tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-60260755235813697712024-03-13T13:24:23.941-07:00ARTICLES OF AN ADVOCATEadvocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comBlogger441125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-79660083238257429132021-04-12T19:36:00.001-07:002021-04-12T19:36:07.585-07:00<p> </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-cvtSl6QXp24/YHUDMBG9atI/AAAAAAAAVH4/zlKABaLSDRg66D5UELsF0EhnvtFSULUpwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="174" data-original-width="290" height="192" src="https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-cvtSl6QXp24/YHUDMBG9atI/AAAAAAAAVH4/zlKABaLSDRg66D5UELsF0EhnvtFSULUpwCLcBGAsYHQ/image.png" width="320" /></a></div><p><br /></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;">Wishing you all</span></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;">a happy & prosperous </span></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;">Plava nama UGADI new year </span></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;">God bless you all</span></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;">with great health & wealth & prosperity</span></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;"> with regards</span></p><p><span style="font-size: x-large;"> advocatemmmohan</span></p>advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-17110373166101408452013-09-01T17:48:00.000-07:002016-05-18T08:54:35.270-07:00M. Padmanabhacharlu - Great Father<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<img alt="" data-mce-src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_A7bMVSOPoMA/TNI1k3bmwxI/AAAAAAAAABY/agBJlM4F_lY/s320/Image0237.jpg" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/_A7bMVSOPoMA/TNI1k3bmwxI/AAAAAAAAABY/agBJlM4F_lY/s320/Image0237.jpg" style="border: 0px; cursor: default; margin: 0px; max-width: 645px;" /></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong>Passing Night </strong></em><em style="border: none; font-size: 12.8px; line-height: 14.4px;"><strong> released</strong></em><em style="border: none; font-size: 12.8px; line-height: 14.4px;"><strong> </strong></em><em style="border: none; font-size: 12.8px; line-height: 14.4px;"><strong>the life from <a class="zem_slink" data-mce-href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Comet" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Comet" rel="wikipedia" style="color: #cd4517;" target="_blank" title="Great Comet">Great</a> Journey of 85 years </strong></em></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong>My Father's soul rest in Great Peace </strong></em></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong>Great Personality stands for his words and Deeds - Great Father </strong></em></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong>My father left behind him adorable Works & adoptable Life Style</strong></em></div>
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<li><em style="border: none;"><strong>Work till last breathe ;</strong></em></li>
<li><em style="border: none;"><strong>Never be burden for yourself ;</strong></em></li>
<li><em style="border: none;"><strong>Save your health & life with clean habits ;</strong></em></li>
<li><em style="border: none;"><strong>Extend your Love & Affection to the needy with out expectations ;</strong></em></li>
</ul>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong>His life time Achievement as Organizing Secretary - </strong></em><br />
<em style="border: none;"><strong>"Sri <a class="zem_slink" data-mce-href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shivaji" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shivaji" rel="wikipedia" style="color: #cd4517;" target="_blank" title="Shivaji">Shivaji</a> Spurthy Kendram " <a class="zem_slink" data-mce-href="http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=16.074,78.868&spn=0.1,0.1&q=16.074,78.868 (Srisailam)&t=h" href="http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=16.074,78.868&spn=0.1,0.1&q=16.074,78.868%20(Srisailam)&t=h" rel="geolocation" style="color: #cd4517;" target="_blank" title="Srisailam">Srisailam</a> <a data-mce-href="http://shivajikendra.wordpress.com/" href="http://shivajikendra.wordpress.com/" style="color: #cd4517;">http://shivajikendra.wordpress.com/</a></strong></em></div>
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<img alt="" data-mce-src="http://shivajikendra.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/6x4-1c2528122529.jpg?w=320&h=212&h=212" src="http://shivajikendra.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/6x4-1c2528122529.jpg?w=320&h=212&h=212" style="border: 0px; cursor: default; margin: 0px; max-width: 645px;" /><br />
<em style="border: none;"><strong>God is great " may his <a class="zem_slink" data-mce-href="http://www.collectivesoul.com/" href="http://www.collectivesoul.com/" rel="homepage" style="color: #cd4517;" target="_blank" title="Collective Soul">Soul</a> rest in GREAT PEACE "</strong></em></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong> With regards</strong></em></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong> yours</strong></em></div>
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<em style="border: none;"><strong> Advocatemmmohan</strong></em></div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-9016329408262904182013-08-07T00:14:00.001-07:002013-08-07T00:14:44.845-07:00 My views on sec. 53 of Insolvency Act = whether the court can directly annul the sale deed while adjudging debtor as insolvent or after adjudging insolvent only, a petition under sec. 53 is maintainable for annuling the sale deed ?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-size: large;"><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">“</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">53. Avoidance of voluntary transfer</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">:-- </span></u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: red;">Any transfer of property </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: #660000;">not being a transfer made before and in consideration of marriage or </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: #660000;">made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: red;">shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on a petition presented within two years after the date of the transfer, be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the Court.”</span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: red;"><br /></span></i></b></span>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">“<b>6. Acts of insolvency</b>:-- (1) A debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following cases, namely:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">(a) If, in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region></st1:place> or elsewhere, he makes a transfer of all or substantially all his property to a third person for the benefit of his creditors generally;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">(b) If, in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region></st1:place> or elsewhere, he makes a transfer of his property or of any part thereof, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">(c) If in <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">India</st1:country-region></st1:place> or elsewhere, he makes any transfer of his property or of any part thereof, which would, under this or any other enactment for the time being in force, be void as a fraudulent preference if he were adjudged an insolvent.”</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">“<b>7. Petition and adjudication</b>:-- Subject to the conditions specified in this Act, if a debtor commits an act of insolvency, an insolvency petition may be presented either by a creditor or by the debtor, and the Court may on such petition make an order (hereinafter called an order of adjudication) adjudging him as insolvent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">Explanation:--The presentation of a petition by the debtor shall be deemed an act of insolvency within the meaning of this section, and on such petition the Court may make an order of adjudication.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">“<b>9. Conditions on which creditor may petition</b>:--<br /><b><i><span style="color: red;">(1) A creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor unless,--</span></i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">(a) the debt owing by the debtor to the creditor, or, if two or more creditors join in the petition, the aggregate amount of debts owing to such creditors, amounts to five hundred rupees; and<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;"><b><i><span style="color: red;">(b) the debt is a liquidated sum payable either immediately or at some certain future time, and</span></i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">(c) the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;">Provided that where the said period of three months referred to in Clause (c) expires on a day when the Court is closed, the insolvency petition may be presented on the day on which the Court re-open.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 20px;"> (2) if the petitioning creditor is a secured creditor, he shall in his petition either state that he is willing to relinquish his security for the benefit of the creditors in the even of the debtor being adjudged insolvent, or give an estimate of the value of the security. In the latter case, he may be admitted as a petitioning creditor to the extent of the balance of the debt due to him after deducting the value so estimated in the same way as if he were an unsecured creditor.”</span><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;"> </span></div>
<span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>whether the court can directly annul the sale deed while adjudging debtor as insolvent </u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>or </u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>after adjudging insolvent only, a petition under sec. 53 is maintainable for annuling the sale deed and as court has no power to annul directly?</u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><b><i><u><br /></u></i></b></span>
<span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">the words employed in sec. 53 is to be taken into consideration.</span><br />
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-size: large;"><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><br /></span></u></i></b></span>
<span style="color: #cc0000; font-size: large;"><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">“</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">53. Avoidance of voluntary transfer</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;">:-- </span></u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: red;">Any transfer of property </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: #660000;">not being a transfer made before and in consideration of marriage or </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: #660000;">made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: red;">shall, </span></i></b></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red; font-size: large;">if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on a petition </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red; font-size: large;">presented within two years after the date of the </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red; font-size: large;">transfer, </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 13.600000381469727px; line-height: 20px; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="color: red;">be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the Court.”</span></i></b></span><br />
<i style="font-size: x-large;">any transfer of property</i><br />
<b><i><u>one is </u></i></b>= ---if transferor is adjudged insolvent on petition [under sec. 7 to 9 on the grounds of sec.6 (b)]<br />
<b><i><u>another is </u></i></b> = if transferor is adjudged insolvent ......<br />
on petition presented with in 2 years after the date of the transfer , ---<br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><i>shall be voidable as against the receiver and may be annulled by the court.</i></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><b><i><u><span style="color: red;">Doubts lingering in mind </span></u></i></b>:- </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">1. whether it is </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">"if the transferor is adjudged insolvent on petition under sec.7 etc.,"</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">Or </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">"after the transferor adjudged as insolvent "</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">2. "on a petition under sec. 53 - with in two years after the date of sale"..... </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">for example </span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">if the I.P. Proceedings takes time more than two years for adjudicating him as insolvent on the ground of sec. 6 (b). </span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">How this petition under sec. 53 is maintainable after two years of the sale date as per former version.</span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: red; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">My view =</span><span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"> </span><br />
<span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">with great respects to the decisions of various High courts, </span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><span style="color: #351c75;">i am of the view that the words employed clearly shows that if the transferor is adjudged as insolvent on a petition filed by the creditor under sec. 6 (b) (c) , </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><span style="color: #351c75;">automatically all transfers of properties except exempted , </span><b><i><u><span style="color: red;">made with in 2 years of the insolvency petition</span></u></i></b><span style="color: #351c75;"> , shall be voidable against the receiver and may be annulled by the court simultaneously. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><span style="color: #351c75;">No separate petition is necessary. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><span style="color: red;"><u>if separate petition is necessary</u></span><span style="color: #351c75;"> </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><span style="color: #351c75;">and if it is to filed only after adjudication of insolvency petition as insolvent, </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;"><span style="color: #351c75;">the time clause with in two years comes in to play and </span></span><span style="color: #351c75; font-family: Verdana; font-size: large;">no court at any time can not annul the sale as void because no court dispose the insolvency petition with in two years .</span></div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-23143995976292210492013-05-30T05:45:00.002-07:002013-05-30T05:45:32.656-07:00Order 38 Rule 5 of C.P.C.-Order 21 Rule 46A and 46C Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, =This application under Order XIV Rule 8 of O.S. Rules read with Sec.9(ii)(a),(b) (c) & (e) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the applicant, for issuance of prohibitory order restraining the Garnishees from making the payment upto a limit of Rs.2,73,11,000/- (Rupees two crores seventy three lakhs and eleven thousand only) and consequently, direct the Garnishees to deposit the amount so withheld into this Court, pending enforcement of the award that may ultimately be passed by the sole Arbitrator =The provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A and 46C cannot apply to proceeding under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as underlying principle of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C can be invoked after passing the decree, as the words used are judgment debtor and not debtor or parties. = Even on the admitted facts pleaded in this case, it can safely be said that this application is nothing but misuse of process of Court, as application framed under Sec.9 of the Act, is not competent in this Court for want of jurisdiction and for the reason that order against Garnishee can be passed to execute a decree. " The argument that the power under Section 9 of the Act is independent of the Specific Relief Act or that the restrictions placed by the Specific Relief Act cannot control the exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act cannot prima facie be accepted. The reliance placed on Firm Ashok Traders & Anr. Vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja & Ors. [(2004) 3 S.C.C. 155] in that behalf does not also help much, since this Court in that case did not answer that question finally but prima facie felt that the objection based on Section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act may not stand in the way of a party to an arbitration agreement moving the court under Section 9 of the Act. The power under Section 9 is conferred on the District Court. No special procedure is prescribed by the Act in that behalf. It is also clarified that the Court entertaining an application under Section 9 of the Act shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it. Prima facie, it appears that the general rules that governed the court while considering the grant of an interim injunction at the threshold are attracted even while dealing with an application under Section 9 of the Act. There is also the principle that when a power is conferred under a special statute and it is conferred on an ordinary court of the land, without laying down any special condition for exercise of that power, the general rules of procedure of that court would apply. The Act does not prima facie purport to keep out the provisions of the Specific Relief Act from consideration. No doubt, a view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by the Specific Relief Act has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by Order XVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a view taken by the High Court of Bombay. But, how far these decisions are correct, requires to be considered in an appropriate case. Suffice it to say that on the basis of the submissions made in this case, we are not inclined to answer that question finally. But, we may indicate that we are prima facie inclined to the view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act must be based on well recognized principles governing the grant of interim injunctions and other orders of interim protection or the appointment of a receiver."<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS<br />
<br />
DATED: 01/04/2013<br />
<br />
CORAM<br />
<br />
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE VINOD K.SHARMA<br />
<br />
A.No.5314 of 2012<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
M/S. L & T FINANCE LIMITED <br />
REP BY ITS ASST MANAGER<br />
MR C BALASUBRAMANIAN<br />
<br />
vs<br />
<br />
C.T. RAMANATHAN INFRASTRUCTURE PVT LTD<br />
FLAT NO.4/3<br />
II FLOOR SK ENCLAVE 47<br />
NEW NO.4 SNOWROJI ROAD<br />
CHETPET<br />
CHENNAI 31<br />
<br />
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER <br />
SOUTHERN RAILWAYS<br />
ERNAKULAM<br />
<br />
GENERAL MANAGER (ACCOUNTS) <br />
SOUTHERN RAILWAYS CONTRACT<br />
CHENNAI 3<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
ORDER<br />
<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><span style="color: blue;"><b>This application under Order XIV Rule 8 of O.S. Rules read with Sec.9(ii)(a),(b) (c) & (e) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the applicant, for issuance of prohibitory order restraining the Garnishees from making the payment upto a limit of Rs.2,73,11,000/- (Rupees two crores seventy three lakhs and eleven thousand only) and consequently, direct the Garnishees to deposit the amount so withheld into this Court, pending enforcement of the award that may ultimately be passed by the sole Arbitrator.</b></span><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>2 The applicant is a non Banking Finance Company having its registered office at Mumbai with branches all over India. In the course of its business, the applicant advanced unsecured loan for its working capital requirements of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crores only) which was repayable in 24 monthly instalments, together with interest @ 9.04% p.a. <br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>3 <i> It is pleaded that the respondent was irregular in making payment of instalments and committed default from third instalment which fell due on 5.5.2012. In exercise of powers conferred under the agreement, the agreement was terminated, and notice was issued to recall the amount. Notice was also issued to the guarantor. In reply to notice it was stated that amount is recoverable from Garnishee, therefore, the respondent was unable to pay the amount.</i><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>4 The case of the applicant, is that on the date of filing this application, a sum of Rs.2,73,11,000/- (Rupees two crores seventy three lakhs and eleven thousand only) was due along with future interest @ 36% p.a. <i>The agreement also contains arbitration clause. In the notice, it was stated that in the event of failure to pay the amount, one Mr.Bharat B.Jain shall be appointed as Arbitrator. On the pleadings referred to above, this application has been filed.</i><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>5 <i>Reading of provisions of C.P.C. shows, that the order of Garnishee can be passed in case of recovery from the judgment debtor meaning thereby that the provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C are applicable only after passing of decree.</i> <br />
<i><span style="color: blue;">Furnishing of security pending arbitral proceedings therefore will be governed by underlying principle of Order 38 Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure. </span></i><br />
<i><span style="color: #990000;"><b>It is only in rarest of rare cases that provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C can be invoked pending arbitral proceedings, and not in a routine manner. </b></span></i><br />
<i><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The reason being that the relationship of Garnishee with the debtor or creditor is not governed by arbitration clause between the parties to the dispute. </b></span></i><br />
<i>In case of any dispute with regard to claim, the Garnishee cannot approach the Arbitrator for want of arbitration agreement. </i><br />
<i>Though under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it is open to the Court to pass interim order against a party who is not a party to arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings, but it can be with regard to subject matter of arbitration and not otherwise. </i><br />
<b>The Court can pass order against third party in exceptional cases in the interest of justice to protect the property from being transferred or becoming vested with third party illegally. </b><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>6 <b><i><u>The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Firm Ashok Traders vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja (A.I.R. 2004 SC 1433) </u></i></b>was pleased to lay down that<br />
<i><b><span style="color: #990000;">since remedy under section 9 flows from arbitration agreement, a third party who is not a party to the arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings, cannot seek any relief in this section, nor he can be pleaded as party in any application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, it is in the rarest of rare case, that the relief against Garnishee would be competent under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and not otherwise. It is also well settled law that unsecured loan cannot be converted into a secured loan, by invoking Order 38 Rule 5 of C.P.C.</span></b></i><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>6 Furthermore, in the agreement executed between the parties, stipulated as under:<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><i><b>"<span style="color: #cc0000;">This agreement shall be governed and construed in all respects with the Indian laws, and the parties hereto agree that any matter or issue arising hereunder or any dispute hereunder shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at Mumbai."</span></b></i><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>7 <i><b>In view of the agreement between the parties the exclusive jurisdiction vests with Courts at Mumbai, therefore, this application is not maintainable in this Court. It is settled law that parties by consent cannot give jurisdiction to a Court which does not have jurisdiction, but can restrict jurisdiction to particular Court if more than one Court has jurisdiction. In this case, exclusive jurisdiction vests with Mumbai Courts.</b></i><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>8 The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court <b><i><u>in Garlapati Ramanaiah Naidu and another vs. L & T Finance Ltd. (2012(5) CTC 172) </u></i></b>to contend that this Court also has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present application. The Hon'ble Division Bench in this case was pleased to lay down that:<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><i><b><span style="color: blue;">"40 The execution of the Loan-cum-Hypothecation Agreement and the Deeds of Guarantee is not in serious dispute. As per Clause 19, no exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the Courts of the State of Mumbai and it has been clearly indicated in the said clause that the Non-Exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Mumbai shall not, however, limit the rights of the lender (Respondent herein) to take appropriate proceedings in any other Court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the respondent has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court and filed the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.</span></b></i><br />
<i><b><span style="color: blue;"><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>41 It is also pertinent to point out at this juncture that the Deeds of Guarantee were executed at Chennai and one of the clauses of the Letter of Guarantee also states that nothing contianed in Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, shall in any way, affect the right of any of or preclude the parties to/from seek/seeking such interim relief/s in any Court of competent jurisdiction, including the interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and Rules framed thereunder.</span></b></i><br />
<i><b><span style="color: blue;"><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>42 Clause (e) of the letter of guarantee also reads that the venue of Arbitration shall be Mumbai or such other place as the lender may in the sole discretion determine and the Courts in Mumbai or such other place shall have exclusive jurisdiction."</span></b></i><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>9 <span style="color: #cc0000;">The contention on the face of it is misconceived. The Hon'ble Division Bench rejected the objection to the jurisdiction, firstly on the ground that it was not open to the appellant to raise plea of territorial jurisdiction first time in appeal. Secondly that, the parties had not given exclusive jurisdiction to the Mumbai Courts alone.</span><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>10 But in the case in hand, exclusive jurisdiction is given to Mumbai Courts.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>11 It may also noticed that Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, cannot be used to convert this Court into Recovery Agents to pass an order against Garnishee, even before serving notice. <br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>12 <b><i>The provisions of Order 21 Rule 46A and 46C cannot apply to proceeding under Sec.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as underlying principle of Order 21 Rule 46A to 46C can be invoked after passing the decree, as the words used are judgment debtor and not debtor or parties. </i></b> The security or attachment pending proceedings are governed by provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 of C.P.C.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>13 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in <b><i><u>Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. vs. Kalinga Mining Corporation and others ((2007)6 SCC 798) </u></i></b>was pleased to lay down as under:<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><span style="color: #990000;">"15. The argument that the power under Section 9 of the Act is independent of the Specific Relief Act or that the restrictions placed by the Specific Relief Act cannot control the exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act cannot prima facie be accepted. </span><br />
<b><i><u>The reliance placed on Firm Ashok Traders & Anr. Vs. Gurumukh Das Saluja & Ors. [(2004) 3 S.C.C. 155]</u></i></b><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">in that behalf does not also help much, </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">since this Court in that case did not answer that question finally </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">but prima facie felt that the objection based on Section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act may not stand in the way of a party to an arbitration agreement moving the court under Section 9 of the Act. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">The power under Section 9 is conferred on the District Court. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">No special procedure is prescribed by the Act in that behalf. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">It is also clarified that the Court entertaining an application under Section 9 of the Act shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: #990000;"><b><i>Prima facie, it appears that the general rules that governed the court while considering the grant of an interim injunction at the threshold are attracted even while dealing with an application under Section 9 of the Act. </i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;">There is also the principle that when a power is conferred under a special statute and it is conferred on an ordinary court of the land, without laying down any special condition for exercise of that power, the general rules of procedure of that court would apply. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;"><b><i>The Act does not prima facie purport to keep out the provisions of the Specific Relief Act from consideration</i></b>. </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">No doubt, a view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by the Specific Relief Act has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The power under Section 9 of the Act is not controlled by Order XVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a view taken by the High Court of Bombay. But, how far these decisions are correct, requires to be considered in an appropriate case. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: #990000;">Suffice it to say that on the basis of the submissions made in this case, we are not inclined to answer that question finally. </span><br />
<span style="color: #990000;"><b><i><u>But, we may indicate that we are prima facie inclined to the view that exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act must be based on well recognized principles governing the grant of interim injunctions and other orders of interim protection or the appointment of a receiver."</u></i></b></span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>14 <span style="color: blue;"><i><b>Even on the admitted facts pleaded in this case, </b></i></span><br />
<span style="color: blue;"><i><b>it can safely be said that this application is nothing but misuse of process of Court, </b></i></span><br />
<span style="color: blue;"><i><b>as application framed under Sec.9 of the Act, is not competent in this Court for want of jurisdiction and for the reason that order against Garnishee can be passed to execute a decree.</b></i></span><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>No merit, dismissed with costs, which are assessed at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only).<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
vaan<br />
<br /></div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-5276418007667921012013-05-30T05:02:00.000-07:002013-05-30T05:02:01.552-07:00Order 14 Rule 2 r/w. Section 151 C.P.C., and Section 12(2) of the Court Fees Act with a prayer to decide the court fees as a preliminary issue. The contention in the affidavit is that the suit property is a house site and the property ought to have been valued not on the basis of the tax assessment, but on the basis of market value.= It is not enough for the revision petitioner to contend that the worth of the property is in crores without showing how the properties can be construed as house site, when the chitta and patta has been filed to show that the suit properties are ryotwari lands. Hence, the order passed by the trial Court did not suffer from illegality or irregularity and therefore, the civil revision petition is dismissed.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT<br />
<br />
DATED: 08/05/2013<br />
<br />
CORAM<br />
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE S.VIMALA<br />
<br />
C.R.P.(PD) MD.No.924 of 2012<br />
AND<br />
M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012<br />
<br />
1.Syed Ahamed Kabir<br />
2.Ms.Mohamed Seeni Fathima<br />
3.Ms.Mohamed Mariam Beevi<br />
4.Md.Syed Saheera Hasana<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>. Petitioners/Defendants<br />
<br />
Vs<br />
<br />
Naina Mohamed Sahib<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> ... Respondent/Plaintiff<br />
<br />
PRAYER<br />
<br />
Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution<br />
of India, to call for the records relating to the fair and decretal order dated<br />
13.02.2012 passed in I.A.No.13 of 2011 in O.S.No.137 of 2010 on the file of<br />
District Munsif Court, Ramanathapuram, and set aside the same.<br />
<br />
!For Petitioners ..<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Mr.R.Sundar Srinivasan<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>for M/s.AL.Ganthimathi<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
^For Respondent <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> ..<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Mr.S.Ramesh<br />
<br />
<br />
:ORDER<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.137 of 2010 seeking the<br />
relief of declaration and injunction.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>2. The defendants filed I.A.No.13 of 2011 under <b><i><span style="color: red;">Order 14 Rule 2 r/w.</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">Section 151 C.P.C., and Section 12(2) of the Court Fees Act with a prayer to</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">decide the court fees as a preliminary issue. The contention in the affidavit</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">is that the suit property is a house site and the property ought to have been</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">valued not on the basis of the tax assessment, but on the basis of market value.</span></i></b><br />
