sanjay’s parents for a few years, and a second child was born, but it is
apparent that things were not moving in the right directions evidenced by
the fact that firstly the couple shifted to a residential accommodation and
then to a flat purchased in Suman’s name by finances provided partly by
Sanjay and partly by Suman’s mother. It is apparent that between the
young couple, they were managing well. But, two more lives meant two
more mouths to be fed and it appears that the economic pressures of
family budgeting started taking their toll. Whereas Suman is a housewife
and Sanjay works, and we are given to understand earns about `45,000/-
per month, Suman started suspecting Sanjay’s fidelity towards her. She
probably could not understand that in a workplace where even women
work, her husband was bound to be speaking to his female colleagues.
The young couple could not sort out their affairs and Suman was illadvised to lodge false complaints alleging dowry harassments not only by
Sanjay but even his father. We cannot overlook the fact that Sanjay had
contributed for a flat to be purchased in the name of Suman. The
pressure-cooker seems to have exploded in the year 2009. Sanjay had
deposed of Suman coming to his office and creating a scene. Complaints
have been made by Suman to the police contents whereof which she has
not been able to prove as true; and on the contrary from the admitted facts
noted above any reasonable person would draw the conclusion that the
complaints alleging dowry harassment from the inception not only by
Sanjay but even his parents are ex-facie false. Admittedly Sanjay’s
parents did not bless the couple when they officially got married on
February 26, 1999. If they were not present at the scene, where is the FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 17 of 21
question of they demanding dowry from the very inception of the
marriage. The fact that Sanjay and Suman resided with Sanjay’s friend
till the year 2002 is proof of the fact that both of them were persona-nongrata in the house of Sanjay’s parents. Thus, there would be no question
of a dowry demand being raised till said year. Admittedly, the two
shifted to the house of Sanjay’s parents when Suman was in the advanced
stage of pregnancy. Within less than 3 weeks of the couple shifting to the
house of Sanjay’s parents, they were blessed with a baby girl. They
shifted out of the house somewhere in the year 2007 and it is apparent
that things were not too well. The only probable reason which one can
fathom is that the dislike for Suman could not be bridged. But the fact
that Sanjay left the house of his parents is proof of the fact that he was
ready to stand by Suman. The young couple along with their two
daughters took a house on rent but probably found the rent to be a strain
on their finances. It appears that the usual matrimonial discord which we
find in a large number of houses in Delhi i.e. the difficulty faced to beat
the inflation and manage the family budget started taking its toll.
Suman’s parents stepped in to provide some finances and some were
provided by Sanjay to buy a flat in Suman’s name. The fact that the flat
was purchased in Suman’s name tells us that her parents were wanting to
secure their daughter when they provided part finances. But the fact that
even Sanjay provided part finances and still allowed the flat to be
purchased in Suman’s name evidences that he had no motive to extract
dowry. It was a desperate attempt of the young couple to not only
acquire a property but get rid of the liability to pay monthly rent. All this
budgeting must have taken a toll. Small skirmishes seems to have turned
into ugly spats finally ending up with Suman accusing her husband of
having developed illicit relations, probably for the reason Sanjay was FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 18 of 21
reaching home late; and as regards him, the probable reason could be: the
thought of returning to a comfortless home with a nagging wife waiting
resulting in his spirits being more often depressed than excited and
therefore the return to the house being late. The young couple appears to
have been caught in a vicious circle of cause and effect. Suman’s
nagging led Sanjay to return home late and Sanjay’s late returning to
home in turn triggering further nagging and thereby compelling Sanjay to
return home late and late and in turn the nagging becoming severe till it
reached the uncomfortable level for Sanjay to tolerate any further when
Suman started lodging false complaints with the police.