This petition was dismissed and as against which, the present revision petition<br />
has been filed.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that<br />
the trial Court did not frame proper issues for consideration and without<br />
affording sufficient opportunity has decided the issue. This contention does<br />
not appear to be correct.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>4. A perusal of the order passed by the trial Court would reveal<br />
that the trial Court has taken note of the following facts:-<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><span style="color: red;"><b>a) It is nowhere contended by the defendants that the suit</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b>properties are not ryotwari lands.</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>b) Just because the suit properties are located in and around</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b>the residential area, it will not lead with the conclusion that the suit</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b>properties would also be used as a house site and that the property ought to</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b>have been valued as a house site.</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>c) No document has been filed by the defendants to show that</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b>the suit properties are house sites, when the plaintiffs have raised a specific</b></span><br />
<span style="color: red;"><b>contention that the suit properties are ryotwari lands.</b></span><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>5. Based on these reasoning, the trial Court has come to the<br />
conclusion that the valuation of the property and the consequent Court fee paid<br />
is also correct.<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>6. <b><i><span style="color: red;">It is not enough for the revision petitioner to contend that the</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">worth of the property is in crores without showing how the properties can be</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">construed as house site, when the chitta and patta has been filed to show that</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">the suit properties are ryotwari lands. Hence, the order passed by the trial</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">Court did not suffer from illegality or irregularity and therefore, the civil</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">revision petition is dismissed.</span></i></b><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>7. After this case was heard on merits, the issue regarding<br />
maintainability of revision in respect of matters governing petitions under<br />
Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C., was raised in C.R.P.(MD)Nos.1085 to 1088 of 2005 and<br />
1068 of 2006 wherein it has been decided that Revision Petition is not<br />
maintainable. The learned counsel appearing on both sides agreed that the<br />
decision taken in those cases would be applicable to this case also. Therefore,<br />
on the question of maintainability also, this Civil Revision Petition is<br />
dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.<br />
No costs.<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
smn2<br />
<br />
To<br />
<br />
The District Munsif Court,<br />
Ramanathapuram. </div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-64122356255849041392013-05-28T07:46:00.001-07:002013-05-28T07:46:17.639-07:00issue the passport by using the name of the step father S.Ravisankar in the passport.= writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to receive the passport application of the petitioner viz., R.Gayathirir daughter of Padmini S.Ravisankar and process of the application and issue the passport by using the name of the step father S.Ravisankar in the passport.- the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application on online in view of the fact that the petitioner's birth certificate reflect the name of the biological father as M.Rangarajan, but the school records reflect the name of the step father viz., S.Ravishankar. Since the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application through E.Mail, she met officials of the respondent office on 06.05.2013. The said officials informed the petitioner's mother that unless they get a direction from this Court to use the name of the step father in the passport, it will not be possible for them to issue passport to the petitioner, because the name of the father differs in school records from that of the birth certificate. -This Court taking note of the fact that the petitioner's educational prospect should not be affected and also that the petitioner is to furnish the passport number within 27.05.2013, so as to enable her to admit in the course in Astro Physics in National University of Singapore, on the basis of fair play, equity and even as a matter of prudence, direct the respondent/Regional Passport Officer, Chenai to receive the passport application of the petitioner and process the said application and to proceed further in regard to the issuance of passport by using the name of step father viz., S.Ravishankar in the passport, in the manner known to law and in accordance with law. Further the said exercise is to be done within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS<br />
<br />
Dated: 16.05.2013<br />
<br />
Coram:<br />
<br />
The Honourable Mr.Justice M.VENUGOPAL<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> <br />
W.P.No.14182 of 2013<br />
and<br />
M.P.No.1 of 2013<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
R.Gayathiri<br />
Minor<br />
Rep. By mother and natural guardian<br />
Padminisi S.Ravisankar<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>.. Petitioner<br />
<br />
.vs.<br />
<br />
The Regional Passport Officer<br />
The Regional Passport Office<br />
Mount Road, Chennai<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>.. Respondent<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a <span style="color: #274e13;"><b><i>writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to receive the passport application of the petitioner viz., R.Gayathirir daughter of Padmini S.Ravisankar and process of the application and issue the passport by using the name of the step father S.Ravisankar in the passport.</i></b></span><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>For Petitioner <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>: <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Mr.R.Raman Laal<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>For respondent <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>: <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Mr.C.Kanagaraj<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Standing counsel<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
O R D E R<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Heard Mr.R.Raman Laal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.C.Kanagaraj, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner's mother's first husband name is M.Rangarajan and the said marriage was performed on 22.05.1983 at Chennai. Later, due to divergence of opinion, the petitioner's mother along with her husband filed H.M.O.P.No.134 of 2000 on the file of the learned III Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai and on 18.04.2001, a decree of divorce was passed in the aforesaid matrimonial proceedings. The custody of the petitioner was given to the wife i.e., Padmini. <b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">It is not in dispute that the petitioner was born to her mother (Padmini) and her erstwhile husband viz., M.Rengarajan. It comes to be known that after divorce being granted in H.M.O.P.No.134 of 2000 by the trial court on 18.04.2001, the petitioner's mother got remarried and her husband's name is S.Ravishankar. At the time of admission of petitioner's daughter in school, the step father's name was given and all school records unerringly point out the name of the father or guardian viz., S.Ravishankar. </span></i></b><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>3. According to the petitioner's mother, her daughter viz., the petitioner herein completed +2 at DAV Girls Senior Secondary School at Chennai. The school is having an arrangement with National University of Singapore to select meritorious student for placement at National University of Singapore. The staff of National University of Singapore came to the school of petitioner and conducted an interview of meritorious students and analysed the grade obtained in the 10th Standard and provisionally selected the petitioner to admit in a course in Astro Physics in National University of Singapore. The National University of Singapore will issue admission slip only on production of passport number.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>4. The learned counsel for the petitioner urges before this Court that<b><i><span style="color: blue;"> the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application on online in view of the fact that the petitioner's birth certificate reflect the name of the biological father as M.Rangarajan, but the school records reflect the name of the step father viz., S.Ravishankar. Since the petitioner's mother was not successful in registering the application through E.Mail, she met officials of the respondent office on 06.05.2013. The said officials informed the petitioner's mother that unless they get a direction from this Court to use the name of the step father in the passport, it will not be possible for them to issue passport to the petitioner, because the name of the father differs in school records from that of the birth certificate. </span></i></b><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>5. The petitioner has to furnish the passport number within 27.05.2013. Therefore, there is very much urgency in moving this Court during vacation. If the passport number is not furnished, the petitioner's selection will be cancelled, which will affect her future educational career.<br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>6. <b><i><span style="color: red; font-size: large;">This Court taking note of the fact that the petitioner's educational prospect should not be affected and also that the petitioner is to furnish the passport number within 27.05.2013, so as to enable her to admit in the course in Astro Physics in National University of Singapore, on the basis of fair play, equity and even as a matter of prudence, direct the respondent/Regional Passport Officer, Chenai to receive the passport application of the petitioner and process the said application and to proceed further in regard to the issuance of passport </span><span style="color: red; font-size: x-large;">by using the name of step father viz., S.Ravishankar in the passport, in the manner known to law and in accordance with law.</span><span style="color: red; font-size: large;"> Further the said exercise is to be done within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. </span></i></b><br />
<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span>7. The writ petition is disposed of with the above direction. No costs. Consequently, connected MP is closed.<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
nvsri<br />
<br />
To<br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
The Regional Passport Officer<br />
The Regional Passport Office<br />
Mount Road<br />
Chennai<br />
<br /></div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-46394666280037000942013-05-28T01:47:00.000-07:002013-05-28T01:47:04.666-07:00it is well settled that only the reasons recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings u/s 147 of the Act are to be looked at or examined for sustaining or setting aside a notice issued u/s 148 of the Act. The reasons are required to be read as they were recorded by the AO. No substitution or deletion is permissible. No addition can be made to those reasons. Therefore, the details of entries or amount mentioned in the assessment order and in respect of which ultimate addition has been made by the AO, cannot be made a basis to say that the reasons recorded by the AO were with reference to those amounts mentioned in the assessment order. The reasons recorded by the AO are totally silent with regard to the amount and nature of bogus entries and transactions and the persons with whom the transactions had taken place. In this respect, we may rely upon the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictionalITA 608-609/2012 Page 9 of 9 Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Atul Jain (2000) 299 ITR 383, in which case the information relied upon by the AO for initiating proceedings u/s 147 of the Act did indicate the source of the capital gain and nobody knew which shares were transacted and with whom the transaction has taken place and in that case there were absolutely no details available and the information supplied was extremely scanty and vague and in that light of those facts, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional Delhi High Court held that initiation of proceedings u/s 147 of the Act by the AO was not valid and justified in the eyes of law. The recent decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court of Delhi in the case of Signature Hotels (P) Ltd. (supra) also supports the view we have taken above.” 9. We do not see any reason to differ with the view expressed by the Tribunal. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
ITA 608-609/2012 Page 1 of 9<br />
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI<br />
% Judgment delivered on: 20.05.2013<br />
+ ITA 608/2012<br />
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - IV ... Appellant<br />
versus<br />
M/s INSECTICIDES (INDIA) LTD. ... Respondent<br />
+ ITA 609/2012<br />
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - IV ... Appellant<br />
versus<br />
M/s INSECTICIDES (INDIA) LTD. ... Respondent<br />
Advocates who appeared in this case:<br />
For the Appellant : Mr N. P. Sahni with Mr Ruchesh Sinha<br />
For the Respondent : Mr K.V.S Gupta<br />
CORAM:-<br />
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED<br />
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU<br />
JUDGMENT<br />
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)<br />
1. These appeals by the revenue are directed against the order dated<br />
12.10.2011 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in<br />
ITA Nos. 2332-2333/Del/2010 relating to the assessment years 2002-03ITA 608-609/2012 Page 2 of 9<br />
and 2003-04 (respectively).<br />
In both these appeals the issue relates to the<br />
<u><i><b><span style="color: red;">validity of the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 of the Income</span></b></i></u><br />
<u><i><b><span style="color: red;">- tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”).</span></b></i></u><br />
2. Insofar as assessment year 2002-03 is concerned, the original<br />
assessment under Section 143(3) of the said Act was completed on<br />
29.11.2004. The notices under Section 148 were issued on 21.09.2006.<br />
As regards, assessment year 2003-04, there was no assessment under<br />
Section 143(3) of the said Act, however, an intimation under Section<br />
143(1) thereof had been issued. The notice under Section 148 seeking to<br />
re-open the assessment was issued on 17.10.2006.<br />
3. The reasons indicated behind the re-opening of the assessments<br />
were identical in both the cases. We are setting out below the reasons<br />
given in respect of the assessment year 2002-03. They are as under:-<br />
“It has been informed by the Director of Income-tax<br />
(Inv.), New Delhi vide letter dated 16.6.2006 that the<br />
above named company was involved in giving and taking<br />
bogus entries/transactions during the F.Y. 2001-02.<br />
From the information gathered by the DIT(Inv.)-1,<br />
New Delhi that the assessee was involved in giving and<br />
taking accommodation entries only and represented<br />
unsecured money of the assessee company is actually<br />
unexplained income of the assessee company. The assessee<br />
company has failed to disclose fully and truly all theITA 608-609/2012 Page 3 of 9<br />
material facts and source of these funds routed through<br />
bank accounts of the assessee company. I, therefore have<br />
reasons to believe that the income has escaped assessment<br />
within the meaning of section 147 of the I.T. Act, 1961 for<br />
the asstt. Year referred above.<br />
Hence notice u/s 148 is issued.”<br />
The respondent / assessee had filed objections against the said notices<br />
under Section 148 of the said Act. However, without disposing of those<br />
objections by reasoned order, the Assessing Officer framed reassessment<br />
orders on 15.10.2007 in respect of both the years. By virtue of the<br />
reassessment orders, the Assessing Officer made an addition of ` 30 lakhs<br />
in respect of the assessment year 2002-03 and an addition of ` 35 lakhs in<br />
respect of the assessment year 2003-04. Essentially, the Assessing<br />
Officer held that the said sums of money represented income of the<br />
assessee from undisclosed sources which had been shown as share<br />
application money. In other words, the Assessing Officer held the said<br />
sums to be bogus entries.<br />
4. Being aggrieved by the said orders passed by the Assessing<br />
Officer, the respondent / assessee preferred appeals. Those appeals were<br />
allowed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) by a common<br />
order dated 06.01.2011. Insofar as the assessment year 2002-03 was<br />
concerned, the CIT (Appeals) held that the reassessment proceedings<br />
were bad inasmuch as it amounted to a mere change of opinion. The<br />
findings of the CIT (Appeals) to this effect were as under:-ITA 608-609/2012 Page 4 of 9<br />
“The submissions made on behalf of the appellant<br />
company and reasons recorded by the Ld AO have been<br />
carefully perused. On consideration, I find that the issue<br />
of share capital and share application money has come up<br />
in the regular assessment proceedings and the appellant<br />
company, vide its letter dated 09.11.2004, had submitted<br />
detailed written reply along with necessary details of<br />
share capital, share holding pattern and confirmation of<br />
the persons contributing to share capital along with proof<br />
of filing of their income tax return, PAN nos.<br />
Ward/Circle/Range etc. Further, this fact was again<br />
brought to the notice of Ld AO, vide appellant’s letter<br />
dated 28.08.2007, while filing the objections to the<br />
reopening the assessment for the assessment year under<br />
consideration. On a perusal of the said letter it is seen<br />
that not only the issue was examined by the AO but also<br />
the claim of the appellant company was accepted in the<br />
original assessment. In this factual position, it cannot be<br />
held that the issue of share capital of ` 30 lacs was not<br />
examined and decided by the Ld AO at the time of the<br />
regular assessment. I also find myself in agreement with<br />
the Ld counsel that no fresh material, let alone tangible<br />
material, has come to his possession so as to<br />
empower/enable the AO to take recourse to the<br />
provisions of section 147 of the IT Act, 1961. Therefore,ITA 608-609/2012 Page 5 of 9<br />
the reopening of assessment is based merely on change of<br />
opinion, which I am afraid, is not sustainable in law.<br />
Therefore, in the light of the judgment relied upon by the<br />
ld counsel, I have no hesitation in holding that the<br />
reopening of assessment in terms of section 147 of the<br />
Act is not sustainable in law.”<br />
5. In respect of both the assessment years, the CIT (Appeals) held in<br />
favour of the assessee on merits also.<br />
6. Being aggrieved by the deletion of the addition made by the CIT<br />
(Appeals), the revenue preferred the above mentioned appeals before the<br />
Tribunal. As mentioned above, the Tribunal rejected those appeals and<br />
that is how the revenue has filed these appeals before us.<br />
7. We may point out at this juncture itself that the Tribunal did not go<br />
into the question of merits. It only examined the question of the validity<br />
of the proceedings under Section 147 of the said Act. The Tribunal, in<br />
essence, held that the purported reasons for reopening the assessments<br />
were entirely vague and devoid of any material. As such, on the available<br />
material, no reasonable person could have any reason to believe that<br />
income had escaped assessment. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the<br />
proceedings under Section 147 of the said Act were invalid.ITA 608-609/2012 Page 6 of 9<br />
8. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for concluding that the<br />
proceedings under Section 147 were invalid. Instead of adding anything<br />
to the said reasons, we think it would be appropriate if the same are<br />
reproduced:-<br />
“In the case at hand, as is seen from the reasons recorded<br />
by the AO, we find that the AO has merely stated that it<br />
has been informed by the Director of Income-tax (Inv.),<br />
New Delhi, vide letter dated 16.06.2006 that the above<br />
named company was involved in giving and taking bogus<br />
entries/transactions during the relevant year, which is<br />
actually unexplained income of the assessee company.<br />
The AO has further stated that the assessee company has<br />
failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts and<br />
source of these funds routed through bank account of the<br />
assessee company. In the reasons recorded, it is nowhere<br />
mentioned as to who had given bogus entries/transactions<br />
to the assessee or to whom the assessee had given bogus<br />
entries or transactions. It is also nowhere mentioned as to<br />
on which dates and through which mode the bogus<br />
entries and transactions were made by the assessee. What<br />
was the information given by the Director of Income-tax<br />
(Inv.), New Delhi, vide letter dated 16.06.2006 has also<br />
not been mentioned. In other words, the contents of the<br />
letter dated 16.06.2006 of the Director of Income-tax<br />
(Inv.), New Delhi have not been given. The AO hasITA 608-609/2012 Page 7 of 9<br />
vaguely referred to certain communications that he had<br />
received from the DIT(Inv.), New Delhi; the AO did not<br />
mention the facts mentioned in the said communication<br />
except that from the informations gathered by the DIT<br />
(Inv.), New Delhi that the assessee was involved in<br />
giving and taking accommodation entries only and<br />
represented unsecured money of the assessee company is<br />
actually unexplained income of the assessee company or<br />
that it has been informed by the Director of Income-tax<br />
(Inv.), New Delhi vide letter dated 16.06.2006 that the<br />
assessee company was involved in giving and taking<br />
bogus entries/transactions during the relevant financial<br />
year. The AO did not mention the details of transactions<br />
that represented unexplained income of the assessee<br />
company. The information on the basis of which the AO<br />
has initiated proceedings u/s 147 of the Act are<br />
undoubtedly vague and uncertain and cannot be<br />
construed to be sufficient and relevant material on the<br />
basis of which a reasonable person could have formed a<br />
belief that income had escaped assessment. In other<br />
words, the reasons recorded by the AO are totally vague,<br />
scanty and ambiguous. They are not clear and<br />
unambiguous but suffer from vagueness. The reasons<br />
recorded by the AO do not disclose the AO’s mind as to<br />
what was the nature and amount of transaction or entries,ITA 608-609/2012 Page 8 of 9<br />
which had been given or taken by the assessee in the<br />
relevant year. The reasons recorded by the AO also do<br />
not disclose his mind as to when and in what mode or<br />
way the bogus entries or transactions were given or taken<br />
by the assessee. From the reasons recorded, nobody can<br />
know what was the amount and nature of bogus entries or<br />
transactions given and taken by the assessee in the<br />
relevant year and with whom the transaction had taken<br />
place. As already noted above,<br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>it is well settled that only</u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>the reasons recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings</u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>u/s 147 of the Act are to be looked at or examined for</u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>sustaining or setting aside a notice issued u/s 148 of the</u></i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i><u>Act. </u></i></b></span><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">The reasons are required to be read as they were</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">recorded by the AO. No substitution or deletion is</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">permissible. No addition can be made to those reasons.</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">Therefore, the details of entries or amount mentioned in</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">the assessment order and in respect of which ultimate</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">addition has been made by the AO, cannot be made a</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">basis to say that the reasons recorded by the AO were</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">with reference to those amounts mentioned in the</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">assessment order. The reasons recorded by the AO are</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">totally silent with regard to the amount and nature of</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">bogus entries and transactions and the persons with</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #990000;">whom the transactions had taken place.</span></i></b><br />
In this respect,<br />
we may rely upon the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictionalITA 608-609/2012<br />
Page 9 of 9<br />
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Atul Jain (2000)<br />
299 ITR 383, in which case the information relied upon<br />
by the AO for initiating proceedings u/s 147 of the Act<br />
did indicate the source of the capital gain and nobody<br />
knew which shares were transacted and with whom the<br />
transaction has taken place and in that case there were<br />
absolutely no details available and the information<br />
supplied was extremely scanty and vague and in that light<br />
of those facts, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional Delhi High<br />
Court held that initiation of proceedings u/s 147 of the<br />
Act by the AO was not valid and justified in the eyes of<br />
law. The recent decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High<br />
Court of Delhi in the case of Signature Hotels (P) Ltd.<br />
(supra) also supports the view we have taken above.”<br />
9. We do not see any reason to differ with the view expressed by the<br />
Tribunal. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration.<br />
The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.<br />
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J<br />
VIBHU BAKHRU, J<br />
MAY 20, 2013<br />
SU</div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-7393128052593350002013-05-27T18:19:00.003-07:002013-05-27T18:19:48.032-07:00cruelty - by filing numerous false complaints against Sanjay and his family members with the police and in the office of Sanjay that Sanjay and his family members used to demand dowry from her and treated her with cruelty when she failed to fulfill their demands and that Sanjay was having an illicit relation with his colleague, Suman has caused ‘mental cruelty’ to Sanjay thereby entitling him to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. =The failure of the Respondent/her counsel, in not putting forward her case in cross-examination of the Petitioner/husband and failure to give suggestions in rebuttal of his deposition constitute and are deemed, to be admissions on her part. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 1 of 21<br />
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI<br />
% Judgment Reserved on: May 09, 2013<br />
Judgment Pronounced on: May 23, 2013<br />
+ FAO 108/2013<br />
SUMAN SINGH .....Appellant<br />
Represented by: Ms.Padmini Gupta, Advocate<br />
versus<br />
SANJAY SINGH ..... Respondent<br />
Represented by: Respondent in person<br />
FAO 109/2013<br />
SUMAN SINGH .....Appellant<br />
Represented by: Ms.Padmini Gupta, Advocate<br />
versus<br />
SANJAY SINGH ..... Respondent<br />
Represented by: Respondent in person<br />
CORAM:<br />
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG<br />
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO<br />
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.<br />
1. On February 26, 1999, respondent Sanjay and appellant Suman got<br />
happily married and the two were blessed with a daughter born on June<br />
15, 2002 followed by another bundle of delight, another daughter born on<br />
February 10, 2006.<br />
2. Unfortunately, relations soured with passage of time. Sanjay<br />
sought dissolution of the marriage alleging cruelty and Suman sought<br />
restitution of her conjugal rights. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 2 of 21<br />
3. Both Sanjay and Suman reached the Court on July 19, 2010. It<br />
appears both were aware of the action proposed to be taken by the other.<br />
Petition filed by Sanjay under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage<br />
Act was filed on July 19, 2010, which was the date when Suman’s<br />
application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was also filed.<br />
4. Whereas Suman alleged that within a few days of the marriage<br />
Sanjay’s behaviour changed because he was aggrieved of insufficient<br />
dowry brought by her notwithstanding her family members having spent<br />
lavishly when the two got married; but she bore him. His behaviour<br />
turned rude and he started picking up quarrel on trivial matters and<br />
additionally he would even turn physical, but she continued to suffer to<br />
maintain the family bond but realized that Sanjay have developed<br />
intimacy with another woman and had left the matrimonial house<br />
compelling her to seek restitution of her conjugal rights. Sanjay pleaded<br />
that the marriage was a dowry-less marriage and during 10 years<br />
thereafter he was regularly harassed and tortured by Suman who degraded<br />
and insulted him at the drop of the hat and even would misbehave with<br />
his parents. To save the marriage he left his parents and since January<br />
2005 started living separately from his parents. But Suman’s attitude did<br />
not change. In the year 2006 he purchased Flat No.91, Pocket IV, Sector-<br />
2, Rohini in Suman’s name hoping that she would improve. But she did<br />
not. She even started visiting his office and created ugly scenes by<br />
abusing him. She not only threatened but lodged false complaints with<br />
the police alleging false facts against him and his parents. She repeatedly<br />
threatened to commit suicide and leave a note recording false facts to<br />
teach him and his parents a lesson. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 3 of 21<br />
5. Sanjay’s written statement to Suman’s petition is his version<br />
pleaded in the petition filed by him seeking dissolution of the marriage;<br />
of course he denied the insinuations against him, and as regards Suman,<br />
she denied the insinuation against her but pleaded that theirs was a love<br />
marriage solemnized on March 22, 1997 without telling the parents and<br />
that subsequently, in front of her parents she and Sanjay performed the<br />
rituals of marriage on February 26, 1999. For 3 years after the marriage<br />
she and Sanjay lived with a friend and shifted to the house of Sanjay’s<br />
parents in May 2002 but since they never approved of the marriage she<br />
and Sanjay shifted to a residential accommodation before Sanjay<br />
purchased a flat in her name in Rohini part sale consideration whereof<br />
was paid by her mother; but would continue to harass and misbehave with<br />
her. He developed intimate relations with a lady named Jyoti and<br />
therefore wanted Suman to divorce her and that Sanjay was pressurizing<br />
her mother to transfer ownership of her property situated in Sultanpuri in<br />
his favour.<br />
6. In HMA No.527/2010 filed by Suman, following issues were<br />
settled:-<br />
“1. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the restitution of<br />
conjugal rights as prayed? OPP<br />
2. Relief.”<br />
7. In HMA No.685/2010 filed by Sanjay, following issues were<br />
settled:-<br />
“1. Whether after solemnization of marriage, the Respondent<br />
has treated the Petitioner with cruelty? OPP<br />
2. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the decree of divorce<br />
as prayed? OPPFAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 4 of 21<br />
3. Relief.”<br />
8. Evidence was led by the parties in HMA No.685/2010 filed by<br />
Sanjay. In support of his case, Sanjay examined himself as PW-1. In his<br />
examination-in-chief, Sanjay PW-1 deposed on the lines of averments<br />
made in the divorce petition filed by him. He was cross-examined, and<br />
being relevant, a part of the cross-examination is being noted as under:-<br />
“I was married with the respondent about 13 years back but I<br />
do not remember the date. Our marriage was love marriage.<br />
My parents were not agree for the marriage but the parents of<br />
the respondent were agreed for the marriage….After marriage I<br />
resided with the respondent at rental accommodation at P-<br />
2/401-402, Sultanpuri, Delhi. Presently, I am posted at<br />
Directorate of Family Welfare, Metcalfe House, Delhi, as<br />
UDC….I always resided with the respondent at rental<br />
accommodation. For two years after the marriage, we resided<br />
at rented accommodation but I do not remember the exact<br />
period and thereafter. I along with the respondent shifted to my<br />
parental home. I along with the respondent resided at my<br />
parental home for about 6 years…Presently, I am residing<br />
separately from the respondents since 1 ½ years…I know Ms.<br />
Jyoti Sharma as she was earlier my colleague. Ms. Jyoti<br />
Sharma never met me after the year 2007. Again said, she met<br />
me 2-3 times in the year 2007 in connection with official work.<br />
It is wrong to suggest that I used to meet Ms. Jyoti Sharma after<br />
the year 2007….It is wrong to suggest that my father in drunken<br />
condition has thrown out the respondent after quarrelling with<br />
the respondent. It is correct that after throwing out the<br />
respondent from the matrimonial home, after some time we<br />
lived together in a rented accommodation…. It is wrong to<br />
suggest that I have not purchased any flat in the name of the<br />
respondent in the year 2006. It is wrong to suggest that I had<br />
purchased the said flat in the name of the respondent in the<br />
year 2005 with the contribution of money given by the mother<br />
of the respondent. I used to come home after 12 midnight. I<br />
used to come home between 9 PM to 10 PM. It is wrong to<br />
suggest that I used to come home after 12 midnight. (Vol. I used<br />
to come late due to the nature of work assigned to me by the<br />
department as I was appointed as a caretaker). It is wrong to FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 5 of 21<br />
suggest that I used to spend time with one Jyoti after close of<br />
working hours at 5.00 PM…I have no liability except the<br />
petitioner and my two minor children… It is wrong to suggest<br />
that we are residing separately since January 2007 or that<br />
there is no cohabitation since September 2008. It is wrong to<br />
suggest that I am deposing falsely.”<br />
9. Suman examined herself as RW-1 and deposed in harmony with<br />
the averments made in the written statement filed by her to the petition<br />
seeking divorce filed by Sanjay. She proved a complaint, Ex.RW-1/1<br />
dated July 28, 2010, submitted by her to Deputy Commissioner of Police,<br />
Outer District, Delhi, which complaint records that Sanjay and his father<br />
used to harass Suman for dowry. She was cross-examined and being<br />
relevant, a part of the cross-examination is being noted as under:-<br />
“It is correct that I have filed a petition against the respondent<br />
(petitioner in the HMA No.685/10). It is also correct that I have<br />
also filed a complaint against the respondent (petitioner in the<br />
HMA No.685/10) and his other family members under Section<br />
498A/406 IPC. The complaint was filed by me in August, 2010<br />
but the complaint was made earlier to DCP, Outer. It is correct<br />
that the petition filed by me under Domestic Violence Act has<br />
been dismissed from the court of Ms. Rachna Tiwari<br />
Lakhanpal, the ld. M.M., Delhi. The respondent (petitioner in<br />
the HMA No. 685/10) has committed cruelty towards me in the<br />
year 1999 at the time of Raksha Bandhan. I have not made any<br />
complaint in the year 1999. I have also not made any complaint<br />
since 1999 to 2010. It is correct that all the complaints have<br />
been made by me after August, 2010. I have not mentioned any<br />
incident in my affidavit Ex.PW1/A.<br />
I am graduate. It is correct that I have not mentioned in<br />
my affidavits Ex.PW1/A regarding demand of dowry and<br />
beatings and cruelty by the respondent (petitioner in the HMA<br />
No.685/10) and his other family members. It is correct that I<br />
have mentioned in my domestic violence petition that I had<br />
purchased the flat bearing No.91, Second Floor, LIG Flat,<br />
Pocket-4, Sector-2, Rohini, Delhi after selling my jewellery. I<br />
have not filed any petition against the respondent (petitioner in FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 6 of 21<br />
the HMA No. 685/10) in respect of demand of dowry as well as<br />
cruelties during the period 1999 to 2010. It is correct that I<br />
have no matrimonial relations with respondent (petitioner in<br />
the HMA No. 685/10) for the last about 3 and a half years…I<br />
have not told about my cruelty as well as demand of dowry to<br />
my mother and other family members…It is correct that I made<br />
so many complaints against my husband. It is correct that all<br />
the complaints have been made by me after August, 2010 as I<br />
came to know about Ms. Jyoti Sharma. It is wrong to suggest<br />
that the respondent (petitioner in the HMA No. 685/10) is not<br />
having any relations with Ms. Jyoti Sharma….I have seen Jyoti<br />
Sharma with the respondent (petitioner in the HMA No. 685/10)<br />
at C-1, 368, Third Floor, Muskan Apartment, Sector-17,<br />
Rohini, Delhi. (Vol. The said property is in the name of Jyoti<br />
Sharma and mentioned as Jyoti Sharma, W/o Sanjay Sharma). I<br />
have not filed any documents regarding the said property as I<br />
have approached the concerned authority through RTI but still,<br />
I have not received any information. It is wrong to suggest that<br />
the respondent is not having illicit relations with Ms. Jyoti<br />
Sharma.<br />
It is correct that the complaints dated 30.06.2010,<br />
01.07.2011, 18.05.2011, 21.07.2011, 25.10.2011, 01.06.2011,<br />
28.10.2010, 13.08.2010 and 28.07.2010 have been filed by me<br />
and the same are Ex.RW-1/PX (Colly). It is correct that I had a<br />
few differences with the respondent like not giving me quality<br />
time….It is correct that I am also filed a petition under<br />
Domestic Violence Act and the same was also dismissed by Ms.<br />
Rachna Tiwari Lakhanpal, the ld. M.M. I did not file any<br />
appeal against the said order of ld. MM since we have got our<br />
house property back. After the marriage, my father-in-law and<br />
two brothers-in-law raised demands of dowry. I never lodged<br />
any complaint against the said in-laws with police or any other<br />
authority.<br />
It is correct that I have stated in my affidavit that my<br />
husband had illicit relation with one Ms. Jyoti Sharma his<br />
colleague. It is also correct that I want to stay with my husband<br />
despite his having illicit relationship with the said Jyoti<br />
Sharma. It is correct that I have not cohabited with my husband<br />
for last 4 years. I made several efforts to stay with my husband.<br />
I even suggested that he may continue with his illicit FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 7 of 21<br />
relationship but stay in the house with us. It is wrong to suggest<br />
that I am deposing falsely.” (Emphasis Supplied)<br />
10. By a common judgment dated December 14, 2012, the learned<br />
Additional Principal Judge, Family Courts, Rohini, Delhi has allowed<br />
petition seeking dissolution of the marriage filed by Sanjay being HMA<br />
No.685/2010, and has dismissed HMA No.527/2010 re-numbered as<br />
HMA No.273/2011 filed by Suman. The learned Judge has held that<br />
Sanjay has successfully established cruelty as pleaded by him at the<br />
hands of Suman.<br />
11. In so concluding, it has been held by the learned Trial Judge that:-<br />
(i) In spite of being cross-examined on material points no<br />
contradictions to render unreliable Sanjay’s testimony were brought out;<br />
(ii) Sanjay was not found wavering on material points;<br />
(iii) On may material points Suman’s lawyer had not cross-examined<br />
Sanjay i.e. had not even dared to challenge Sanjay’s sworn testimony;<br />
(iv) Complaints lodged by Suman alleging dowry harassment at the<br />
hands of Sanjay and his parents were ex-facie false;<br />
(v) Suman had failed good to establish Sanjay having illicit<br />
relationship with another lady and said allegations would cause immense<br />
mental pain and agony;<br />
(vi) Sanjay’s testimony that whenever he visited Suman’s parental<br />
house he was treated badly could be rebutted by Suman by examining her<br />
family members, whom she did not requiring an adverse inference to be<br />
drawn against her. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 8 of 21<br />
12. It would be most apposite to note the following portion of the<br />
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge:-<br />
<b><i><u>“39. The failure of the Respondent/her counsel, in not putting </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>forward her case in cross-examination of the </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>Petitioner/husband and failure to give suggestions in rebuttal of </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>his deposition constitute and are deemed, to be admissions on </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>her part. </u></i></b>The Petitioner, has thus, clearly brought over the<br />
record that the Respondent started harassing and torturing him<br />
just a few days after the marriage. She pressurized him to get<br />
separated from his family members. She was brought to the<br />
matrimonial home by the parents of the Petitioner but due to<br />
her nature/conduct, she (with the Petitioner), was asked to<br />
leave the house, after staying for a few days. The Petitioner<br />
has, also, brought over the record that the Respondent did not<br />
like him talking to his parents and other family members. She<br />
did not like him to sit with them even when they were unwell.<br />
She never wanted him to help them financially, to whatever<br />
little extent he could.<br />
45. It is a general rule that one who asserts a fact or claim<br />
has to prove it. The burden of proof is on him, who asserts it<br />
and not on him who denies. [Reliance placed on 1 (2005) DMC<br />
397 (DB)]. The nature of proof required in the matrimonial<br />
matters is different. The facts alleged by a spouse about their<br />
private intimate life are not supposed to be known to any other<br />
person and no corroboration can be expected in such case. To<br />
seek a corroboration to a fact alleged by a spouse to a<br />
marriage regarding the healthy or unhealthy character of their<br />
intimate relation which belongs to the sacred and secrets<br />
precincts of marital life, and which are known only to the<br />
spouses and which are not supposed to be known to any other<br />
living soul on the surface of the planet, would amount to<br />
shutting one‟s eye towards the facts of life and reality.<br />
Corroboration, therefore, to the version of either spouse can<br />
hardly be expected to come from any other independent source.<br />
Such matters are always decided on preponderance of<br />
probabilities. (Reliance placed on A versus B- 1985<br />
Matrimonial Law Reporter 326).<br />
46. It is, also, well settled law that where accusations and<br />
allegations have been leveled by the parties against each other, FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 9 of 21<br />
the court has to consider the context in which such accusations<br />
etc. have been made. the court, also, has to keep in mind the<br />
physical and mental condition of the parties, as well as their<br />
social status and has to consider the impact of the personalities<br />
and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing<br />
all the incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that<br />
point of view. The conduct of a spouse has to be examined in<br />
the light of the other spouse‟s capacity for endurance and<br />
extent to which that capacity is known to the spouse. (Reliance<br />
placed on 151 (2008) DLT 341- Surender Pal vs Kanwaljeet<br />
Kaur).<br />
47. The parties are well-educated and come from middle<br />
class section of the society…<br />
48. The values that middle class section of our Indian society<br />
holds, are well known. The in-laws and other relations expect<br />
due regards from the newly-wed wife. In fact it is expected that<br />
she gets-up early, prepares breakfast, lunch and dinner for the<br />
entire family herself or with the assistance of other family<br />
members. It is, also, expected that such a newly-wed greets the<br />
guests and visitors to the house respectfully. It is, also, expected<br />
that she serves lunch or dinner to them and if it does not<br />
happen, they feel disgraced in the presence of others. If the<br />
newly-wed does not behave in such manner as expected from<br />
her, they are bound to suffer mental pain and agony. The<br />
Respondent, in the instant case, remained indifferent towards<br />
the feelings of the Petitioner‟s parents and other family<br />
members. She did not care for any visitor (s), any guest (s) or<br />
any relation (s) of the Petitioner or even his friend (s). The<br />
Petitioner, therefore, would have suffered mental pain and<br />
agony, due to such acts of omission and commission on the part<br />
of the Respondent.” (Emphasis Supplied)<br />
13. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated December 14, 2012<br />
passed by the Trial Judge granting decree of divorce to Sanjay and<br />
dismissing HMA No.527/2010 filed by Suman seeking restitution of<br />
conjugal rights, Suman has filed the above captioned appeals.<br />
14. Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 prescribes that<br />
any marriage, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 10 of 21<br />
wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other<br />
party „has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner<br />
with cruelty‟.<br />
15. A matrimonial dispute is not just a legal dispute, but more<br />
importantly it is a family problem and a social concern. Matrimonial<br />
disputes should not be viewed from the glasses of legal technicalities.<br />
They should be appreciated at the human level of being a conflict<br />
between a husband and wife. Such issues should be dealt with sensitively<br />
rather than mechanically. Thus, a pragmatic approach and not a pedantic<br />
one is required while dealing with matrimonial disputes.<br />
16. While dealing with the concept of ‘cruelty’, in the decision<br />
reported as AIR 2005 SC 534 A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, the Supreme<br />
Court observed as under:<br />
“The expression „cruelty‟ has not been defined in the Hindu<br />
Marriage Act, 1955. The said expression has been used in<br />
relation to human conduct or human behavior. It is the conduct<br />
in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and<br />
obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is<br />
adversely affecting the other. It may be defined as willful and<br />
unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to<br />
life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a<br />
reasonable apprehension of such a danger, The question of<br />
mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of<br />
marital ties of the particular society to which the parties<br />
belong, their social values, status, environment in which they<br />
live.”<br />
17. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of the spouse<br />
same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the<br />
treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind<br />
of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare, then such conduct FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 11 of 21<br />
amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one<br />
has to see the probabilities of the case.<br />
18. Cruelty may be mental or physical. Mental cruelty may consist of<br />
verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to<br />
constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party. If the cruelty is<br />
physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question<br />
of fact and degree. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct<br />
evidence, but in case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be<br />
direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are<br />
required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents<br />
that are brought out in evidence. The concept, proof beyond the shadow<br />
of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and<br />
certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those, of<br />
husband and wife. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel<br />
treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse,<br />
whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or<br />
injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be<br />
drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on<br />
the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct<br />
complained of itself is bad enough and per-se unlawful or illegal. Then<br />
the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired<br />
into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the<br />
conduct itself is proved or admitted.<br />
19. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be ‘grave<br />
and weighty’ so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse<br />
cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be<br />
something more serious than ‘ordinary wear and tear of married life’. It FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 12 of 21<br />
is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct<br />
was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be<br />
considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure it as<br />
a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may<br />
cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial<br />
irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married<br />
life, would not amount to cruelty. The foundation of a sound marriage is<br />
tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each<br />
other's fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every<br />
marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exaggerated<br />
and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All<br />
quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what<br />
constitutes cruelty in each particular case, keeping in view the physical<br />
and mental condition of the parties, their character and social status. A<br />
too technical and hypersensitive approach would be counter productive to<br />
the institution of marriage. Conduct has to be considered in the<br />
background of several factors such as social status of parties, their<br />
education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is<br />
difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description<br />
of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the<br />
type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between<br />
the parties had deteriorated to such an extent, due to the conduct of the<br />
other spouse, that it would be impossible for them to live together without<br />
mental agony, torture or distress, entitling the complaining spouse to<br />
secure divorce.<br />
20. In the backdrop of above legal position, we proceed to examine the<br />
present case.FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 13 of 21<br />
21. In the instant case, it is the claim of Sanjay that Suman treated him<br />
with cruelty after their marriage was solemnized. On the other hand,<br />
Suman claims that it was Sanjay who treated her with cruelty and that she<br />
is ready to forgive Sanjay and lead a matrimonial life with him.<br />
22. As already noted hereinabove, the Trial Judge has accepted the<br />
case set up by Sanjay that Suman had treated him with cruelty after<br />
solemnization of their marriage. The mainstay of the decision of the Trial<br />
Judge is that the failure of counsel appearing for Suman to put forward<br />
the case of Suman to Sanjay in his cross-examination and giving<br />
suggestions to him regarding number of the allegations leveled against<br />
her by him in his examination-in-chief goes to show that Suman had<br />
‘admitted’ as correct the allegations of cruelty leveled against her by<br />
Sanjay.<br />
23. The aforesaid approach adopted by the Trial Judge is too narrow<br />
and pedantic. It is true that the cross-examination of Sanjay by the<br />
counsel acting for Suman is most unsatisfactory because with respect to<br />
numerous incidents deposed to by Sanjay the counsel has not even<br />
bothered to even suggest that the same are untrue. But, human relations<br />
have not to be severed due to level of advocacy falling below acceptable<br />
standards. In an adversarial litigation, which we follow in India, if a<br />
Judge were to find that a counsel’s standard has not reached the desired<br />
level and the litigation ceases to be adversarial, the Judge must step in.<br />
We often use the phrase that a Judge is a match referee. We do not use<br />
the phrase that the Judge is an umpire. Now, an umpire has a static<br />
position as in the game of cricket. But a referee, as is to be found in a<br />
game of football, runs up and down in the field keeping a hawk’s eye on<br />
the football to ensure that nobody fouls. FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 14 of 21<br />
24. A closer look at the impugned judgment would reveal that the<br />
learned Trial Judge had adopted different yardsticks while appreciating<br />
the evidence led by the parties. In case of Sanjay, his sole testimony has<br />
been held to be sufficient by the leaned Trial Judge on the ground that „to<br />
seek a corroboration to a fact alleged by a spouse to a marriage<br />
regarding the healthy or unhealthy character of their intimate relation<br />
which belongs to the sacred and secrets precincts of marital life, and<br />
which are known only to the spouses and which are not supposed to be<br />
known to any other living soul on the surface of the planet, would amount<br />
to shutting one‟s eye towards the facts of life and reality.‟ On the other<br />
hand, an adverse inference has been drawn against Suman for not<br />
examining her family members to disprove allegations leveled by Sanjay<br />
that he was not treated properly by family members of Suman whenever<br />
he went to her parental house. One of the allegations leveled by Suman<br />
against Sanjay was that the family members of Sanjay used to misbehave<br />
with her and instigate Sanjay to treat her with cruelty since they did not<br />
approve of their marriage. The learned Judge has not drawn an adverse<br />
inference against Sanjay who has likewise not produced his parents to<br />
rebut the same.<br />
25. As observed by us in the preceding paras, a pragmatic approach<br />
and not a pedantic one is required while dealing with matrimonial<br />
disputes. The Trial Judge has dealt with the evidence led by the parties in<br />
a very superficial manner.<br />
26. We take upon ourselves the task of examining the evidence led by<br />
the parties in order to arrive at a just decision in the present case.<br />
27. A careful analysis of the evidence led by the parties brings out the<br />
following: Sanjay and Suman had a clandestine love affair because both FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 15 of 21<br />
knew that their family members would be against their relationship. They<br />
probably solemnized a secret marriage and two years thereafter on<br />
February 26, 1999, with the blessings of Suman’s parents the two got<br />
officially married, but without any approval from parents of Sanjay. For<br />
about 2 years after their marriage, Sanjay and Suman stayed in a rented<br />
accommodation. Thereafter they shifted to the parental house of Sanjay.<br />
On June 15, 2002 Sanjay and Suman were blessed with a baby girl<br />
Shriya. For the next 5 years Sanjay and Suman stayed at the parental<br />
house of Sanjay, during which period they were blessed with another<br />
baby girl, Harleen on February 10, 2006. In the year 2007 Sanjay and<br />
Suman along with the two daughters shifted to a rented accommodation<br />
and finally to a house purchased in Suman’s name by funds partly made<br />
available by Sanjay and partly by Suman’s parents.<br />
28. The city of Delhi is a costly place to live. Family budgeting and<br />
especially when a child is born is becoming a herculean task even for the<br />
financially well-off and even they come under financial stress and the<br />
same burdens and causes stress on the matrimonial bond.<br />
29. From the fact that Sanjay and Suman, as admitted by Suman<br />
herself, got secretly married on March 22, 1997 without informing their<br />
parents and for 2 years hid the marriage till when the two officially got<br />
married on February 26, 1999; but only in presence of her parents, we<br />
have sufficient proof that the marriage was a dowry-less marriage and<br />
Sanjay’s parents never reconciled to their son marrying a girl not of their<br />
choice. Thus, ex-facie, Suman’s allegations that her in-laws harassed her<br />
for dowry from the inception of the marriage is incorrect. Admittedly, for<br />
another three years the couple lived with a friend of Sanjay. They shifted<br />
to the house of Sanjay’s father, where Sanjay’s parents resided in May, FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 16 of 21<br />
2002 and the reason appears to be the fact that Suman was in the family<br />
way. Shriya was born on June 15, 2002. It appears that by said time the<br />
anger of Sanjay’s parents had vanished. The couple resided in the house<br />
of Sanjay’s parents for a few years, and a second child was born, but it is<br />
apparent that things were not moving in the right directions evidenced by<br />
the fact that firstly the couple shifted to a residential accommodation and<br />
then to a flat purchased in Suman’s name by finances provided partly by<br />
Sanjay and partly by Suman’s mother. It is apparent that between the<br />
young couple, they were managing well. But, two more lives meant two<br />
more mouths to be fed and it appears that the economic pressures of<br />
family budgeting started taking their toll. Whereas Suman is a housewife<br />
and Sanjay works, and we are given to understand earns about `45,000/-<br />
per month, Suman started suspecting Sanjay’s fidelity towards her. She<br />
probably could not understand that in a workplace where even women<br />
work, her husband was bound to be speaking to his female colleagues.<br />
The young couple could not sort out their affairs and Suman was illadvised to lodge false complaints alleging dowry harassments not only by<br />
Sanjay but even his father. We cannot overlook the fact that Sanjay had<br />
contributed for a flat to be purchased in the name of Suman. The<br />
pressure-cooker seems to have exploded in the year 2009. Sanjay had<br />
deposed of Suman coming to his office and creating a scene. Complaints<br />
have been made by Suman to the police contents whereof which she has<br />
not been able to prove as true; and on the contrary from the admitted facts<br />
noted above any reasonable person would draw the conclusion that the<br />
complaints alleging dowry harassment from the inception not only by<br />
Sanjay but even his parents are ex-facie false. Admittedly Sanjay’s<br />
parents did not bless the couple when they officially got married on<br />
February 26, 1999. If they were not present at the scene, where is the FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 17 of 21<br />
question of they demanding dowry from the very inception of the<br />
marriage. The fact that Sanjay and Suman resided with Sanjay’s friend<br />
till the year 2002 is proof of the fact that both of them were persona-nongrata in the house of Sanjay’s parents. Thus, there would be no question<br />
of a dowry demand being raised till said year. Admittedly, the two<br />
shifted to the house of Sanjay’s parents when Suman was in the advanced<br />
stage of pregnancy. Within less than 3 weeks of the couple shifting to the<br />
house of Sanjay’s parents, they were blessed with a baby girl. They<br />
shifted out of the house somewhere in the year 2007 and it is apparent<br />
that things were not too well. The only probable reason which one can<br />
fathom is that the dislike for Suman could not be bridged. But the fact<br />
that Sanjay left the house of his parents is proof of the fact that he was<br />
ready to stand by Suman. The young couple along with their two<br />
daughters took a house on rent but probably found the rent to be a strain<br />
on their finances. It appears that the usual matrimonial discord which we<br />
find in a large number of houses in Delhi i.e. the difficulty faced to beat<br />
the inflation and manage the family budget started taking its toll.<br />
Suman’s parents stepped in to provide some finances and some were<br />
provided by Sanjay to buy a flat in Suman’s name. The fact that the flat<br />
was purchased in Suman’s name tells us that her parents were wanting to<br />
secure their daughter when they provided part finances. But the fact that<br />
even Sanjay provided part finances and still allowed the flat to be<br />
purchased in Suman’s name evidences that he had no motive to extract<br />
dowry. It was a desperate attempt of the young couple to not only<br />
acquire a property but get rid of the liability to pay monthly rent. All this<br />
budgeting must have taken a toll. Small skirmishes seems to have turned<br />
into ugly spats finally ending up with Suman accusing her husband of<br />
having developed illicit relations, probably for the reason Sanjay was FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 18 of 21<br />
reaching home late; and as regards him, the probable reason could be: the<br />
thought of returning to a comfortless home with a nagging wife waiting<br />
resulting in his spirits being more often depressed than excited and<br />
therefore the return to the house being late. The young couple appears to<br />
have been caught in a vicious circle of cause and effect. Suman’s<br />
nagging led Sanjay to return home late and Sanjay’s late returning to<br />
home in turn triggering further nagging and thereby compelling Sanjay to<br />
return home late and late and in turn the nagging becoming severe till it<br />
reached the uncomfortable level for Sanjay to tolerate any further when<br />
Suman started lodging false complaints with the police.<br />
30. At this juncture, we note the decision of the Supreme Court<br />
reported as 2013 III AD (SC) 458 K. Srinivas Rao v D.A. Deepa in which<br />
decision, on the subject of making unfounded complaints to the police,<br />
and the same being treated as constituting mental cruelty, the Supreme<br />
Court observed as under :-<br />
“14. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted<br />
in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Making unfounded<br />
indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his or<br />
her relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing<br />
notices or news items which may have adverse impact on the<br />
business prospect or the job of the spouse and filing repeated<br />
false complaints and cases in the court against the spouse<br />
would, in the facts of a case, amount to causing mental cruelty<br />
to the other spouse.<br />
xxxxxxxx<br />
22. We need to now see the effect of the above events. In our<br />
opinion, the first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the<br />
scurrilous, vulgar and defamatory statement made by the<br />
respondent-wife in her complaint dated 4/10/1999 addressed to<br />
the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection Cell. The<br />
statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked her to<br />
sleep with his father is bound to anger him. It is his case that FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 19 of 21<br />
this humiliation of his parents caused great anguish to him. He<br />
and his family were traumatized by the false and indecent<br />
statement made in the complaint. His grievance appears to us<br />
to be justified. This complaint is a part of the record. It is a part<br />
of the pleadings. That this statement is false is evident from the<br />
evidence of the mother of the respondent-wife, which we have<br />
already quoted. This statement cannot be explained away by<br />
stating that it was made because the respondent-wife was<br />
anxious to go back to the appellant-husband. This is not the<br />
way to win the husband back. It is well settled that such<br />
statements cause mental cruelty. By sending this complaint the<br />
respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellanthusband.<br />
23. Pursuant to this complaint, the police registered a case<br />
under Section 498-A of the IPC. The appellant-husband and his<br />
parents had to apply for anticipatory bail, which was granted to<br />
them. Later, the respondent-wife withdrew the complaint.<br />
Pursuant to the withdrawal, the police filed a closure report.<br />
Thereafter, the respondent-wife filed a protest petition. The<br />
trial court took cognizance of the case against the appellanthusband and his parents (CC No. 62/2002). What is pertinent to<br />
note is that the respondent-wife filed criminal appeal in the<br />
High Court challenging the acquittal of the appellant-husband<br />
and his parents of the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act<br />
and also the acquittal of his parents of the offence punishable<br />
under Section 498-A of the IPC. She filed criminal revision<br />
seeking enhancement of the punishment awarded to the<br />
appellant-husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the<br />
IPC in the High Court which is still pending. When the criminal<br />
appeal filed by the appellant-husband challenging his<br />
conviction for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC was<br />
allowed and he was acquitted, the respondent-wife filed<br />
criminal appeal in the High Court challenging the said<br />
acquittal. During this period respondent-wife and members of<br />
her family have also filed complaints in the High Court<br />
complaining about the appellant-husband so that he would be<br />
removed from the job. The conduct of the respondent- wife in<br />
filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and defamatory<br />
allegation against her mother-in-law, in filing revision seeking<br />
enhancement of the sentence awarded to the appellanthusband, in filing appeal questioning the acquittal of the FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 20 of 21<br />
appellant-husband and acquittal of his parents indicates that<br />
she made all attempts to ensure that he and his parents are put<br />
in jail and he is removed from his job. We have no manner of<br />
doubt that this conduct has caused mental cruelty to the<br />
appellant- husband.<br />
24. In our opinion, the High Court wrongly held that because<br />
the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did not stay<br />
together there is no question of the parties causing cruelty to<br />
each other. Staying together under the same roof is not a precondition for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty<br />
by his or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under<br />
the same roof. In a given case, while staying away, a spouse<br />
can cause mental cruelty to the other spouse by sending vulgar<br />
and defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints<br />
containing indecent allegations or by initiating number of<br />
judicial proceedings making the other spouse‟s life miserable.<br />
This is what has happened in this case.<br />
28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent-wife<br />
has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellanthusband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down.”<br />
(Emphasis Supplied)<br />
31. Applying the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in<br />
Deepa’s case (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that <b><i><span style="color: red;">by filing </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">numerous false complaints against Sanjay and his family members with </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">the police and in the office of Sanjay that Sanjay and his family members </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">used to demand dowry from her and treated her with cruelty when she </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">failed to fulfill their demands and that Sanjay was having an illicit </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">relation with his colleague, Suman has caused ‘mental cruelty’ to Sanjay </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">thereby entitling him to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: red;">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. </span></i></b><br />