30. At this juncture, we note the decision of the Supreme Court
reported as 2013 III AD (SC) 458 K. Srinivas Rao v D.A. Deepa in which
decision, on the subject of making unfounded complaints to the police,
and the same being treated as constituting mental cruelty, the Supreme
Court observed as under :-
“14. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted
in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Making unfounded
indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his or
her relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing
notices or news items which may have adverse impact on the
business prospect or the job of the spouse and filing repeated
false complaints and cases in the court against the spouse
would, in the facts of a case, amount to causing mental cruelty
to the other spouse.
xxxxxxxx
22. We need to now see the effect of the above events. In our
opinion, the first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the
scurrilous, vulgar and defamatory statement made by the
respondent-wife in her complaint dated 4/10/1999 addressed to
the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection Cell. The
statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked her to
sleep with his father is bound to anger him. It is his case that FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 19 of 21
this humiliation of his parents caused great anguish to him. He
and his family were traumatized by the false and indecent
statement made in the complaint. His grievance appears to us
to be justified. This complaint is a part of the record. It is a part
of the pleadings. That this statement is false is evident from the
evidence of the mother of the respondent-wife, which we have
already quoted. This statement cannot be explained away by
stating that it was made because the respondent-wife was
anxious to go back to the appellant-husband. This is not the
way to win the husband back. It is well settled that such
statements cause mental cruelty. By sending this complaint the
respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellanthusband.
23. Pursuant to this complaint, the police registered a case
under Section 498-A of the IPC. The appellant-husband and his
parents had to apply for anticipatory bail, which was granted to
them. Later, the respondent-wife withdrew the complaint.
Pursuant to the withdrawal, the police filed a closure report.
Thereafter, the respondent-wife filed a protest petition. The
trial court took cognizance of the case against the appellanthusband and his parents (CC No. 62/2002). What is pertinent to
note is that the respondent-wife filed criminal appeal in the
High Court challenging the acquittal of the appellant-husband
and his parents of the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act
and also the acquittal of his parents of the offence punishable
under Section 498-A of the IPC. She filed criminal revision
seeking enhancement of the punishment awarded to the
appellant-husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the
IPC in the High Court which is still pending. When the criminal
appeal filed by the appellant-husband challenging his
conviction for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC was
allowed and he was acquitted, the respondent-wife filed
criminal appeal in the High Court challenging the said
acquittal. During this period respondent-wife and members of
her family have also filed complaints in the High Court
complaining about the appellant-husband so that he would be
removed from the job. The conduct of the respondent- wife in
filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and defamatory
allegation against her mother-in-law, in filing revision seeking
enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellanthusband, in filing appeal questioning the acquittal of the FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 20 of 21
appellant-husband and acquittal of his parents indicates that
she made all attempts to ensure that he and his parents are put
in jail and he is removed from his job. We have no manner of
doubt that this conduct has caused mental cruelty to the
appellant- husband.
24. In our opinion, the High Court wrongly held that because
the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did not stay
together there is no question of the parties causing cruelty to
each other. Staying together under the same roof is not a precondition for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty
by his or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under
the same roof. In a given case, while staying away, a spouse
can cause mental cruelty to the other spouse by sending vulgar
and defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints
containing indecent allegations or by initiating number of
judicial proceedings making the other spouse‟s life miserable.
This is what has happened in this case.
28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent-wife
has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellanthusband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
31. Applying the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Deepa’s case (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that by filing 
numerous false complaints against Sanjay and his family members with 
the police and in the office of Sanjay that Sanjay and his family members 
used to demand dowry from her and treated her with cruelty when she 
failed to fulfill their demands and that Sanjay was having an illicit 
relation with his colleague, Suman has caused ‘mental cruelty’ to Sanjay 
thereby entitling him to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
32. In view of above discussion, impugned judgment dated December
14, 2010 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Courts, Rohini, Delhi
granting decree of divorce in favor of Sanjay and dismissing application
for restitution of conjugal rights filed by Suman is affirmed.FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 21 of 21
33. Parties are left to bear their respective costs.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE
(V.KAMESWAR RAO)
JUDGE
MAY 23, 2013
mamta