32. In view of above discussion, impugned judgment dated December<br />
14, 2010 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Courts, Rohini, Delhi<br />
granting decree of divorce in favor of Sanjay and dismissing application<br />
for restitution of conjugal rights filed by Suman is affirmed.FAO Nos.108/2013 & 109/2013 Page 21 of 21<br />
33. Parties are left to bear their respective costs.<br />
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)<br />
JUDGE<br />
(V.KAMESWAR RAO)<br />
JUDGE<br />
MAY 23, 2013<br />
mamta</div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-89783034608440804662013-05-27T17:52:00.002-07:002013-05-27T17:52:20.715-07:00audit objection = It is difficult to sustain the notice issued u/s. 148. The audit objection is only an inference that the royalty payment resulted in a capital benefit; such an opinion expressed by the audit cannot constitute tangible material on the basis of which the assessment can be reopened. In the case of Indian Eastern and Newspaper Society v. CIT, (1979) 119 ITR 996 the Supreme Court expressed the view that information as to correct legal position must come from a formal source or body which is competent to pronounce upon the issue and that revenue audit is not competent to pronounce on issues of law. There is no averment that the revenue audit only pointed out to any factual aspect or material or primary fact that was omitted to be disclosed by the petitioner. 18. The alleged non-deduction of tax from the royalty which would authorise the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) is a fact that is mentioned for the first time in the counter-affidavit and it does not find place in the reasons recorded. As noted earlier, it is impermissible to look into any record other than the reasons recorded to judge the validity of the reopening of the assessment. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 1 of 8<br />
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI<br />
Reserved on: 17th December, 2012<br />
% Date of Decision: 2nd January, 2013<br />
+ W.P. (C) 8483/2010<br />
+ W.P. (C) 8485/2010<br />
+ W.P. (C) 8486/2010<br />
XEROX MODICORP LTD. ..... Petitioner<br />
Through: Mr. Ajay Vohra with Ms. Kavita Jha<br />
and Mr. Somnath Shukla, Advocates.<br />
versus<br />
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ..... Respondents<br />
Through: Mr. Kamal Sawhney, Sr. Standing<br />
Counsel.<br />
CORAM:<br />
MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT<br />
MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR<br />
R.V. EASWAR, J.<br />
These are three writ petitions filed by the petitioner which is a company<br />
engaged in the export of software, manufacture of photocopiers and trading in fax,<br />
paper and toner. They are directed against reassessment proceedings initiated by<br />
issue of notices under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.<br />
2. W.P. (C) Nos.8483 & 8486/2010 relate to the proceedings for the assessment<br />
years 2002-03 and 2003-04 respectively. They can be dealt with together and<br />
separate from W.P. (C) Nos.8485/2010 because for those years the reassessment<br />
proceedings were initiated after a period of four years from the end of the relevant<br />
assessment years, whereas for the assessment year 2004-05, which is the year<br />
involved in W.P.(C) No.8485/2010, the reassessment proceedings were initiated<br />
within the period of four years from the end of the said assessment year, and<br />
therefore different considerations apply.W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 2 of 8<br />
W.P.(C) Nos.8483 & 8486/2010:<br />
The relevant dates are set out below:<br />
Asst.year Asst.year<br />
2002-03 2003-04<br />
Original assessment made u/s. 143(3) 143(3)<br />
Date of the original assessment 31.03.2005 23.03.2006<br />
Notice u/s.148 issued on 30.03.2009 30.03.2010<br />
3. Under the first proviso to section 147, notice to reopen an assessment<br />
completed under section 143(3) may be issued beyond the period of four years from<br />
the end of the relevant assessment year only if income chargeable to tax has escaped<br />
assessment on account of the failure of the assessee to file returns of income or to<br />
furnish fully and truly all material facts relating to his assessment at the time of the<br />
original assessment. This is a jurisdictional pre-condition.<br />
4. For the assessment year 2002-03, the reasons recorded u/s. 148(2) for<br />
reopening the assessment are as follows:<br />
“The assessment of M/s Xerox India Ltd. for the assessment year<br />
2002-03 was completed under scrutiny in March 2005 determining<br />
an income of `7836.96 lakhs. The assessed income was however<br />
reduced under section 250/154 to `1136.81 lakhs.<br />
2. The assessee company had claimed and was allowed an<br />
expenditure of `438.59 lakh on account of royalty paid to a foreign<br />
company in foreign exchange in lieu of rendering technical<br />
assistance. Since this expenditure has provided the assessee a<br />
benefit of enduring nature, this expenditure ought to have been<br />
treated as capital expenditure in accordance with the judgment of<br />
Supreme Court in the case of Southern Switchgear Ltd. vs CIT and<br />
another reported at 232 ITR 359. The omission resulted in<br />
underassessment of income of `438.59 lakh.<br />
3. Further, the assessee claimed and was allowed a loss of<br />
`317.43 lacs on account of provision for securitisation. It being only<br />
a provision and the loss being of speculative nature was not<br />
allowable.W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 3 of 8<br />
4. From the above facts, I have reason to believe that income of<br />
`756.02 lakhs, as above has escaped assessment by virtue of<br />
omission on the part of the assessee to disclose the above income.<br />
This is therefore a fit case for issuance of notice u/s.148 of the<br />
Income Tax Act, 1961”.<br />
The reasons recorded for the assessment year 2003-04 are:<br />
“It is seen from records that the assessee company claimed expenses<br />
of `3,59,59,436 on royalty and `2,04,92,135 on a/c provision for<br />
securitisation. Whereas expenditure on royalty is liable to be<br />
capitalised and provisions for securitisation is contingent liability is<br />
inadmissible, both the expenditure(s) are liable to be added to<br />
income.<br />
Therefore, I have reason to believe that income of `5.63 Crores has<br />
escaped Assessment.<br />
Accordingly, re-Assessment proceedings are initiated under section<br />
147 of Income Tax Act, 1961. Notice is issued under section 148 of<br />
Income Tax Act 1961”.<br />
5. It is common ground before us that the assessing officer (respondents herein)<br />
has dropped the ground relating to disallowance of the provision for securitisation<br />
for both the years; therefore, what survives is only the disallowance of the royalty<br />
paid as capital expenditure.<br />
6. Let us examine the disclosure made by the petitioner. In respect of the<br />
assessment year 2002-03, the return of income was accompanied by the audited<br />
accounts along with the notes and schedules. In the profit and loss account for the<br />
year ended on 31.03.2002, “material and manufacturing expenses” of `31,341.04<br />
lakhs was debited and the details thereof were given in Schedule N; in the schedule,<br />
royalty of `438.59 lakhs was shown as part of the expenses. It is not in dispute that<br />
the royalty was paid under a technical services agreement entered into on<br />
22.03.1984 with Xerox Ltd. of England and was being allowed in all the<br />
assessments made from the assessment year 1984-85. It is stated in the counteraffidavit that no query was raised by the respondent in the course of the original<br />
assessment proceedings with regard to the royalty payment, that the petitioner did<br />
not submit the information or copies of the relevant documents showing the terms<br />
and nature of the benefit accruing from the royalty agreements in this assessment W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 4 of 8<br />
year, that each year is a separate year and the rule of res judicata is not applicable to<br />
income-tax proceedings, that the rule of consistency does not hold good on the facts<br />
of this case and that in these circumstances the reopening was valid. It is pointed out<br />
that the contents of the supplementary agreements 1 & 2 were not submitted by the<br />
petitioner during the original assessment proceedings.<br />
7. In respect of the assessment year 2003-04 also, the royalty of `359.59 lakhs<br />
was separately shown in the Schedule-O which sets out the details of the “material<br />
and manufacturing expenses”. A questionnaire was issued by the AO on 06.02.2006<br />
in which 28 queries were raised by him, including query No.23 in which the<br />
petitioner was directed to furnish “evidence that royalty has been paid within the<br />
time prescribed u/s. 43B and file evidence of TDS from royalty”. The petitioner<br />
submitted the details asked for under cover of letter dated 15.02.2006. On<br />
23.03.2006 the petitioner again gave certain clarifications about the TDS from<br />
royalty payments in response to the queries raised by the respondent by letter dated<br />
17.03.2006. The assessment was completed on 23.03.2006. The counter-affidavit<br />
filed by the respondents is substantially the same as in the writ petition for the<br />
assessment year 2002-03.<br />
8. It is seen that it is in the counter-affidavit, for the first time, that the<br />
respondent has taken the stand that there was failure on the part of the petitioner to<br />
furnish the royalty agreements including the supplementary agreements in the course<br />
of the assessment proceedings for the years in question; no such reason was stated in<br />
the reasons recorded u/s. 148(2). All that was said in the reasons recorded was only<br />
that in the view of the assessing officer, the royalty payments ought to have been<br />
held to be capital in nature.<br />
9. It is settled law that the assessing authority cannot keep improving his case<br />
from time to time and that the reassessment proceedings have to stand or fall on the<br />
basis of what was stated in the reasons recorded u/s. 148(2) and nothing more. No<br />
failure to furnish full and true particulars relating to the royalty payments, including<br />
the failure to file the relevant agreements, has been alleged in the reasons recorded.<br />
If anything, the reasons are an admission that it was the assessing officer who did W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 5 of 8<br />
not draw the inference that the royalty payments were capital in nature. It was for<br />
him to draw the appropriate inference and not for the assessee to tell him what<br />
inference of fact or law should be drawn from the primary facts furnished. That is<br />
the ratio of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd., (1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC).<br />
10. Accordingly, the reassessment notices for the assessment years 2002-03 and<br />
2003-04 are quashed as also the consequent proceedings.<br />
W.P. (C) No.8485/2010:<br />
11. The facts in this petition are slightly different. The original assessment was<br />
completed u/s. 143(3) on 27.12.2006. Notice u/s. 148 was issued on 30.03.2009<br />
which is within the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year<br />
(2004-05). The reasons recorded are:<br />
“The assessment of M/s. Xerox India Ltd. for the assessment year<br />
2004-05 was completed under section 143(3) vide order dated<br />
27.12.2006 determining an income of `27,39,40,490/-.<br />
2. The assessee company had claimed and was allowed an<br />
expenditure of `3,79,50,791/- on account of royalty paid to a foreign<br />
company in foreign exchange in lieu of rendering technical<br />
assistance. Since this expenditure has provided the assessee a<br />
benefit of enduring nature, this expenditure ought to have been<br />
treated as capital expenditure.”<br />
12. The other reasons recorded relating to provision for securitisation, contingent<br />
liability, gratuity/superannuation etc. are not reproduced since the objections of the<br />
petitioner with respect to those issues were accepted by the respondent by order<br />
passed u/s.154 on 11.02.2010.<br />
13. The contention of the petitioner is that the notice issued u/s. 148 is without<br />
jurisdiction on the basis of the Full Bench judgment of this court in CIT v.<br />
Kelvinator of India Ltd., (2002) 256 ITR 1, which stands affirmed by the Supreme<br />
Court in CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 561. The contention is that<br />
once an assessment is completed under sec. 143(3), the assessing officer is presumed<br />
to have applied his mind to all the issues and he cannot thereafter reopen the<br />
assessment on the ground that he did not form any opinion with respect to any W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 6 of 8<br />
particular issue; he must have tangible material before him on the basis of which he<br />
can entertain a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped<br />
assessment. It is contended that there is no reference to any tangible material in the<br />
reasons recorded and that all that is stated therein is that the expenditure by way of<br />
royalty conferred an enduring benefit to the assessee and ought to have therefore<br />
been disallowed as capital expenditure. That is, argues counsel for the petitioner,<br />
nothing but a change of opinion without any tangible material coming to the<br />
possession of the assessing officer subsequent to the completion of the original<br />
assessment.<br />
14. The learned standing counsel for the revenue strongly relies on the following<br />
observations of the majority opinion in paragraph 23 of the judgment of the Full<br />
Bench of this court in CIT v Usha International Ltd., (2012) 348 ITR 485 and<br />
contends that having regard to those observations of the majority, the notice issued<br />
by the AO is valid: -<br />
“23. The said observations do not mean that even if the Assessing<br />
Officer did not examine a particular subject matter, entry or<br />
claim/deduction and therefore had not formed any opinion, it<br />
must be presumed that he must have formed an opinion. This is<br />
not what was argued by the assessee or held and decided. There<br />
cannot be deemed formation of opinion even when the particular<br />
subject matter, entry or claim/deduction is not examined”.<br />
15. In the accounts the royalty of `379.51 lakhs was debited to the profit and<br />
loss account along with several other items of expenditure under the head “material<br />
and manufacturing expenses”. Schedule-O to the accounts gives the break-up of the<br />
expenditure and shows royalty separately.<br />
16. In the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that the relevant agreements under<br />
which the royalty was paid were not furnished by the petitioner along with the return<br />
or during the original assessment proceedings, that the facts of the past years showed<br />
that no technology was ever developed by the petitioner in India and it was<br />
dependent on the technical inputs supplied by the parent company and thus there<br />
arose an enduring benefit to the petitioner, that the petitioner omitted to state that it<br />
derived such enduring benefit, that the petitioner failed to deduct tax from the W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 7 of 8<br />
royalty payments which attracted the provisions of section 40(a)(i) of the Act under<br />
which the royalty payments could have been disallowed, that since there was no<br />
query raised or any discussion made on the issue of allowability of the royalty in the<br />
original assessment proceedings no opinion was formed by the assessing officer and<br />
therefore the petitioner cannot allege that the reopening was prompted by a mere<br />
change of opinion. It is also averred that the assessing officer received information<br />
by way of revenue audit report from the DG Audit, Central Revenue, IP Estate, New<br />
Delhi vide letter dated 03.09.2007 accompanied by a “statement of facts” which was<br />
“thoroughly examined by the AO and only after he was fully satisfied and formed an<br />
opinion that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by way of Royalty<br />
payment that reasons were recorded and notice u/s 148 was issued on<br />
30.03.2010....”, that thus the reopening was “based on information received from<br />
Revenue Audit” and that “an examination of records with reference to the Revenue<br />
Audit Objection also revealed that the petitioner had not disclosed full and true facts<br />
about the capital nature of Royalty payments”. It is denied that the reopening is<br />
based on a mere change of opinion.<br />
17. <b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">It is difficult to sustain the notice issued u/s. 148. The audit objection is only </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">an inference that the royalty payment resulted in a capital benefit; such an opinion </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">expressed by the audit cannot constitute tangible material on the basis of which the </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">assessment can be reopened. In the case of Indian Eastern and Newspaper Society v.</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">CIT, (1979) 119 ITR 996 the Supreme Court expressed the view that information as </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">to correct legal position must come from a formal source or body which is </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">competent to pronounce upon the issue and that revenue audit is not competent to </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">pronounce on issues of law. There is no averment that the revenue audit only </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">pointed out to any factual aspect or material or primary fact that was omitted to be </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">disclosed by the petitioner.</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">18. The alleged non-deduction of tax from the royalty which would authorise the </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">disallowance under section 40(a)(i) is a fact that is mentioned for the first time in the </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">counter-affidavit and it does not find place in the reasons recorded. As noted earlier, </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">it is impermissible to look into any record other than the reasons recorded to judge </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">the validity of the reopening of the assessment. </span></i></b>Further, the statement in the counter-W.P. (C) No.8483/2010, 8485/2010 & 8486/2010 Page 8 of 8<br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">affidavit that the facts relating to the past years disclosed that the petitioner was </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">wholly dependent on the parent company for the technical inputs goes against the </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">revenue, in the sense that it was always known to the revenue that the petitioner did </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">not develop any technology of its own but was dependent on the technology from </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">the parent company. Moreover, it is not for the petitioner to advise the assessing </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">officer as to what inference he should draw as to nature of the expenditure – whether </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">it is revenue or capital in nature.</span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">19. Since the reasons recorded have been prompted by the revenue audit’s </span></i></b><br />
<b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">opinion as admitted in the counter-affidavit, <u>it is not necessary to examine the </u></span></i></b><br />
<u><b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">contention of the revenue based on the observations of the majority in paragraph 23 </span></i></b></u><br />
<u><b><i><span style="color: #cc0000;">of the judgment in CIT v. Usha International Ltd. (supra).</span></i></b></u><br />
20.<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i> In the light of the foregoing, we are of the view that the notice issued u/s. </i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i>148 for the assessment year 2004-05 is also without jurisdiction. The same is </i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i>quashed as also the consequent proceedings.</i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i>21. In the result, all the writ petitions are allowed. The notices u/s.148 and the </i></b></span><br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;"><b><i>consequent proceedings are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.</i></b></span><br />
(R.V. EASWAR)<br />
JUDGE<br />
(S. RAVINDRA BHAT)<br />
JUDGE<br />
JANUARY 2, 2013<br />
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-4514799220874867732012-11-20T16:07:00.000-08:002012-11-20T16:07:01.375-08:00There is no serious dispute about the fact that Venkata Raju and Pullam Raju continued to be members of the family as can be seen from the allegations in the plaint. In this connection, it is useful to refer to Section 6 of the Act prior to amendment. “Explanation 1:- For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2:- Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein”. 11. Therefore, when Pullam Raju did not leave behind any female heir or legal heir through his explanation will not operate and by virtue of Section 6 of the Act by virtue of survivorship, the property will devolve upon Venkata Raju. Consequently, the father of the plaintiff or the plaintiff cannot claim any rights in the property.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO</div>
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<span lang="EN-IN">SECOND APPEAL No.13 OF 2012</span></h2>
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JUDGMENT:-</h3>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.25 of 2005 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kothapeta, is the appellant herein.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">2. <b><i> The suit was one filed for partition of the ‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties into three shares, allotment of one such share from each schedule to the plaintiff and plaint ‘B’ schedule properties into three shares and that allotment of two shares to the plaintiff.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">3. The allegations in the plaint go to show that </span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">one Venkata Raju has got two sons, who are Subba Raju, the father of the plaintiff and Pullam Raju.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">The father of the plaintiff filed O.S.No.3 of 1973 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Razole, for partition and there was a compromise and </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">father of the plaintiff was allotted some property and</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> Venkata Raju got ‘A’ schedule property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Pullam Raju is alleged to have allotted ‘B’ schedule property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Pullam Raju is unmarried and pre-deceased to his brother and </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Venkata Raju died in 1985.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">4. <b><i><u>Defendants 1 and 2 are children of defendant No.3. The 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant is second wife of Venkata Raju. </u></i></b></span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">After the death of Pullam Raju and Venkata Raju, the ‘B’ schedule property was taken possession by the defendants and </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">the ‘C’ schedule property was acquired by Venkata Raju from the income of the other properties.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Therefore, they are ancestral properties.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Venkata Raju died intestate on 12.02.2003 and </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">the defendants took possession of all the properties and managed the same.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"><b><i>Though shared the profits for sometime with the plaintiff, subsequently they did not give the share to the plaintiff.</i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"><b><i>It was pleaded that the Pullam Raju having died intestate and unmarried his share of property devolved upon Venkata Raju and Subba Raju and they are entitled to half share each</i></b> and </span></li>
<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">half share of Venkata Raju is again liable for partition among the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Subba Raju is entitled for 1/3</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">rd</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">share of the half share of Venkata Raju and </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">the plaintiff being legal heir of Subba Raju is entitled for the same.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">It was contended by the plaintiff that the plaintiff is entitled for 1/3</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">rd</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">share in the ‘C’ schedule property also.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">5. Defendants contended that</span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> in the compromise decree, Venkata Raju got 75 cents at Vedireswaram and 65 cents at the same place apart from 10 cents of house site.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">He also got some property at Deverapally.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Venkata Raju acquired the ‘C’ schedule property by his own business.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the schedule property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">6. <b><i> After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court has dismissed the suit and though a Will-Ex.B.7 by Venkata Raju was set up without any pleading, it was also accepted and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.</i></b> </span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Against that, the plaintiff has carried the matter in appeal in A.S.No.14 of 2008 and <b><i><u>the Senior Civil Judge, Kothapeta, set aside the finding of the lower Court with regard to the Will </u>and applying the explanation to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act (for short, ‘the Act’), dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.</i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">Aggrieved by the said judgment the present appeal is filed.</span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">7. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the Courts below have not properly appreciated the legal aspect and </span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">as Venkata Raju died intestate and as Pullam Raju has also died intestate, the father of the plaintiff will be entitled to the share in the property, consequently, the plaintiff will be entitled to the said shares.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">8.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">There is no dispute about the fact that the father of the plaintiff filed the suit for partition and a decree was granted with regard to his share only as per Ex.B.9.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">It is also not in dispute that the other son Pullam Raju and the father Venkata Raju lived together and continued as co-parceners and members of the joint family.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">9. The point to be considered is </span></div>
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<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;">whether after the death of Pullam Raju, his share of property is liable for partition or will be succeeded by his father Venkata Raju by survivorship.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt;"> </span></i></b></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">10. <b><i>There is no serious dispute about the fact that Venkata Raju and Pullam Raju continued to be members of the family as can be seen from the allegations in the plaint. In this connection, it is useful to refer to Section 6 of the Act prior to amendment.<o:p></o:p></i></b></span></div>
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<b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 22px;">“Explanation 1:- For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 22px;"><b><i> Explanation 2:- Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein”.<o:p></o:p></i></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i>11. Therefore, when Pullam Raju did not leave behind any female heir or legal heir through his explanation will not operate and by virtue of Section 6 of the Act by virtue of survivorship, the property will devolve upon Venkata Raju. Consequently, the father of the plaintiff or the plaintiff cannot claim any rights in the property.</i></b> Further, the question is as to whether after the death of Venkata Raju since he has got wife as a class one heir and also the other legal heirs through her children since explanation No.1 lays down that the succession can only be by applying the Section 8 of the Act. The next question is as to whether the plaintiff is not entitled for any share in the property of Venkata Raju, who died intestate. The Court below has taken into consideration explanation ‘2’ of Section 6 of the Act and as the father of the plaintiff is already divided, the benefit of explanation ‘1’ will not inure to the plaintiff and consequently, there cannot be any share for the plaintiff.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">12. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to contend that the share of Pullam Raju in ‘B’ schedule is liable for partition as the plaintiff is a class 2 heir and as both Venkata Raju and Pullam Raju died intestate, so far as the properties of Venkata Raju are concerned, as a class one heir, the plaintiff is entitled for the property and so far as the properties of Pullam Raju are concerned, he is entitled for a share as class ‘2’ heir.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">13. The claim made by the appellant has already been decided and there is no ambiguity about the question of law. It is useful to refer to the decision reported in <b>Ganta Appalanaidu Vs. Ganta Narayanamma and others<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><b><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></b></span></span></a>, </b>it will be appropriate to extract paragraph ‘5’ at page 260, which is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 22px;">“5. Explanation 2 to Section 6 also does not help the defendants in the present case. According to the proviso to Section 6 the interest of a male Hindu in coparcenary property shall not devolve by survivorship if there is a female relative specified in class ‘1’ of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative. That is to say, even though the property is coparcenary property which should devolve on the surviving coparceners in accordance with the main provision of Section 6, it shall not so devolve if there is a female relative specified in class (1) etc. In such an event, the property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession as the case may be. Explanation 2 provides that a separated member of the coparcenary cannot take advantage of the proviso to claim a share in property. An example will make the position clear. Suppose A dies leaving a divided son B, an undivided son C and a widow D. At the time of his death A and C alone are members of a coparcenary. On A’s death his half share in the coparcenary property shall not go by survivorship to C since there is a female relative specified in Class I. It shall devolve by intestate succession. The two sons and the widow will be heirs but Explanation 2 excludes the divided son B. The result therefore is that the half share of A in the coparcenary property shall devolve by intestate succession on C, his undivided son and D, his widow. That is all the effect of the explanation. Where property which ought to devolve by survivorship on an undivided coparcener under the main provision of Section 6 devolves on the heirs as if on intestacy because of the existence of the female relative etc., mentioned in the proviso to Section 6, the explanation provides that the divided coparcener, nonetheless, shall not claim as an heir. The explanation does not however prevent a divided son from claiming succession on intestacy if there is no person on whom the property can devolve by survivorship in accordance with the provisions of Section 6. Section 8 applies to every case of a Hindu dying intestate leaving no one on whom the property can devolve by survivorship”.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">14. Evidently, the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant is son of Venkata Raju through the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant and he creates a coparcenary with Venkata Raju and under Section 6 of the Act, he would have got the property but for the fact that the deceased left behind him female member, who is class one heir i.e., the 3<sup>rd</sup> defendant, the wife. Therefore, in view of the above principle of law, the plaintiff, who is the son of Subba Raju and who has divided from other coparceners, cannot get any share in the property. Though it was sought to be contended that ‘B’ Schedule property was allotted to the share of Pullam Raju, there is no material and Ex.B.9 compromise decree clearly shows that plaintiff’s father alone has got his share from the joint family properties and the remaining properties are still joint kin between Venkata Raju and Pullam Raju. In fact, it is a finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below, does not call for any interference.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">15. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision reported in <b>Satyanarain Mahto and other Vs. Rameshwar Mahto and others<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><b><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[2]</span></b></span></span></a></b>, wherein it was found that explanation 2 has no application where all the sons and the father have separated and there was no copercenary. In fact, the decision of this Court referred above was considered with approval. He also relied upon a decision reported in <b>G.V. Kishan Rao Vs. State of A.P.<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><b><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[3]</span></b></span></span></a>,</b> which has also no application to the facts of this case. So also the decision reported in <b>Savitri Amma Vs. Devki Amma and others<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><b><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[4]</span></b></span></span></a></b> has also no application to the facts of this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">16. Therefore, for all the above reasons, I find that there is no substantial question of law since it has been already decided by the Court in the decision referred supra and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> <b><i>Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> _______________________________<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO</h4>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Date:16.07.2012<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Note: L.R. Copy to be marked.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> (B/O.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> INL <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a> <span style="font-family: Tahoma;">AIR 1972 AP 258<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[2]</span></span></span></a> <span style="font-family: Tahoma;">AIR 1982 PATNA 44<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[3]</span></span></span></a> <span style="font-family: Tahoma;">AIR 1987 AP 239<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/sa/sa_13_2012.html#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[4]</span></span></span></a> <span style="font-family: Tahoma;">AIR 1982 KARNATAKA 67</span></div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-51870548415049181032012-11-20T15:17:00.001-08:002012-11-20T15:21:38.458-08:00It is well settled that there cannot be any adverse possession for a person against his own property. In this case, the plaintiff claims that the sale has taken place in 1990 and she has become the owner of the property and consequently, her animus is as an owner of the property in her own name and not in enjoyment of the property belonging to some other person as an owner. ;the grant of injunction is an equitable relief and the conduct of the plaintiff in seeking such a relief should be fair. When the plaintiff is not admitting her possession as a tenant, setting up a plea of purchase under oral sale and also being in possession without filing a suit for specific performance of the agreement, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the relief of injunction when the contractual term stipulates the registration of the document.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO</div>
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<span lang="EN-IN">SECOND APPEAL No.15 OF 2012</span></h2>
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JUDGMENT:-</h3>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> The plaintiff in O.S.No.711 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Guntur</st1:city></st1:place>, is the appellant herein.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">2. <b><i> The suit was filed for confirmation of title and possession and for consequential injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">3.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">According to the case of the plaintiff, </span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendants Nos.1 and 2 are her own sisters.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Defendants Nos.1 and 2 purchased the suit schedule property from one G.Tulasamma under the registered sale deed dated 04.08.1971.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.8,000/- on 14.05.1987 and Rs.8,600/- on 04.08.1988 from the plaintiff</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">for agricultural purposes and executed promissory notes.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Subsequently, the said debts could not be discharged.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Therefore, the defendants accepted the said borrowing and agreed to sell the property orally as the borrowing was for the family necessity.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The consideration under the promissory notes was adjusted towards the sale consideration to a tune of Rs.25,000/-.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The plaintiff was put in possession of the property on 01.05.1990 and as per the understanding the defendants agreed to register the property as and when called for.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The mutation of the name of the plaintiff was accepted in the revenue records and pattadar pass book was also issued.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The plaintiff also took crop loan from mortgaging schedule property and revenue record discloses the possession and enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Though the cist was being paid, <b><i><u>the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment in her own right since 1990 and therefore, the suit was filed for confirmation of title.</u></i></b></span><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Though the plaintiff and defendants have agreed to execute a registered sale deed, no registered sale deed was obtained.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The plaintiff is entitled to assert right in the schedule property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The defendants have been making hectic efforts to deny the right of the plaintiff, and therefore, the suit was filed.</span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">4. The defendants contended the 2<sup>nd</sup> defendant was married and living at <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Visakhapatnam</st1:place></st1:city> since 1986 and the 1<sup>st</sup> defendant has been cultivating the lands on her behalf. The 1<sup>st</sup> defendant was in custody of the original title deeds. </span></div>
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<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The property was leased out to the plaintiff for a period of ten years as some monies were borrowed by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant and the Maktha should have appropriated towards the debt.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The original sale deeds were also taken by the plaintiff by putting the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant in dark and they were not returned.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The plaintiff paid Maktha for some time and did not pay subsequently.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The 2</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">nd</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant separately pleaded that she never sold the property and came to know that the plaintiff obtained pattadar pass book and managed revenue entries and filed an appeal before the revenue authorities and the same is pending.</span></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The debts borrowed by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant do not bind on the 2</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">nd</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant.</span></i></b></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">5. On the basis of the above pleadings, evidence was let-in and </span></div>
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<li><b style="font-family: Tahoma;"><i>the trial Court found that the oral sale was not proved and also found that no title passes under the oral sale without there being a registration and consequently, the suit was dismissed.</i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Aggrieved by the said judgment, A.S.No.421 of 2000 was preferred to the VI Additional District Judge (</span><st1:street style="font-family: Tahoma;" w:st="on"><st1:address w:st="on">Fast Track Court</st1:address></st1:street><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">),</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><st1:city style="font-family: Tahoma;" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Guntur</st1:place></st1:city><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">and he also dismissed the said suit.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal is filed.</span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">6. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the suit filed by the plaintiff is valid and original sale deed Ex.A.1 was with the plaintiff and borrowing under Exs.A.2 and A.3 was proved and further contended that as the possession of the plaintiff is admitted over the suit schedule property as a tenant, Courts below should have granted the injunction.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">7. <b><i><u>Evidently, in order to succeed in the suit, </u></i></b></span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i><u>the plaintiff has to prove the factum of oral sale and also the alternative plea of establishing title by adverse possession.</u></i></b></span><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Though generally for a transfer of immovable property, a registered sale deed is required, </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i><u>but in case of persons, who are in possession of the property, oral sale can be accepted after the payment of the entire consideration by the purchaser to the vendor or the possession of the property is made over to the purchaser.</u></i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">But, however, in order to substantiate the oral sale, it has to be proved that the persons, who have got title to the property, have conveyed the same.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Evidently, according to the case of the plaintiff, the oral sale was done by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The 2</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">nd</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i><u>defendant is joint owner of the property</u></i></b> and </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">there is nothing on record to show that she has also sold the property and received any consideration.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The debts that were said to have been borrowed by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant are for his family benefit, consequently the oral sale that was said to have been entered by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant is not from the real owner of the property and consequently, it cannot be taken into consideration.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></i></b><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Even otherwise if the parties have contemplated under the oral sale that there shall be no further act to be done by any of the parties, the sale is complete.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
<li><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">But, however, in this case, it is the specific plea of the plaintiff that an agreement was arrived at, but subsequently a registered sale deed has to be executed.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></i></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Therefore, it is quite clear that the parties intended it to be only a contract and not a concluded sale.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">If really the sale is true, the endorsement should have been made on the reverse of the promissory notes Exs.A.2 and A.3 about the alleged sale of the property and discharge of the promissory notes debt.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></u></i></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The absence of such an endorsement clearly shows that the claim of the plaintiff cannot be accepted.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">8. In fact,</span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> it is the specific case of the plaintiff that the property was sold by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant and <b><i>though an authority is pleaded given by the defendants, there is nothing in writing.</i></b></span><b><i><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></i></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i><u>Consequently, the sale set up by the plaintiff is not valid.</u></i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">The Courts below have rightly found that the sale transaction entered by the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant will not bind on the 2</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">nd</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Merely the plaintiff got possession of the original document probably from the husband of the 1</span><sup style="font-family: Tahoma;">st</sup><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">defendant, it will not advance her case.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i><u>If really the sale is complete and the plaintiff has derived title in the property by virtue of adverse possession, the suit should have been filed for a declaration of title.</u></i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">It was sought to be contended that when the long possession of the plaintiff is admitted, the Court should have granted an injunction against the defendants.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i>But, however, it is to be noted that the grant of injunction is an equitable relief and the conduct of the plaintiff in seeking such a relief should be fair.</i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><b><i><u><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">When</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">the plaintiff is not admitting her possession as a tenant, setting up a plea of purchase under oral sale and also being in possession without filing a suit for specific performance of the agreement, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the relief of injunction when the contractual term stipulates the registration of the document.</span></u></i></b></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">9. So far as the plea of adverse possession is concerned, </span></div>
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<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">it postulates an intention on the part of the enjoyer to treat the property in his possession belonging to some other as his own property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">It is well settled that there cannot be any adverse possession for a person against his own property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">In this case, the plaintiff claims that the sale has taken place in 1990 and <b><i><u>she has become the owner of the property and consequently, her animus is as an owner of the property in her own name and not in enjoyment of the property belonging to some other person as an owner.</u></i></b></span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><b><i><u> </u></i></b></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Therefore, even the plea under Section 53 of the Specific Relief Act is not open since there is no agreement in writing to sell the property.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Consequently, there are no merits in the appeal and there are no grounds to admit.</span></li>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">10. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.</span><span style="font-family: Tahoma;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;"> _______________________________<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO</h4>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">Date:24.07.2012<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Tahoma;">INL </span></div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-69431145359751322592012-11-19T17:42:00.001-08:002012-11-19T17:44:48.106-08:00What is prima faice proof = For seeking temporary injunction, the petitioner has to prove that she is in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property on the date of filing of the suit and that she has to comply the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience in her favour and irreparable loss being caused to her if temporary injunction is not granted. The petitioner in order to prove her possession over the petition schedule property has filed documents - Exs.A.3, A.4 and A.5. But, Exs.A.3 to A.5 are issued based on Exs.A.1 and A.7, and these documents do not in any way establish the possession of the petitioner over the petition schedule property. Except, Exs.A.3 to A.5, the petitioner has not filed any authentic material to show that she is in possession of the petition schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner has prima facie proved her possession over the petition schedule property. So far as the admission of respondent No.1 in his deposition and the report of the Advocate Commissioner in O.S.No.234 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur are concerned, the petitioner has to bring the same on record during the course of the trial in the suit and it cannot be dealt with at this interlocutory stage. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
<br />
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA <br />
<br />
C.M. A. No.437 of 2005<br />
<br />
04.10.2012 <br />
<br />
Urumula Yellamma w/o.late Venkatappa Reddy <br />
<br />
1)Pullapati Raja Rao, 2)Pullapati Rupadhar, 3) Pullapati Lata, 4)Pullapati<br />
Usharani<br />
<br />
Counsel for the Appellant: Sri K.S.Murthy<br />
<br />
Counsel for Respondent No.1: Sri P.Thirumala Rao<br />
<br />
^Counsel for Respondents 2 to 4 : Sri Upendra Chakravarthy<br />
<br />
<GIST :<br />
<br />
>HEAD NOTE : <br />
<br />
?Cases referred :<br />
<br />
JUDGMENT: <br />
<br />
This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred assailing the order<br />
dated 11.03.2005 in I.A. No.1205 of 2004 in O.S. No.497 of 2004 on the file of<br />
the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur.<br />
<br />
2. <b><i>The appellant herein is the petitioner - plaintiff and the respondents</i></b><br />
<b><i>herein are the respondents - defendants in the I.A. </i></b> Suit is filed <b><i>for</i></b><br />
<b><i>declaration and for consequential injunction</i></b> restraining the respondents -<br />
defendants, their men from interfering with possession and enjoyment of the<br />
petitioner - plaintiff over the suit schedule property.<br />
<br />
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they<br />
arrayed in the I.A.<br />
<br />
4. <b><i>The petitioner filed the present I.A. under Order 39</i></b><br />
<b><i>Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC') for temporary</i></b><br />
<b><i>injunction restraining the respondents, </i></b>their men, agents etc. in any way<br />
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner over<br />
the petition schedule property or from entering into any transactions of<br />
alienation or lien or charge pending disposal of the suit. After enquiry, the<br />
<b><i><u>trial Court dismissed the I.A. holding that the petitioner has not proved prima</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss.</u></i></b> Aggrieved thereby, the<br />
petitioner filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.<br />
<br />
5. It is the case of the petitioner before the trial Court that originally<br />
<br />
<b><ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i>her mother - Challa Narasamma had purchased the petition schedule property from </i></b></li>
</ul>
</b><ol style="text-align: left;">
</ol>
<br />
<b><i>respondent No.1 - Pulipati Raja Rao and his mother under notarized agreement of</i></b><br />
<b><i>sale dated 15.11.1974 and possession was also delivered to her.</i></b> <br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>Thereafter,</li>
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: left;">
</ol>
<br />
<b><i>petitioner's mother - Challa Narasamma and brother - Sambireddy had sold the</i></b><br />
<b><i>property in favour of the petitioner under sale deed dated 2.4.2002 and she has</i></b><br />
<b><i>been in possession and enjoyment of the same.</i></b> <br />
The respondents without any<br />
manner of right are trying to interfere with peaceful possession of the<br />
petitioner over the petition schedule property. Hence the petitioner preferred<br />
the present I.A.<br />
<br />
6. It is the case of the respondents before the trial Court that<br />
<br />
<b><ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i><u> respondent</u></i></b></li>
</ul>
</b><ol style="text-align: left;">
</ol>
<br />
<b><i><u>No.1 or his mother never sold any property under the alleged agreement of sale</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>dated 15.11.1974 to the petitioner's mother - Challa Narasamma and they never</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>delivered possession of the petition schedule property to her.</u> </i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>In fact, the</li>
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: left;">
</ol>
<br />
<b><i>respondents are in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property.</i></b><br />
<br />
<b><ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i>The petitioner is making all efforts to mutate her name in the revenue records</i></b></li>
</ul>
</b><ol style="text-align: left;">
</ol>
<br />
<b><i>in respect of the petition schedule property. </i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>Further, <b><i><u>with regard to the</u></i></b></li>
</ul>
<ol style="text-align: left;">
</ol>
<br />
<b><i><u>petition schedule property,</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>O.S. No.34 of 1999 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Guntur, is</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>pending.</u></i></b><br />
<br />
7. Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the material<br />
available on record.<br />
<br />
8. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner (appellant<br />
herein) that<br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li> the trial Court should have seen that <b><i>from the date of agreement of</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>sale, the mother of the petitioner was in possession and thereafter pursuant to</i></b><br />
<b><i>the sale deed, the petitioner is in possession of the petition schedule property</i></b><br />
<b><i>and the same is evident from Exs.A.1 to A.8. </i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>The trial Court failed to notice</li>
</ul>
<br />
that<b><i> respondent No.1 admitted in his deposition in O.S.No.234 of 1979 on the</i></b><br />
<b><i>file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur that he and his mother sold away Ac.2-00</i></b><br />
<b><i>to the mother of the petitioner about 10 years back. </i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>The trial Court, <b><i>while</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>dealing with a temporary injunction application, ought not to have gone into</i></b><br />
<b><i>title, and it ought to have seen who is in actual possession of petition</i></b><br />
<b><i>schedule property.</i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li> Further, the trial Court failed to notice that<b><i> in O.S.No.234</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>of 1979, the advocate commissioner in his report stated that petitioner herein</i></b><br />
<b><i>purchased the petition schedule property and has been in possession of the same.</i></b><br />
<br />
9. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned order<br />
passed by the trial Court needs no interference at the hands of this Court as<br />
the trial Court has given cogent and convincing reasons for dismissing the<br />
application filed by the petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC. As<br />
such, there are no merits in the C.M.A. and the same is liable to be dismissed.<br />
<br />
10. It is seen that<br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li> <b><i>the petitioner claiming title and possession over the</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>petition schedule property by mainly relying on documents Exs.A.7- agreement of</i></b><br />
<b><i>sale dated 15.11.1974 and </i></b><br />
<b><i>A.1 -sale deed dated 02.04.2002.</i></b> <br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li> It is the contention of the petitioner that</li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>originally her mother - Challa Narasamma purchased the petition schedule</i></b><br />
<b><i>property from respondent No.1 and his mother under notarized agreement of sale</i></b><br />
<b><i>dated 15.11.1974 and that they delivered possession of the same to her mother -</i></b><br />
<b><i>Challa Narsamma and thereafter, petitioner's mother and brother - Sambireddy</i></b><br />
<b><i>sold the property to the petitioner vide registered sale deed dated 2.4.2002 and</i></b><br />
<b><i>since then she has been in possession of the same.</i></b> <br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>The order under appeal <b><i>does</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>not indicate the extent of the petition schedule property</i></b>. <br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>It is the contention</li>
</ul>
<br />
o<b><i>f the respondents that the petitioner is never in possession of the petition</i></b><br />
<b><i>schedule property.</i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i><u>For seeking temporary injunction, the petitioner has to prove</u></i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i><u>that she is in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property on the</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>date of filing of the suit and that she has to comply the provisions of Order</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience in her</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>favour and irreparable loss being caused to her if temporary injunction is not</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>granted. </u></i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i>The petitioner in order to prove her possession over the petition</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>schedule property has filed documents - Exs.A.3, A.4 and A.5. But, Exs.A.3 to</i></b><br />
<b><i>A.5 are issued based on Exs.A.1 and A.7, and these documents do not in any way </i></b><br />
<b><i>establish the possession of the petitioner over the petition schedule property.</i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i>Except, Exs.A.3 to A.5, the petitioner has not filed any authentic material to</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>show that she is in possession of the petition schedule property as on the date</i></b><br />
<b><i>of filing of the suit. </i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i>As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner has prima</i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i>facie proved her possession over the petition schedule property.</i></b><br />
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b><i><u> So far as the</u></i></b></li>
</ul>
<br />
<b><i><u>admission of respondent No.1 in his deposition and the report of the Advocate</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>Commissioner in O.S.No.234 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>are concerned, the petitioner has to bring the same on record during the course</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>of the trial in the suit and it cannot be dealt with at this interlocutory</u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>stage.</u></i></b><br />
<br />
11. In view of the above discussion and having regard to the facts and<br />
circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the<br />
impugned order passed by the trial Court does not suffer from any illegality or<br />
irregularity warranting interference from this Court, and as such, the C.M.A. is<br />
liable to be dismissed.<br />
<br />
12. In the result, the C.M.A. is dismissed. There shall be no order as to<br />
costs. Since the suit is of the year 2004, the trial Court is directed to<br />
dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, uninfluenced by any of the<br />
observations made by this Court in this order.<br />
<br />
_________________ <br />
B.N. RAO NALLA, J <br />
Date:04.10.2012<br />
<br /></div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-87535071167065226352012-11-16T08:13:00.000-08:002012-11-16T08:13:22.281-08:00the principles of res judicata without considering the voluminous evidence placed by the plaintiff to support the title to the property. According to him, the enquiry under Section 30 of Land Acquisition Act is of a limited nature and any decision with regard to title therein will not operate as res judicata. In this connection, it is to be noted that by virtue of the amendment of Civil Procedure Code in 1976, as per the explanation (8) of Section.11 the issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction shall also operate as res judicata. Evidently, the claim before the Land Acquisition Officer is based on the same facts of title acquired by the plaintiff. The court has framed necessary issues and decided the title which was a point of controversy between the parties. When the part of the suit land was held to be the land belonging to the third defendant and when such finding has become final as rightly held by the courts below, no further decision contrary to the earlier finding can be undertaken. Even otherwise, the records filed by the defendants shows that the land is inam land and evidently it was meant for the deity. The pleadings on the part of the plaintiffs is also not clear as to when imams were abolished and when Nuzivid is zamindar village whether the partition between the vendor of the plaintiffs’ father and other brothers relate to the family land. Further more, after the abolition of the imams also, the plaintiffs have not obtained any patta from the Settlement Officer. There is nothing on record to show that a personal grant given to any person for the services to be rendered or if any other purpose is alienable though it may be inheritable. Therefore, from the facts and circumstances of the case, when part of the land is found to be the land belonging to the deity, there cannot be any contrary view to be taken.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 10pt;">SECOND APPEAL NO.347 OF 2011<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 29px;">JUDGMENT:-<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;"> The plaintiffs in O.S.No.42 of 1991 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Nuzvidu, Krishna District are the appellant herein.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;"><b><i>The suit was filed for declaration of title of the second plaintiff to the suit schedule property, which is an extent of Ac.6.99 cents of land situated at Nadim Tiruvur and for an injunction.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">The contention of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule property is known as Ganga Ragi Chettu Thota. The half of the schedule property was purchased by the first plaintiff’s father from one late Shaik Gulam Ali Saheb in the year 1938 and the second half of the said land was purchased by one late Rajah Vellanki Radhakrishna Rao from one Shaik Kandam Bibi and he in turn sold the property to the plaintiffs’ father in the year 1944 for a sum of Rs.800/-. <b><i><u>The revenue records show that the land was leased out to Shiak Gulam Ali Saheb by the Rajah. The inam fair register does not show that it is an inam land which is claimed by the third defendant.</u></i></b> The plaintiff has been exercising the right of ownership and possession over the entire suit schedule property. The ryotwari passbook was also issued to the plaintiffs. Part of the suit land which is an extent Ac.0.55 cents was acquired by the Government and a reference was made to the civil court in O.P.No.6 of 1984. In that the land was held to be the Government land. As against that the appeal A.S.No.1421 of 1985 was carried and the judgment was confirmed. <b><i><u>The defendants, therefore, contended that the land was granted as Inam to the deity and the inam B register clearly goes to prove the same. In 10(1) Adangal Account maintained by the Government, the third defendant is shown as the owner of the property. The question of extinguishing of title does not arise. The title of the plaintiff has been seriously disputed.</u></i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;"><b><i>After considering the evidence on record, the trial court has considered the issue<u> based on principles of res judicata </u>and held that the suit is liable to be dismissed.</i></b> As against that Appeal A.S.No.40 of 2002 was preferred to the VIII Additional District Judge,<st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vijayawada</st1:place></st1:city>, who also dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present Second Appeal is sought to be filed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, the learned Senior Counsel representing the counsel for the appellants contends that both the courts below have misapplied <b><i>the principles of res judicata without considering the voluminous evidence placed by the plaintiff to support the title to the property. According to him, the enquiry under Section 30 of Land Acquisition Act is of a limited nature and any decision with regard to title therein will not operate as res judicata. In this connection, it is to be noted that by virtue of the amendment of Civil Procedure Code in 1976, as per the explanation (8) of Section.11 the issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction shall also operate as res judicata. Evidently, the claim before the Land Acquisition Officer is based on the same facts of title acquired by the plaintiff. The court has framed necessary issues and decided the title which was a point of controversy between the parties. When the part of the suit land was held to be the land belonging to the third defendant and when such finding has become final as rightly held by the courts below, no further decision contrary to the earlier finding can be undertaken. Even otherwise, the records filed by the defendants shows that the land is inam land and evidently it was meant for the deity. The pleadings on the part of the plaintiffs is also not clear as to when imams were abolished and when Nuzivid is zamindar village whether the partition between the vendor of the plaintiffs’ father and other brothers relate to the family land. Further more, after the abolition of the imams also, the plaintiffs have not obtained any patta from the Settlement Officer. There is nothing on record to show that a personal grant given to any person for the services to be rendered or if any other purpose is alienable though it may be inheritable. Therefore, from the facts and circumstances of the case, when part of the land is found to be the land belonging to the deity, there cannot be any contrary view to be taken.</i></b> The contention of the counsel for the appellants cannot be entertained in view of the settled proposition of land and also in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in<b><i> Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair(<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2011/sa/sa_347_2011.html#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></b></span></span></a>)</i></b>. Therefore, I find no merits in the appeal and there are no substantial questions of law to be entertained in this Second Appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">_______________________<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">N.R.L.</span></b><b><i><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 9pt;"> </span></i></b><b><i><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">NĀGESWARA RĀO</span></i></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: Verdana;">,</span></b><b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">J</span></b><b><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 15pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">28-08-2012<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-IN" style="font-family: Verdana;">TSNR</span></div>
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<div id="ftn1">
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2011/sa/sa_347_2011.html#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span lang="EN-IN"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span lang="EN-IN" style="font-size: 10pt;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span lang="EN-IN"> </span>(1994) 2 SCC 14 = AIR 1994 SC 152</div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-45087973079145856132012-11-11T23:04:00.003-08:002012-11-11T23:05:10.410-08:00 CASH ACCEPTANCE AGAINST TO THE PROVISION OF SEC. 271 Dwhether the assessee has accepted cash loan from M/s. Lahari Green Park, in contravention of S.269SS of the Act, so as to invite the rigour of the penal provision of S.271D of the Act. It is the case of the Department that the assessee has accepted cash loan in contravention of the provisions under S.269SS, whereas the assessee’s consistent stand has been that there was no cash loan, and whatever has happened was only by way of journal entries in the books of the firm in respect of the transactions between the proprietary concern, M/s. Lahari Green Park and the vendor, without her knowledge or involvement. This claim of the assessee that there was no cash flow between the proprietary firm and the assessee, and whatever happened was only by way of passing of journal entries in the books of the proprietary concern needs to be verified from the records of the firm. However, from the records available before us, we are not able to decide the issue as to whether the assessee has taken cash loan as stated by ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad. 6 the department, or there are only journal entries as claimed by the assessee, since material to that effect have not been furnished before us. We therefore, deem it just and proper to remit the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer, to verify the fact as to whether the assessee has actually received cash loan from M/s. Lahari Green Park or there were mere journal entries to that effect. If ultimately, it is found that no cash loan was actually received by the assessee in the course of the transaction and there were only journal entries to that effect. then no penalty can be levied under S.271D of the Act. The Assessing Officer shall accordingly redecide the issue of applicability of the penal provisions of S.271D of the Act to the facts of the present case, in accordance with law, keeping in view our aforesaid direction, and after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL<br />
HYDERABAD BENCH ‘B', HYDERABAD<br />
BEFORE SHRI CHANDRA POOJARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER<br />
AND SHRI SAKTIJIT DEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER<br />
ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 : Assessment year 2005-06<br />
Dy. Commissioner of Incometax Central Circle 6, Hyderabad <br />
V/s. Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi,<br />
Hyderabad.<br />
( PAN - ADBPG 1396 H)<br />
<br />
(Appellant) (Respondent)<br />
<br />
Cross Objection No.129/Hyd/2012<br />
(in ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012) : Assessment year 2005-06<br />
Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi,<br />
Hyderabad.<br />
( PAN - ADBPG 1396 H)<br />
V/s. Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax<br />
Central Circle 6, Hyderabad <br />
(Appellant) (Respondent)<br />
Assessee by : Smt. Amisha S.Gupt DR<br />
Department by : Shri J.J.Varun<br />
Date of Hearing 5.11.2012<br />
Date of Pronouncement 9.11.2012<br />
O R D E R<br />
Per Saktijit Dey, Judicial Member:<br />
This appeal by the Revenue and cross objection by the assessee<br />
are directed against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals) I,<br />
Hyderabad date 25.5.2012 for the assessment year 2005-06. Since a ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 <br />
Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad.<br />
<br />
<br />
2<br />
common issue is involved, these appeals are being disposed off with this<br />
common order for the sake of convenience.<br />
2. <b><i>The only issue involved in the appeal of the Revenue relates to </i></b><br />
<b><i>the action of the CIT(A) in cancelling the penalty of Rs.24,01,500 levied by </i></b><br />
<b><i>the Assessing Officer for the assessment year 2005-06 under S.271D of the </i></b><br />
<b><i>Act. By the cross-objection, the assessee merely supports the action of the </i></b><br />
<b><i>CIT(A) in cancelling the penalty. </i></b><br />
3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that in the course of assessment <br />
proceedings, the Assessing Officer noticed that during the relevant financial<br />
year, the assessee has purchased a land, and for purchasing the land, the<br />
assessee has received cash loan of Rs.24,01,500 from M/s. Lahari Green<br />
Park, which happens to be the proprietary concern of the assessee’s husband,<br />
Shri G.Hari Babu. The Assessing Officer made addition of the aforesaid<br />
amount under S.68 of the Act, while completing the assessment. The<br />
assessee challenged the addition made before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) deleted<br />
the addition made under S.68 of the Act, by observing that the cash loan<br />
taken by the assessee from M/s. Lahari Green Park has been shown in the<br />
Receipts and Payments Account, and therefore, no addition can be made<br />
under S.68 of the Act. <b><i>The Assessing Officer noting that the CIT(A) while </i></b><br />
<b><i>deleting the addition made under S.68 of the Act, had observed that the </i></b><br />
<b><i>assessee had taken cash loan, was of the view that there is contravention of </i></b><br />
<b><i>the provisions of S.269SS of the Income-tax Act6, as cash loan was accepted </i></b><br />
<b><i>by the assessee. The Assessing Officer therefore, initiated proceedings for </i></b><br />
<b><i>imposition of penalty under S.271D of the Act. The assessee, in her </i></b><br />
<b><i>explanation, submitted before the Assessing Officer that since the CIT(A) has </i></b><br />
<b><i>observed that there is no cash credit under S.68 of the Act, there cannot be </i></b><br />
<b><i>any violation of the provisions of S.269SS of the Act.</i></b> It was further ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 <br />
Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad.<br />
<br />
<br />
3<br />
submitted by the assessee that though land was purchased in the name of<br />
the assessee, the payment was made by M/s. Lahari Green Park. At the end<br />
of the year, when the land was registered, the land account was debited in<br />
the books of M/s. Lahari Green Park and the party in whose name, the land<br />
was purchased, i.e. the assessee, was credited in the books of M/s. Lahari<br />
Green Park., Thus, in effect, there was no cash loan received by the assessee<br />
and as such there was no contravention of the provisions of S.269SS of the<br />
Act. The Assessing Officer, however, did not accept the explanation of the<br />
assessee, by holding that the character of the transaction between M/s.<br />
Lahari Green Park and the assessee, is a loan which has been taken by the<br />
assessee in cash, and therefore, the penal provisions of S.271D are attracted. <br />
With the aforesaid conclusion, the Assessing Officer imposed penalty of<br />
Rs.24,01,500 under S.271D of the Act, vide order of penalty dated<br />
25.5.2012. <br />
4. The assessee challenged the imposition of penalty, by filing an<br />
appeal before the CIT(A). In the course of hearing before the CIT(A), it was<br />
contended by the assessee that M/s. Lahari Green Park had purchased the<br />
land in question in the name of the assessee by passing journal entry in the<br />
books. Subsequently, the land was transferred to M/s. Lahari Green Park at<br />
the same value, and the assessee has not derived any benefit out of this<br />
transaction. It was contended that in reality, there was no cash transfer by<br />
M/s. Lahari Green Park to the assessee, but only book entries were made at<br />
the time of purchase and at the time of sale. The sale consideration was paid<br />
directly by M/s. Lahari Green Park to the vendor. It was contended by the<br />
assessee that she neither received the money nor made any payment to M/s.<br />
Lahari Green Park and hence no penalty under S.271D can be imposed. It<br />
was further contended by the assessee that the cash payment by M/s. Lahari ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 <br />
Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad.<br />
<br />
<br />
4<br />
Green Park has been considered in the assessment of the proprietor, Shri<br />
G.Hari Babu, and disallowance has been made under S.40A(3). <br />
5. <b><i><u>The CIT(A) after considering the contentions raised by the </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>assessee came to a conclusion that though there is no dispute to the fact that </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>the consideration for purchase of land was paid in cash, however, the </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>assessee was never in receipt of the cash. The transaction was entered in </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>the books of M/s. Lahari Green park, by passing journal entries in the name </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>of the assessee and the cash was paid by the creditor, directly to the vendor </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>towards sale consideration of the land. It was further observed by the CIT(A) </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>that M/s. Lahari Green Park has made the payment in cash to the seller of </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>the property directly, without involving the assessee. The CIT(A) observed </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>that provisions of S.269SS come into play, only when the assessee accepts </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>cash loans. Since in the present case, no cash loan was accepted by the </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>assessee and since it only represents a journal entry, no penalty can be </u></i></b><br />
<b><i><u>imposed under S.271D of the Act. </u></i></b><br />
6. Being aggrieved by the relief granted by the CIT(A), Revenue is<br />
in appeal before us.<br />
7. The learned Departmental Representative submitted that the<br />
CIT(A) was not correct in holding that the assessee has not received the loan<br />
in cash, when the CIT(A) while deciding the quantum appeal fo the assessee,<br />
has observed that the assessee has received cash loans from M/s. Lahari<br />
Green Park. The learned Departmental Representative submitted that there is<br />
clear violation of the provisions of S.269SS, and therefore, imposition of<br />
penalty under S.271D should be sustained. ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 <br />
Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad.<br />
<br />
<br />
5<br />
8. The learned Authorised Representative for the assessee, refuting<br />
the arguments of the learned Departmental Representative submitted that<br />
<b><i>the assessee has never accepted any cash loan in contravention of the </i></b><br />
<b><i>provisions of S.269SS of the Act.</i></b> There were only journal entries made at<br />
the time of purchase and at the time of sale in the books of M/s. Lahari Green<br />
Park. The learned Authorised Representative for the assessee submitted that<br />
the CIT(A) being convinced with the fact that the assessee has not accepted<br />
any cash loan has correctly deleted the penalty imposed by the Assessing<br />
Officer under S.271D of the Act. He also relied upon various decisions<br />
against the imposition of penalty, duly furnishing copies thereof in the paperbook.<br />
9. We have heard rival submissions and perused the materials on<br />
record. We have also examined the decisions relied upon by the learned<br />
Authorised Representative for the assessee. The only issue to be decided in<br />
the present appeal is as to <b><i>whether the assessee has accepted cash loan from </i></b><br />
<b><i>M/s. Lahari Green Park, in contravention of S.269SS of the Act, so as to </i></b><br />
<b><i>invite the rigour of the penal provision of S.271D of the Act. It is the case of </i></b><br />
<b><i>the Department that the assessee has accepted cash loan in contravention of </i></b><br />
<b><i>the provisions under S.269SS, whereas the assessee’s consistent stand has </i></b><br />
<b><i>been that there was no cash loan, and whatever has happened was only by </i></b><br />
<b><i>way of journal entries in the books of the firm in respect of the transactions </i></b><br />
<b><i>between the proprietary concern, M/s. Lahari Green Park and the vendor, </i></b><br />
<b><i>without her knowledge or involvement. This claim of the assessee that there </i></b><br />
<b><i>was no cash flow between the proprietary firm and the assessee, and </i></b><br />
<b><i>whatever happened was only by way of passing of journal entries in the </i></b><br />
<b><i>books of the proprietary concern needs to be verified from the records of the </i></b><br />
<b><i>firm. However, from the records available before us, we are not able to </i></b><br />
<b><i>decide the issue as to whether the assessee has taken cash loan as stated by ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 </i></b><br />
<b><i> Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad. </i></b><br />
<b><i> </i></b><br />
<b><i> </i></b><br />
<b><i>6</i></b><br />
<b><i>the department, or there are only journal entries as claimed by the assessee, </i></b><br />
<b><i>since material to that effect have not been furnished before us. We </i></b><br />
<b><i>therefore, deem it just and proper to remit the matter to the file of the </i></b><br />
<b><i>Assessing Officer, to verify the fact as to whether the assessee has actually </i></b><br />
<b><i>received cash loan from M/s. Lahari Green Park or there were mere journal </i></b><br />
<b><i>entries to that effect. If ultimately, it is found that no cash loan was actually </i></b><br />
<b><i>received by the assessee in the course of the transaction and there were only </i></b><br />
<b><i>journal entries to that effect. then no penalty can be levied under S.271D of </i></b><br />
<b><i>the Act. The Assessing Officer shall accordingly redecide the issue of </i></b><br />
<b><i>applicability of the penal provisions of S.271D of the Act to the facts of the </i></b><br />
<b><i>present case, in accordance with law, keeping in view our aforesaid direction, </i></b><br />
<b><i>and after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. </i></b><br />
<b><i> </i></b><br />
10. Since the cross-objection of the assessee merely support the<br />
order of the CIT(A), the same does not call for any independent adjudication. <br />
The same is thus rendered redundant, and it is accordingly dismissed as<br />
such. <br />
11. In the result, Revenue’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes,<br />
and the assessee’s cross objection is dismissed. <br />
Order pronounced in the Court on 9.11.2012<br />
Sd/- Sd/- <br />
(Chandra Poojari) (Saktijit Dey)<br />
Accountant Member Judicial Member <br />
Dated/- November, 2012 ITA No.1135/Hyd/2012 & CO No.129/Hyd/2012 <br />
Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Hyderabad.<br />
<br />
<br />
7<br />
Copy forwarded to:<br />
1. Smt. G.Venkat Lakshmi, Plot No.723A,Raod No.26, Jubilee<br />
Hills, Hyderabad.<br />
2.<br />
3.<br />
4.<br />
Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax Central Circle 6, Hyderabad<br />
Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals)-I, Hyderabad <br />
Commissioner of Income-tax Central Hyderabad <br />
5 Departmental Representative, ITAT, Hyderabad.<br />
B.V.S.</div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-20114146870474740812012-10-30T10:07:00.003-07:002020-04-20T23:30:29.302-07:00"Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a Judge in his own cause." = In M.C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam ((1974) 1 SCC 48), this Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, ((1989) 4 SCC 131), it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh ((1995) 3 SCC 426), this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession.. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner". <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">CCC APPEAL No.225 OF 2001 and bt </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">09-06-2011</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Smt.Askari Begum and others </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Md.Ayaz Khan and others </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Counsicl of Petitioner:---</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Counsil for Respondent:--</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">:JUDGMENT: </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> </span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> Both the appeals arise out of common property, which is a house property</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">bearing No.22-3-908 situated at Vazir Ali lane, Darulshifa, Hyderabad, in an</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">extent of 197 square yards.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">2. City Civil Court Appeal No.225 of 2001 arises out of the judgment in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">O.S.No.756 of 1991 on the file of I Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Hyderabad, whereas the Second Appeal arises out of the judgment in A.S.No.292 of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1988 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> The parties are referred as in O.S.No.756 of 1991.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">3. The facts of the case are that the suit property originally belonged to</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">one Khaja Fateh Ali and he sold the same to Smt. Kaneez Fiza @ Putli Bi, W/o.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Syed Mohd.Thaqui Saheb on 18.01.1925 for a consideration of Rs.750/-.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Smt.Kaneez Fiza and her husband were residents of Parbhani of Maharashtra State </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and they had only one daughter Kubra Begum, who is the 2nd plaintiff and who was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">married to one Mohd.Ishaq and they had a daughter by name Sajeeda Begum, who is </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">wife of the 1st plaintiff. Syed Mohd. Thaqui Saheb died on 04.08.1930 leaving</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">behind him his wife and daughter. The property was leased out to one Zaheer-ul-</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Hasan, S/o. Naqui in 1935 and on 05.12.1959 Khaneez Fiza leased out the plaint</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">schedule property to the 2nd defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.20/-. The 2nd</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">defendant was paying the rent. On 01.03.1969 in a sound disposing state of mind</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Kaneez Fiza executed a Will in favour of the 1st plaintiff conveying the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">schedule property and therefore, the 1st plaintiff became entitled to the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">property. His name was also mutated in the Municipal records as per the orders</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">dated 24.10.1970. The tenant attorned the tenancy and in 1974 the 1st plaintiff</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">requested the tenant to vacate the house. The father of the 2nd defendant by</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">name Nazir Hussain was also living in the plaint schedule property along with</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">2nd defendant and he filed a suit in O.S.No.445 of 1974 on the file of IV</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, questioning the mutation in favour</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of the 1st plaintiff and the said suit was dismissed on 07.12.1977 and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">thereafter A.S.No.10 of 1978 was preferred to the Chief Judge, City Civil Court,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Hyderabad, which was also dismissed on 24.07.1978. Thereafter, Nazar Hussain</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">instituted another suit O.S.No.345 of 1978 on the file of V Assistant Judge,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for declaration of his title and for permanent</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">injunction claiming title and perfecting right by adverse possession. The suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">was contested by the 1st plaintiff and the said suit was dismissed holding that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">there was no title but it was partly decreed granting injunction. Thereafter,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the 1st plaintiff filed R.C.No.173 of 1980 on the file of III Additional Rent</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Controller, Hyderabad, against the 2nd defendant for eviction, in which</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">relationship of landlord and tenant was denied and claimed that the property was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">purchased by Md. Thaqui and that Syed Nazar Hussain, who is the son of Thaqui,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">became entitled to the schedule property. The said R.C., was dismissed and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">against that the appeal was filed and it was also dismissed. As against the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">judgment in O.S.No.345 of 1978 the plaintiff preferred appeal A.S.No.292 of 1988</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">said appeal was allowed on 07.12.1998 and as against that the Second Appeal</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">No.336 of 1990 was preferred. Therefore, in view of the above circumstances,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the suit was filed for declaration of title as the legatee under the Will and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">for recovery of the possession from the defendants along with damages. In case</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the 1st plaintiff is not entitled to the property as a legatee, in the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">alternative the 2nd plaintiff is entitled to the suit property as being the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">sole daughter of Kubra Begum.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">4. The defendants filed a written statement denying several of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">allegations in the plaint and contending that the suit property belonged to</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Kaneez Fiza. Sd.Mohammed Thaqui Saheb is the father-in-law of defendants Nos.1 </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and 10. The property was purchased in the name of his wife by Syed Mohammed </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Thaqui Saheb. The plaintiffs are not related to the said owners. The</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">allegations that the property was in possession of the 2nd defendant or his</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">father as tenants is denied. The alleged Will dated 01.03.1969 is denied and it</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">has not seen the light of the day for a long time and it is a fabricated one.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">In the earlier litigation the said Will is found to be not true and since the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">issue has been already decided it cannot be agitated again. Municipal</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Corporation is not competent to decide the title to the property. The earlier</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">suit O.S.No.445 of 1974 was dismissed as it was not a comprehensive one and in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the earlier litigation the title of the plaintiffs was also rejected and the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">judgment in A.S.No.10 of 1978 operates as res judicata. In O.S.No.345 of 1978</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">on an erroneous reasoning the relief of title was not granted but however</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">injunction was granted. The defendants are the absolute owners of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">properties. The Will is not genuine and in view of the decisions in the earlier</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">proceedings between the parties, the plaintiff cannot claim title to the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">property or any relief.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">5. On the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues have been framed</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">by the trial court, for trial:</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1) Whether the Will dated 01.03.1969 is executed in a sound and disposing state</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of mind and it is binding on plaintiffs?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">2) Whether second plaintiff is the daughter of late Kaniz Fiza @ Putli Bee?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">3) Whether the decree and judgment in O.S.No.445 of 1974 on the file of IV</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Assistant Judge and O.S.No.345 of 1978 on the file of V Assistant Judge and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">R.C.No.173 of 1980 on the file of III Additional Rent Controller operates as res</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">judicata?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">4) Whether defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">5) Whether the suit claim is barred by time?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">6) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of declaration and possession?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">7) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for damages if so to what amount?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">8) To what relief?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">6. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PWs.1 to 4 were examined and marked Exs.A.1</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to A.17. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 and 2 were examined and marked </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Exs.B.1 to B.11.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">7. After considering the evidence on record, the lower Court accepted the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Will set up by the plaintiffs and accordingly decreed the suit and aggrieved by</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the said judgment and decree, the present appeal is filed by the defendants.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">8. So far as the Second Appeal No.336 of 1990 is concerned, earlier the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">appellants have filed O.S.No.345 of 1978 claiming that the defendants are the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">absolute owners of the property and they sought for a declaration of title and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">injunction. The same contentions were raised in that suit and the Court found</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">that the plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of 1991 have no relationship with Kaneez Fiza</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and also failed to establish the execution of the Will, but however by applying</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the principles under Order II, Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure (for short,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">'CPC') and on the principles of limitation, the relief of declaration was not</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">granted but injunction was granted. As against that the appeal A.S.No.292 of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1988 was filed and the appeal was allowed dismissing the suit even with regard</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to the partial relief of injunction. As against that the Second Appeal is</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">filed. Both the appeals were heard together.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">9. The points that arise for consideration are:</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1) Whether the Will dated 01.03.1969 in favour of 1st plaintiff by name Mohd</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Ayaz Khan in O.S.No.756 of 1991 is true, valid and confers rights on the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">plaintiffs?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of the declaration and for</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">recovery of possession of the property as granted by the lower Court?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">3) Whether on the principles of res judicata and in view of the earlier</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">decisions in O.S.No.445 of 1974 and 345 of 1978 and R.C.C.No.173 of 1980 the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">10. So far as the 2nd appeal is concerned, the legal questions that falls for</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">consideration are:</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1. Whether the application of the principles of Order.2, Rule 2 of CPC by the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Courts is proper?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">2. Whether the principles of res judicata are not applicable?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">3. Whether the application of the law of limitation by the Courts is legal, when</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the possession of the property is found with the appellants herein, the denial</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of injunction, consequent on the denial of title of the other party is valid?</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">4. Whether the mere non-filing of the appeal against certain findings the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">appellants are estopped from showing and disputing the correctness or otherwise</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of the findings?</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">11. POINTS: </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> In both the cases the litigation is old and it has started in the year,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1974 when on the basis of the Will, mutation is said to have been effected in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the municipal records in favour of the 1st plaintiff and consequently the suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">O.S.No.445 of 1974 was instituted. The fact that the property belonged to</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Kaneez Fiza is admitted by all sides and the fact that Nazar Hussain is the son</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of Mohad. Thaqui, who had two wives and he is the son through the 1st wife and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Kaneez Fiza is the second wife is also undisputable. Therefore, Nazar Hussain</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">becomes the heir of Kaneez Fiza. It is to be noted that the specific claim made</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">by the plaintiffs that the 2nd plaintiff is the daughter of Kaneez Fiza and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Mohd.Thaqui and as a successor to the property was not accepted by the lower</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Court and the relief based as a succession alternatively was dismissed by the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">lower Court, no appeal is filed by her.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">12. The decision in both these matters depends on the findings as to whether</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the Will set up by the plaintiffs, which was marked as Ex.A.4 is true and valid.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Apart from it, the further consideration will be as to whether the 2nd defendant</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and his father Syed Nazar Hussain succeeds to the property of Kaneez Fiza even</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">if the benami nature of the sale is not believed.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">13. Touching on the rights of the parties, in all the earlier litigation</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">evidence was let in and determined by the Courts. Evidently, apart from</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">O.S.No.445 of 1974 another suit, which has got relevancy is O.S.No.345 of 1978.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">The said suit was filed by Syed Nazar Hussain and others for declaration of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">title to the property and injunction against the plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">1991. The copy of the said judgment, which was marked as Ex.A.10, does not in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">dispute that in the said suit the present plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of 1991 set</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">up title in themselves relying on the Will-Ex.A.4 and the Court has not accepted</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the said Will and the said suit was partly decreed for injunction and the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">declaration in favour of the appellants was rejected on the application of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">principles of Order II Rule 2 CPC. In fact, strenuous effort was made by the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">counsel for the respondents to support the judgment in O.S.No.756 of 1991 on the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">ground that in the earlier suits the determination of the validity or</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">genuineness of the Will was not at all in issue and consequently even if the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">claim of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.345 of 1978 is not accepted the suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">O.S.No.756 of 1991 is maintainable and the principles of res judicata have no</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">application. In fact, the lower Court also was of the view that there was no</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">issue for determination of the genuineness of the Will and consequently the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">principle of res judicata has no application.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">14. It is unfortunate that the lower Court has taken the view that as there</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">was no specific issue with regard to the genuineness of the Will, the decision</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">rendered earlier will not operate as res judicata. It is to be mentioned that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">for the application of the principles of res judicata what is essential is the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">determination of the rights of the parties and the rival contentions based on</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the pleadings. It is the identity of the title in the litigations that has to</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">be taken into consideration and some times the identity of the actual property</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">may differ in the two cases. But, in this case, the identity of the property</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">also does not differ as it relates to the same property. It is the decision on</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">a particular aspect of the rights of the parties that has to be taken into</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">consideration with regard to the title to the property. When a comprehensive</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">issue was framed with regard to title of the property claimed by one party and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">opposed by the other party, then it is a determination of the rights of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">parties in issue in both the suits. Merely because a separate issue with regard</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to the source of title claimed by the defendants is not framed it does not mean</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">that the principles of res judicata are not applicable and that the decision in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the earlier suit is not binding. It is to be noted that the decision of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Court on the rights of the parties is essential and not the particular framing</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of an issue. In fact, when a suit for declaration of title is filed and the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">title is denied by the defendants setting in himself a title under a particular</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">document, then the issue in the suit will be as to whom is the owner of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">property and any finding touching on that issue will be binding in the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">subsequent suit. Therefore, the contention of the counsel for the respondents</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">that as no issue was framed specifically with regard to the validity of the Will</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">in the earlier suits and the consequent finding of the failure to prove the Will</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">will not operate as res judicata cannot be accepted. It is needless to say that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">in a suit for title the person who establishes better title will be entitled to</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the relief and if the title of the defendants who have set up an independent</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">title is established the suit of the plaintiffs will be dismissed. But, if such</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">title is not accepted and when such findings have become final the party is</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">bound by it. The limited concept of framing of issue in order to plead for non-</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">application of the principles of res judicata is untenable and the issue will be</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the rights of the parties, which was necessary for determination and when such</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">determination is made Section 11 of the CPC will apply in all fours. In this</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">connection, it is useful to refer to a decision reported in Ram Gobinda Daw and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">others, (In all the Appeals) Vs. Smt. H.Bhakta Bala Dassi etc.,1, wherein it was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">held that -</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> "The test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases but the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">previous decision must be one on a title in respect of which a dispute has been</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">raised and which dispute was heard and finally decided by the Court. Once the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">decision on question of title becomes final it operates as res judicata even if</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the value of the subject matter on which the former decision was pronounced was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">comparatively very trifling. When the decision was given by trial Court after</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">contest it operates as res judicata even if appeal therefrom might have been</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">dismissed on some preliminary grounds like limitation".</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">15. Before adverting to the facts of the case several decisions were also</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">relied on by the parties. The counsel for the respondents has relied on by a</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">decision reported in Alka Gupta Vs. Narender Kumar Gupta2, which dealt with the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">scope of Section 11 of CPC and Order II Rule 2 CPC. So far as Order II Rule 2</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">CPC is concerned, it was held that a plea has to be raised and an issue is to be</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">framed thereon, without which the Court cannot dismiss the suit. It is also</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">found that if the second suit is based on different cause of action, Order II</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Rule 2 CPC has no application. So also reliance was placed on the decision</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">reported in Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair3, about the application of Section</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">11 CPC. The counsel for the respondents also relied on a decision reported in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">S.Saraswathi V. Y.Laxminarayana4, wherein it was held that the judgment in Rent</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Control proceedings will not operate as res judicata in a suit for declaration</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of title.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">16. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Commissioner of Endowments and others Vs. Vittal Rao and others5, wherein it was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">held that even if no issue was formally framed in the earlier suit when a point</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">was material and essential for decision of a case in earlier proceeding, which</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">has attained finality, it would operate as res judicata between the parties. He</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">also relied on a decision reported in Swamy Atmananda and others Vs. Sri</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Ramakrishna Tapovanam and others6, wherein the scope of Section 11 CPC and </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Order II Rule 2 were considered and it was held even in the absence of a formal</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">issue when the parties have gone to trial on a necessary pleadings and filed the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">documents the principles of res judicata were held applicable. This being the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">legal position, it is necessary now to consider about the result of the earlier</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">proceedings and the validity of them.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">17. The suit O.S.No.345 of 1978 was decided on 29.01.1988. In that suit, the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">plaintiffs have set up the Will and pleaded absolute title. But however, a</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">single issue was framed as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled for</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">declaration and consequential relief of injunction. The Court has considered</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the entire evidence on record and in Para No.20 of Ex.A.10, the judgment, the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Court held that -</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> "In view of my above discussion the plaintiff is legal heir of Kaneez Fiza</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and owner of the suit house and the defendant is no way concerned with the suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">house as he failed to establish his relationship with Smt. Kaneez Fiza or</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">alleged attornment of tenancy of plaintiff's son in his favour and also failed</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to establish the execution of Will said to be executed by Smt. Kaneez Fiza.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Hence he has no right to challenge the title of the plaintiff being a stranger</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to the suit house".</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">18. It was also incidentally found by the learned Judge in para No.14 as</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">follows:</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> "Even in this case also the defendant had not chosen to prove the same and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the learned counsel for the defendant fairly conceded that the said Will is not</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">valid because it is executed contrary to the Muslim Law as Smt.Kaneez Fiza had</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">no right to bequeath her entire property. As such the contention of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">defendant that the Will executed in his favour is a valid document is false.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">When Will is not proved and execution of the said document is rejected in the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">earlier litigation I don't understand how the defendant is claiming his rights</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">over the suit premises. Apart from this he also utterly failed to establish his</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">relationship with Kaneez Fiza as he admitted in his cross examination on that he</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">has no document to show that Kubra Begum is the daughter of Kaneez Fiza and also </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">deposed Kubra Begum and her husband are also alive".</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> But however, in para No.19, the learned Judge held that -</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> "Hence the present suit of the plaintiff is hit by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">he omitted the present relief which ought to have asked in the earlier suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">under the same causes of action. Though the plaintiff had better title than the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">defendant herein this legal impediment restraining him to entitle the relief.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Hence the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">over the suit house as it is hit by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. But the defendant has</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">no right to interfere into the suit house taking advantage of this legal</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">impediment as he has no better title that the plaintiff".</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">19. These findings were also considered in the appeal A.S.No.292 of 1988 and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the copy of the judgment is marked as Ex.A.13. The learned Judge in Para No.13</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">found that though the plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of 1991 claimed title to the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">property under the Will, the Will is not proved by any evidence. The findings</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of the lower Court that the Will is not proved and valid is accepted.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Therefore, it is quite clear in O.S.No.345 of 1978, which is comprehensive suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">for a determination of the title to the property between the parties, the rights</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of the appellants were accepted but on technical ground by application of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">principle of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, the relief was not granted, whereas there was a</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">specific finding about the Will set up by the plaintiff in O.S.No.756 of 1991</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and holding that does not proved. It was also found by the trial Court in that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">suit that empathetically as follows in Para No.16 of the judgment in O.S.No.345</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of 1978-Ex.A.10:</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>"As I already stated that the defendant failed to establish the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>will, he is not the owner of the house and not having better title than the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>plaintiff herein, when he is not derived any title from Kaneez Fiza he had no</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>right to challenge the plaintiff's title over the suit house by alleging that</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the plaintiff stayed in the suit house by virtue of his son's tenancy, as it is</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>proved that the plaintiff is the sole legal heir of Kaneez Fiza and entitled for</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the property being sole legal heir of Kaneez Fiza, as she had no other issues.</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>The defendant has not concerned with the property as he failed to prove that he</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>is entitled for the property, under a valid document as well as his relationship</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>with the said Kaneez Fiza".</i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">20. Therefore, the above decision in the earlier suit clearly goes to show</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">that the Will set up by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of 1991 was not accepted as</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">it was not proved, no effort was made to establish the title set up under the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Will. A strange argument was developed by the counsel for the respondents</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">stating that in the above suit, he was not called upon to prove the genuineness</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of the Will and it was only with regard to the declaration of the title claimed</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">by the plaintiffs and consequently, the Will was not an issue directly and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">substantially. This is fallacious. The title of the plaintiff in that suit was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">resisted by setting up a rival title under the Will and in fact, the title of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the plaintiffs was accepted but however on technical grounds the relief was not</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">granted. Therefore, the contention that as there was no issue and as the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">plaintiffs were not called upon to prove the Will in that suit and consequently</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">it was not a decision on the Will has to be discarded. Even in the appeal</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">against the said suit in A.S.No.292 of 1988 the title of the plaintiffs was also</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">not accepted. Therefore, in view of the above circumstances, I have no</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">hesitation in holding that the title of the plaintiffs under the Will was not</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">proved and the Will was not accepted in O.S.No.345 of 1988 and consequently any</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">finding with regard to title to the property is binding in the subsequent suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and the judgment of the Court in O.S.No.756 of 1991 in not applying the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">principles of res judicata and taking the pains of a decision with regard to the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Will is not warranted and it is erroneous.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">21. Furthermore, the question arises as to whether the Will was proved by the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">plaintiffs in this suit. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>Evidently, the burden is on the propounder of the Will</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>to prove the execution of the same. A Will is a compulsorily attestable</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>document and it has to be proved that the executant of the Will was conscious</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>and aware of the contents of the same. In this case evidently, the relationship</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>of the plaintiffs with Kaneez Fiza was not accepted by the Courts. The original</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>of the Will was not produced before the Court. Ex.A.4 is only certified copy of</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the Will and the reasons for not summoning or producing the original Will is not</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>forthcoming. No permission was taken to dispense with the production of the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>original. If the original was marked in the earlier suit O.S.No.445 of 1974, it</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>could have been easily filed when certified copy was obtained. The scribe of</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the Will was not examined. PW.2 is said to be aged about 55 years and a</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>resident of Parbhani and he claims that Kaneez Fiza executed the Will. His</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>evidence does not show that the contents of the Will were dictated by the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>testator and the reason for execution of the Will and that he signed along with</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the other attesters to the witnessing of the testator. He studied only up to</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>5th class and he does not know even the name of the husband of the Kaneez Fiza </i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>and he has not given evidence with regard to the Will earlier. So also the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>evidence of PW.4, who is said to be an Advocate and attester of the Will, is</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>also not sufficient to establish the Will. He is not even able to give the name</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>of the testator and he claims that it was referred in Ex.A.4. He does not even</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>say that the contents of the Will were declared by the testator and that it was</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>drafted in his presence and that he has signed to the witnessing of the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>testator. He does not even know the family particulars of Mohd. Thaqui and he</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>claims to be accidentally present when he went to the Registrar's Office and</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>therefore, he attested Ex.A.4, except that he has no prior information. The</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>evidence of PW.4 appears to be artificial. He was not even able to testify the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>soundness of the mind of the testator at the time of execution of the Will. If</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>such is the evidence, the lower Court heard in holding that the evidence of</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>PWs.2 and 4 establishes the execution of the Will. Therefore, it is quite clear</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>that there is no proper proof even in the present suit about the execution of</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the Will and the legal requirement of soundness of mind and free Will of the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>testator and the declaration of the intention to Will away the property by the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>testator were not spoken either by PW.2 or PW.4. They are also not specific</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>about the testators signing to their witnessing and they attesting the Will to</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the witnessing of the testator. Therefore, the lower Court has failed to apply</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the legal principles in assessing the genuineness of the Will.</i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">22. Furthermore, the lower Court also ignoring the earlier finding of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">relationship of second plaintiff has given a finding that 2nd plaintiff is</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">related to Kaneez Fiza, which is also erroneous. Therefore, the judgment of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">lower Court in accepting the Will and declaring the rights of plaintiff No.1 in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">O.S.No.756 of 1991 is not valid by applying the principles of res judicata and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">also for want of proof of the Will.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">23. So far as the application of the principles under Order II Rule 2 CPC in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">O.S.No.345 of 1978 is concerned, I do not think that it was correct approach.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Evidently, as laid down by the Supreme Court, no issue was framed on that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">aspect. But however, the Court of its own motion considered the aspect. Even</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">otherwise, the earlier suit O.S.No.445 of 1974 is essentially a challenge with</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">regard to the mutation effected in the Muncipal records and a claim to the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">rights in the property. It was not a substantial suit with regard to the title</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to the property and ultiminately the suit was dismissed as it was not a suit for</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">a declaration of title. As against that judgment in A.S.No.10 of 1978 under</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Ex.A.7 the appellate Court found that both parties have failed to prove the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">title to the property though endeavour was made and ultimately it was found in</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">para No.10 as follows:</span><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>"The mere fact that the name of the respondent has been entered into the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Municipal records in respect of the suit property, after the death of Kaneez</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Fiza it does not follow that the respondent has title to the property the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Commissioner has in fact informed the appellant when he have a notice in</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>January, 1971 that the change of mutation does not effect the rights, if any, if</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>the appellant to the property".</u></i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">24. The judgment of the appellate Court clearly goes to show that the remedy</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">was to file a suit for declaration. It was also found that the only course open</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">is to file a suit for declaration of title and on the basis of the decree that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">may be obtained the correction. It was also found that -</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>"The only course open them for the appellant is to file a suit for</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>declaration of his title and on the basis of the decree that he may obtain he</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>should seek for correction in the municipal records".</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>It can be taken in other words as a permission for filing of the separate suit</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>for declaration of title even assuming for a moment the principles of Order II</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Rule 2 CPC are applicable. But, I have no hesitation in holding that the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>dismissal of the suit O.S.No.445 of 1974 will not in any way bar the filing of</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>the suit O.S.No.345 of 1978 since the cause of action is quite different. In</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>fact, the dismissal of the earlier suit with a direction to sue for declaration</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>of a title itself creates a fresh cause of action for institution of the suit</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>for declaration.</u></i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">25. Furthermore, while appreciating the maintainability of the suit for</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">declaration, in Para No.18 under Ex.A.10 the Court found that the suit has to be</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">filed within a period of three years for declaration of title, which was also</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">incidentally accepted by the appellate Court in A.S.No.292 of 1988 under</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Ex.A.13. Evidently, the suit is not based after dispossession. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Under Article</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>65 of the Limitation Act, the suit for declaration of title can be filed when</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>there is a cloud over the title and the limitation is 12 years and the period of</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>three years from the knowledge of the claim made by the other side as found by</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>lower Court does not arise.</u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> Therefore, on this aspect both the appellate Court</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">and the lower Court have erred. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>The period of limitation under Article 65 of</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Limitation Act is applicable and the only plea that can be pleaded by the other</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>side is perfection of title by adverse possession beyond that time.</u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> In this</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">case, evidently, there was no possession of the plaintiffs. These two findings</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">are therefore erroneous and against the settled principles of law and the Courts</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">below have erred in applying the correct legal provision in the suit O.S.No.345</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">of 1978 concerning the Second Appeal.</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">26. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>The principle of law is that a person in possession can protect the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>possession against the entire world and even against a true owner. If there is a</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>settled possession of the property an injunction can be granted</u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">. In this case,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">evidently the plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of 1991 have no title to the property</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">when once the Will is not believed and the title of the appellants is accepted</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">though the declaration is rejected erroneously on technical grounds. The</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">finding of the appellate Court under Ex.A.13 that the relief of injunction also</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">cannot be granted as the evidence shows the 1st plaintiff is residing along with</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the son and it cannot be said that the party is in possession of the said</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">property having right or title, and refusal of the injunction, is incorrect. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>So</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>also, the finding of the appellate Court that as the declaration of title is</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>refused the consequential relief of injunction cannot be granted is also</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>erroneous. </u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">It is to be noted that the declaration of title is not granted, on</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">an erroneous approach and not finding that there is no title or finding that the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">other side is having title to the property. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Therefore, a person in possession</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>of the property can protect the possession as of right unless and until duly</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>evicted by person with title. </u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>In this case, earlier attempts in the eviction</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>proceedings failed and the title under the Will being not accepted, the 1st</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>plaintiff in O.S.No.756 of 1991 has also no right to seek for recovery of</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>possession of the property. Under such circumstances, the person in possession</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>is entitled for injunction even if declaration is refused.</u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> In view of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">decision in O.S.No.756 of 1991 that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">declaration of title, the possession has to be protected. In this connection,</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">it is useful to refer to a decision reported in Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs. Vs.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">M.Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs and another7, in that case the plaintiff filed a</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">suit alleging his title as also his possession over the disputed piece of land.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">The trial court found that although the plaintiff had failed in proving his</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">title, he had succeeded in proving his possession over the suit property, which</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">he was entitled to protect unless dispossessed therefrom by due process of law.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">On this finding the trial court issued an injunction restraining the defendant-</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">appellant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">plaintiff-respondent over the suit property. The defendant's appeal was</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">dismissed by the High Court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court. The</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Supreme Court while considering the rival contentions and the principles of law</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">with regard to the possession and injunction and referring to earlier decisions</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">held that a person in settled possession is entitled for injunction and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">possession itself is a better title when the defendant himself fails to prove</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the title. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the para Nos.7 and 8 of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the above Judgement, which is as follows:</span><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">"7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani (2003)</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">7 SCC 350. In between, to quote a few out of several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Rao Jagdish Singh (AIR 1968 SC 620 : (1968) 2 SCR 203), this Court has held that</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">Court in Yar Moh v. Lakshmi Das (AIR 1959 All 1 : 1958 All LJ 628 (FB)):</span><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u> "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>to become a Judge in his own cause."</u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> (AIR p.5, para 13)</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander (AIR 1968</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">SC 1165 : (1968) 3 SCR 163), this Court held that a person in possession of land</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">decides. The Court quoted Loft's maxim- "Possessio contra omnes valet praeter</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">eur cui ius sit possessionis (he that hath possession hath right against all but</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">him that hath the very right)" and said. (AIR p.1175, para 20)</span><br />
<i style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">"A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid</i><br />
<i style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able</i><br />
<i style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">to raise a presumption prior in time".</i><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>In M.C. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam ((1974) 1 SCC 48), this Court held </u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, ((1989) 4 SCC 131), it was held </u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>Singh ((1995) 3 SCC 426), this Court held that disputed questions of title are</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>the possession.</u></i></b><span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">dispossession by the defendant. </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">8</span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A </i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force.</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. <u>The</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature or</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the</u></i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i><u>true owner".</u></i></b><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"> </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">The above decision clearly applies to the facts of the case and </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the appellants</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>in second appeal are entitled for the injunction as granted by the lower Court,</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>which was erroneously interfered by the appellate Court.</i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">27. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i> Therefore, for all the above reasons, I find all the points in favour of</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>the appellants and I hold that the plaintiffs in O.S.No.756 of 1991 are not</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>entitled for the declaration of title and consequently City Civil Court Appeal</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>No.225 of 2001 and Second Appeal No.336 of 1990 are liable to be allowed.</i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">28. </span><b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i> In the result, City Civil Court Appeal No.225 of 2001 is allowed and</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>O.S.No.756 of 1991 on the file of I Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>Hyderabad, is dismissed. Second Appeal No.336 of 1990 is allowed and the</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>Judgment in A.S.No.292 of 1988 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>Court, Hyderabad is set aside, and the judgment of the lower Court in O.S.No.345</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>of 1978 on the file of V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is</i></b><br />
<b style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;"><i>restored. Each party shall bear their own costs.</i></b><br />
<br style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, Tahoma, Helvetica, FreeSans, sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;" />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">?1 AIR 1971 SUPREME COURT 664 </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">2 (2010)10 Supreme Court Cases 141 </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">3 (1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 14 </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">4 2004(6) ALT 95</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">5 AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 454 </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">6 (2005)10 Supreme Court Cases 51 </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "arial" , "tahoma" , "helvetica" , "freesans" , sans-serif; font-size: 15.0150146484375px; line-height: 30.030029296875px;">7 (2004)1 Supreme Court Cases 769 </span></div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-67092951171787677682012-09-27T09:43:00.002-07:002012-09-27T09:43:39.191-07:00Whether under sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Act 54 of 2002) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Securitization Act") a borrower is permitted to redeem the immovable secured asset after the secured asset was sold but before the confirmation of sale by the secured creditor under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') is the question involved in this appeal filed by the auction purchaser under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging the order of the learned single Judge opining that the borrower is entitled to redeem the immovable secured asset before the confirmation of sale. needless to state that against the sale proceedings of the authorized officer, the borrower has a right to approach the DRT under Section 17 of the Act. In the instant case, as already held, the sale is not confirmed by the secured creditor and the borrower has approached the DRT on 3.4.2012 and the Tribunal issued directions giving liberty to the borrower to pay the amounts within five weeks which have been complied with by the borrower. Therefore, it cannot be said that the proceedings before the DRT are without jurisdiction. The DRT is well within its competence to take up the matter. We, therefore, hold that under the Securitization Act, a borrower has the right to redeem the property under sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Act at any time before the date the property is transferred to the auction purchaser by confirmation of sale by the secured creditor as required under sub-rule (6) of Rule 9 of the Rules. 28 . In the result, we find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR <br />
WRIT APPEAL NO.893 OF 2012 <br />
<br />
12-9-2012<br />
<br />
M/s. India Finlease Securities Limited,Chennai, Rep. by its Authorized<br />
Signatory Sri P.D. Prasad<br />
<br />
Indian Overseas Bank Represented by its Branch Manager Andhra Loyola College <br />
Branch, Vijaywada Krishna District and others <br />
<br />
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Sri D. Prakash Reddy, Senior Counsel, appeared <br />
for Sri C. Ramachandra Raju<br />
<br />
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NOs.1 AND 2: Sri A. Krishnam Raju <br />
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.3: Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, appeared for <br />
Sri Challa Gunaranjan<br />
<GIST<br />
<br />
>HEAD NOTE: <br />
<br />
? CITATIONS: <br />
1. (1977) 3 SCC 247<br />
2. (2004) 4 SCC 311<br />
3. (2007) 5 SCC 745<br />
4. (1991) 3 SCC 588<br />
5. AIR 2008 Madras 108(1)<br />
6. 2005 Company Cases Vol.125, P.676 <br />
7. (2010) 8 SCC 110<br />
8. AIR 1955 SC 376<br />
<br />
JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice)<br />
<br />
<b><i>Whether under sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Securitization and</i></b><br />
<b><i>Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,</i></b><br />
<b><i>2002 (Act 54 of 2002) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Securitization Act") a</i></b><br />
<b><i>borrower is permitted to redeem the immovable secured asset after the secured</i></b><br />
<b><i>asset was sold but before the confirmation of sale by the secured creditor</i></b><br />
<b><i>under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to</i></b><br />
<b><i>as 'the Rules') is the question involved in this appeal filed by the auction</i></b><br />
<b><i>purchaser under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging the order of the</i></b><br />
<b><i>learned single Judge opining that the borrower is entitled to redeem the</i></b><br />
<b><i>immovable secured asset before the confirmation of sale.</i></b><br />
<br />
2. Facts leading to the controversy may briefly be noted: Respondent No.3<br />
herein - M/s Sruthi Builders Private Limited - secured loan from the respondent-<br />
banks - Indian Overseas Bank, Andhra Loyola College Branch, Vijayawada and Dena <br />
Bank, Vijayawada Branch, Governorpet, Vijayawada respectively. When Respondent <br />
No.3 has become a non-performing asset recourse was taken to the provisions of<br />
the Securitization Act and accordingly a tender notification was issued on<br />
27.2.2012 for sale of the immovable secured asset of the borrower and the date<br />
for auction was fixed as 31.3.2012. The borrower requested for one time<br />
settlement on 29.3.2012 by paying Rs.1.00 crore and Rs.27.00 lakhs to the<br />
respondents-banks respectively, but they proceeded with the auction. The<br />
auction purchaser - M/s India Finlease Securities Ltd., Chennai has become the<br />
highest bidder for Rs.18.00 crores for the secured asset i.e "Sainag Complex"<br />
Chandramoulipuram, Vijayawada. The Authorized Officer, Dena Bank and the <br />
Authorized Officer, Indian Overseas Bank jointly issued letter dated 31.3.2012<br />
accepting the auction purchaser as the highest bidder and directing the<br />
purchaser to pay the balance of 25% after deducting EMD amount by 3.4.2012 and <br />
the balance bid amount of Rs.1350 lakhs on or before 16.4.2012. It was<br />
indicated in the letter that the sale shall be confirmed in the name of M/s<br />
India Finlease Securities Ltd., on payment of the entire bid amount subject to<br />
confirmation by the banks. The purchaser paid Rs.2.93 crores by cheque dated<br />
3.4.2012 in favour of Dena Bank.<br />
In the meanwhile, the borrower, aggrieved by the auction filed S.A.No.139 of<br />
2012 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam under Section 17 of the<br />
Act. The respondent-banks filed counters and as per the directions of the DRT a<br />
statement of account showing the amount due by the borrower was also filed. The<br />
auction purchaser has paid the balance amount- Rs.11.70 crores by demand draft<br />
dated 12.4.2012 and Rs.1.80 crores by bankers cheque dated 13.4.2012, both in<br />
favour of Dena Bank. Both the amounts were accepted by the bank subject to the<br />
outcome of S.A.No.139 of 2012 on the file of DRT, Visakhapatnam. It was also<br />
indicated that confirmation of sale shall also be only subject to the outcome of<br />
S.A.No.139 of 2012. On 16.8.2012, the borrower filed an interlocutory<br />
application under section 13(8) of the Securitization Act to permit it to redeem<br />
the secured asset by discharge of the debt due to the respondent banks. By order<br />
dated 16.4.2012, the DRT allowed the application permitting the borrower to pay<br />
the amounts within five weeks as undertook by the borrower in the affidavit<br />
filed before the DRT and in default liberty was given to the respondent-banks to<br />
confirm the sale in favour of the successful highest bidder and the banks were<br />
directed to maintain status quo as on the date. So far as the amounts paid by<br />
the auction purchaser is concerned, the DRT directed that the same shall be kept<br />
in an interest bearing account in the form of term deposit, if agreed upon by<br />
the auction purchaser. Accordingly, it appears that the 2nd respondent wrote a<br />
letter to the auction purchaser to convey their approval for keeping the bid<br />
amount in term deposit as per the directions of the DRT. On 18.6.2012, the 1st<br />
respondent bank filed a memo before the DRT stating that the borrower paid the<br />
entire amount due of Rs.9,96,50,579/- by 20.5.2012. The borrower also filed a<br />
memo to dismiss the S.A as not pressed since the entire loan liability has been<br />
discharged. The IOB issued no due certificate and the Dena bank is yet to issue<br />
no due certificate.<br />
3. At this stage, the appellant-auction purchaser filed Writ Petition<br />
No.16254 of 2012 on 4.6.2012 without impleading the authorized officers of the<br />
banks and the borrower for a direction to the respondent-banks to execute sale<br />
deed in favour of the appellant or its nominees and register the same in respect<br />
of the property in question and for a further direction to pay a sum of<br />
Rs.10.00 lakhs to the appellant towards damages for the delay of each day in<br />
executing the sale deed in favour of the appellant by declaring the inaction of<br />
the respondents-banks in executing the sale deed in spite of the payment of the<br />
amount by 13.4.2012 is unjust, contrary to the terms and conditions of auction<br />
notice and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.<br />
4. The DRT by order dated 18.6.2012 disposed of the S.A observing that the<br />
borrower has a right to exercise his right of redemption before the date of sale<br />
or transfer and once the amount has been paid and the same having been accepted<br />
by both the banks, the applicant is well within it's right to exercise the<br />
right of redemption. Though a prayer was made by the auction purchaser to<br />
implead it as party to the proceedings the same was rejected. Accordingly, the<br />
matter was disposed of directing the banks to issue no due certificate and to<br />
return the title deeds to the borrower. The auction purchaser along with his<br />
advocate appeared before the DRT and prayed for impleadment, but the prayer was<br />
rejected on the ground that such a request should have been made earlier and<br />
that the auction purchaser has already filed the writ petition before the High<br />
Court.<br />
4. During the pendency of the writ petition, the borrower was permitted to<br />
come on record. The respondents-banks and the borrower filed counter-affidavits<br />
detailing the proceedings before the DRT and the directions issued by the<br />
Tribunal.<br />
5. Before the learned single Judge it was argued on behalf of the appellant<br />
that the creditor banks after having received the total bid amount from the<br />
appellant ought not to have received any payment from the borrower after the<br />
sale was over as the borrower has no right for redemption of the secured asset<br />
after the auction was over and the order passed by the DRT is without<br />
jurisdiction. It was further contended that under section 13(8) of the<br />
Securitization Act, the borrower has got right of redemption only up to<br />
conducting of auction, but not later, since the auction was concluded on<br />
31.3.2012, before which date no payment was made, the borrower has no right to<br />
redeem the secured asset.<br />
On behalf of the creditor banks it was argued that the borrower moved S.A.No.139<br />
of 2012 even before the auction purchaser deposited the balance sale<br />
consideration and therefore the banks received the balance sale consideration<br />
subject to the result of S.A.No.139 of 2012. The borrower paid the entire dues<br />
and the same has been recorded by the DRT and the property came to be redeemed <br />
as per the order of the DRT dated 16.4.2012. It was contended on behalf of the<br />
borrower that the borrower has exercised his right to redeem the property well<br />
before the sale was confirmed by the secured creditor and the interpretation<br />
sought to be put forth by the auction purchaser to sub-section (3) of Rule 13<br />
is not correct.<br />
6. On a consideration of the rival submissions, the learned single Judge by<br />
order dated 25.6.2012, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in<br />
Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam1 and Mardia Chemicals Ltd. V. Union of India2 <br />
wherein it was held that the mortgagor has right to redeem unless the sale of<br />
the property was complete by registration in accordance with the provisions of<br />
the Registration Act, came to the conclusion that since the acceptance of the<br />
amount by the auction purchaser was subject to the outcome of the proceedings<br />
before the DRT, confirmation of sale cannot be made absolute and the creditor<br />
banks cannot be compelled to execute registered sale deed in respect of the<br />
mortgaged property which has already been redeemed by the borrower. However,<br />
the learned Judge held that since the auction purchaser paid the entire amount,<br />
the auction purchaser is entitled for some compensation and accordingly awarded<br />
damages quantified at Rs.5.00 lakhs and directed creditor banks and the borrower<br />
to pay the same as compensation to the auction purchaser in equal proportion.<br />
The appellant-writ petitioner also filed Rev.WPMP.No.26312 of 2012 which was<br />
dismissed by the learned single Judge by order dated 10.7.2012.<br />
<br />
7. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge, the auction purchaser<br />
has filed the present appeal.<br />
8. Learned counsel appearing for the auction purchaser submitted that under<br />
sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Securitization Act, the borrower is<br />
entitled to redeem the property by depositing the entire amount due together<br />
with all costs etc. only "before the date fixed for sale" but not later,<br />
therefore, the learned Judge ought to have held that receipt of the amount by<br />
the respondent-banks from the borrower after the date of auction has no legal<br />
sanctity and does not affect the sale in favour the auction-purchaser. Section<br />
13(8) clearly provides that the borrower has right to pay the amount only before<br />
the date fixed for sale and he cannot be permitted to exercise this right after<br />
a particular date i.e. date fixed for sale. There is an emphasis in the wording<br />
'before the date fixed for sale' fixing the parameter. Therefore, there is no<br />
ambiguity at all in the language of the section. After making full payment<br />
within the stipulated time under Rule 9(4), confirmation of sale that took place<br />
on 31.3.2012 under Rule 9(2) holds good and no further confirmation of sale is<br />
required. Learned counsel further submitted that the reference of confirmation<br />
of sale under Rule 9(6) does not mean that the sale has to be again confirmed<br />
for second time. He submitted that the respondent-banks having received the<br />
entire amount before the due date ought to have issued the sale certificate as<br />
per Rule 9(6) of the Rules. The respondent-banks confirmed the sale on<br />
31.3.2012 and therefore the sale was deemed to have been confirmed as per Rule<br />
9(2) of the Rules. When the sale in favour of the purchaser was not set aside by<br />
the DRT or by the respondent-banks, the respondent-banks are not justified in<br />
not issuing a sale certificate in favour of the appellant and the sale<br />
certificate shall be deemed to have been issued in favour of the appellant on<br />
13.4.2012. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned single Judge is<br />
not justified in holding that acceptance of the payment by the respondent-banks<br />
is a conditional one. The learned Judge ought to have held that the orders dated<br />
16.4.2012 and 18.6.l2012 passed by DRT are non est and not binding on the<br />
appellant as the said orders were obtained without making the appellant as<br />
party to the appeal before the Tribunal. The decisions of the Supreme Court in<br />
Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India <br />
have no application to the case of the appellant. Once the sale is confirmed on<br />
31.3.2012 the sale is over and the appellant has become the absolute owner. The<br />
sale certificate does not form part of the sale transaction as it does not<br />
require any registration. The sale certificate contemplated in an auction of<br />
statutory authority is totally different from that of a registered sale deed in<br />
a private sale and placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in B.<br />
Arvind Kumar v. Government of India and others3 and Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya,<br />
Sagar v. Pandit Sadashi Rao Harshe and others4 contending that once the sale is<br />
confirmed the sale becomes absolute and the auction purchaser has got a vested<br />
right in the property, whether the sale certificate is issued or not. The<br />
Supreme Court also held that the sale certificate does not require any<br />
registration and as such issuance of sale certificate has no significance at all<br />
to decide the question whether sale is completed or not. Reliance has also<br />
been placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in K. Chidambhara Manickam <br />
v. Shakeena and others5.<br />
9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents-bank submitted that the<br />
borrower approached the DRT even before the auction purchaser deposited the<br />
balance sale consideration and as per the directions of the Tribunal, the banks<br />
accepted the payments made by the borrower. He placed reliance on the decision<br />
of the Bombay High Court in Manoj D. Kapasi and another v. Union of India6<br />
wherein the Bombay High Court following the judgment of the Supreme Court in<br />
Mardia Chemicals Ltd.'s case held that the right of redemption was a statutory<br />
right available to the borrower till the transfer took place and as such the<br />
learned single Judge has rightly appreciated the provisions. He further<br />
submitted that the bid was accepted subject to confirmation by the banks and<br />
while receiving the balance 75% bid amount it was clearly mentioned that the<br />
payment was received subject to the outcome of proceedings before the DRT. The<br />
decision of the Madras High Court in K. Chidambhara Manickam v. Shakeena and <br />
others has no application because in the said case sale certificate has been<br />
issued, but in the instant case no sale certificate was issued. He further<br />
submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the appellant<br />
is entitled to file a petition under Section 17 of the Securitization Act if he<br />
is aggrieved and placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in United<br />
Bank of India v. Stayavathi Tandon7 wherein the apex Court held that a writ<br />
Court shall not entertain petition under Article 226 unless there are<br />
exceptional circumstances. Learned counsel further submitted that the auction<br />
purchaser is entitled only for a sale certificate as per Rule 9(6) of the Rules<br />
and there is no provision either under the Securitization Act or the rules made<br />
thereunder empowering the bank to execute sale deed in favour of the auction<br />
purchaser and therefore no direction to execute a sale deed can be issued.<br />
Respondents 1 and 2 have brought to the notice of the Tribunal all the<br />
transactions and the Tribunal after considering the same passed orders<br />
permitting the borrower to pay the amounts within a period of five weeks which<br />
have been complied with by the borrower. The learned single Judge has rightly<br />
appreciated the facts and Section 13(8) of the Act and declined to grant the<br />
relief, therefore, no interference is warranted.<br />
10. Learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent submitted that when the<br />
respondent-banks issued a notice for sale of the property, the 3rd respondent by<br />
letter dated 29.3.20112 requested the respondent-banks for one time settlement<br />
and to show bona fides paid Rs.1.00 crore to the 1st respondent and Rs.27.00<br />
lakhs to the 2nd respondent, but the banks without considering the same<br />
proceeded to open the bids on 31.3.2012. Under those circumstances, 3rd<br />
respondent was compelled to approach DRT on 3.4.2012 by filing S.A.No.139 of<br />
2012 and the 3rd respondent complied with the directions of the DRT dated<br />
16.4.2012 and paid the amounts due.<br />
Referring to Rule 9(2) of the Rules and the conditions of auction notification,<br />
learned counsel argued that confirmation of sale by the "secured creditor" is<br />
mandatory and the appellant is not correct in contending that sale automatically<br />
becomes confirmed on payment of the balance of sale consideration. Further, on<br />
confirmation of sale by the secured creditor only, the Authorized Officer has to<br />
issue a certificate of sale of immovable property in favour of the purchaser as<br />
required under rule 9(6) of the Rules. He also submitted that the Judgment of<br />
the Madras High Court in K. Chidambhara Manickam v. Shakeena and others has no <br />
application to the present case.<br />
Referring to sub-section (8) of Section 13 learned counsel submitted that the<br />
interpretation sought to be put forth by the appellant is contrary to the<br />
intendment of the Legislature. Right to get redemption of the property can be<br />
exercised at any time before the date fixed for 'sale' or 'transfer' and that<br />
right of redemption is available till the 'transfer' is effected. He<br />
strenuously argued when the Legislature has designedly used the expression 'sale<br />
or transfer' the word 'transfer' cannot be ignored for considering the import of<br />
Section 13(8). In K. Chidambhara Manickam v. Shakeena and others the Court has <br />
not taken into consideration the same. In the instant case, the borrower has<br />
exercised his right of redemption before the transfer of property is effected.<br />
A transfer can validly be made only on confirmation of sale by the secured<br />
creditor and issuance of a sale certificate by the authorized officer. Since<br />
there is neither confirmation of sale nor the appellant was issued sale<br />
certificate, learned counsel argued, that there was no valid transfer within the<br />
meaning of sub-section (8) of Section 13 and as such the appellant is not<br />
entitled for the relief prayed for. In Manickam's case, the Court has also not<br />
gone into the effect of confirmation of sale by the secured creditor.<br />
Learned counsel further submitted that the banks have received the amounts from<br />
the auction purchaser only subject to the outcome of the proceedings pending<br />
before the DRT and in the document relating to 'details of auction participants'<br />
dated 31.3.2012 accepting the bid of the appellant it was clearly indicated that<br />
the banks reserve their right to cancel/modify the sale before confirmation of<br />
the same. The decisions relied upon by the appellant have no application to the<br />
present case. He submitted that even under the provisions of the Transfer of<br />
Property Act, there is a requirement of confirmation of auction and issuance of<br />
sale certificate. In Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya, Sagar v. Pandit Sadashi Rao Harshe<br />
and others relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Supreme<br />
Court held that issuance of sale certificate is only a ministerial act and the<br />
title vests in the auction purchaser as soon as sale is confirmed. In the<br />
present case, there is no confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and as<br />
such there is no transfer of sale. In K. Chidambhara Manickam vs. Shakeena and<br />
others the Court has not taken into account the decisions of the Apex Court in<br />
Arvind Kumar's case and Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya's case. He, therefore,<br />
submitted that since the borrower has redeemed the property in accordance with<br />
sub-section (8) of Section 13 before the sale was confirmed by the secured<br />
creditor, the appellant is not entitled for the relief which was rightly<br />
rejected by the learned single Judge and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.<br />
11. Before we deal with the issues, we may briefly refer to the relevant<br />
provisions of the Securitization Act and the Rules made thereunder. Chapter III<br />
of the Act deals with Enforcement of Security Interest. Sub-section (1) of<br />
Section 13 provides that any security interest created in favour of any secured<br />
creditor may be enforced without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal by<br />
such creditor in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) of<br />
Section 13 provides that where a borrower makes any default in repayment of<br />
secured debt and where the account in respect of such debt is classified by<br />
the secured creditor as a non-performing asset, the secured creditor may require<br />
the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the<br />
secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the<br />
secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under<br />
sub-section (4). Sub-section (4) provides that where the borrower has failed to<br />
discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section<br />
(2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more measures of the<br />
following to recover his secured debt, namely,: (a) take possession of the<br />
secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease,<br />
assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset; (b) take over the management<br />
of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease,<br />
assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset. However, the right to<br />
transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the<br />
substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the<br />
debt. Sub-section (8) of Section 13 which is relevant for our purpose may be<br />
quoted below:<br />
<br />
"(8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and<br />
expenses incurred by him are tendered to the secured creditor at any time before<br />
the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or<br />
transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step shall be taken by him<br />
for transfer or sale of the secured asset."<br />
<br />
12. Rule 9 of the Rules deals with time of sale, issue of sale certificate and<br />
delivery of possession etc. Rule 9 to the extent relevant reads as under:<br />
(1) No sale of immovable property under the rules shall take place before the<br />
expiry of thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is<br />
published in newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of Rule 8<br />
or notice of sale has been served to the borrower.<br />
<br />
(2) The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the<br />
highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to the authorized<br />
officer and shall be subject to confirmation by the secured creditor.<br />
<br />
Provided that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed, if the amount offered<br />
by sale price is less than the reserve price, specified under sub-rule (5)of<br />
Rule 9.<br />
<br />
Provided further that if the authorized officer fails to obtain a price higher<br />
than the reserve price, he may, with the consent of the borrower and the secured<br />
creditor effect the sale at such price.<br />
<br />
(3) On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately pay a<br />
deposit of twenty-five per cent of the amount of the sale price, to the<br />
authorized officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the<br />
property shall forthwith be sold again.<br />
<br />
(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser<br />
to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale<br />
of the immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in<br />
writing between the parties.<br />
<br />
(5) In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the<br />
deposit shall be forfeited and the property shall be resold and the defaulting<br />
purchaser shall forfeit all claim to the property or to any part of the sum for<br />
which it may be subsequently sold.<br />
<br />
(6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment<br />
have been complied with, the authorized officer exercising the powers of sale<br />
shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the<br />
purchaser in the Form given in Appendix V to these rules.<br />
<br />
13. From the above it is clear that where the borrower fails to discharge the<br />
liability of the secured creditor within sixty days of notice as provided in<br />
sub-section(2) of Section 13 of the Act, under sub-section (4) the secured<br />
creditor may take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the<br />
right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured<br />
asset and has also power to take over the management of the business of the<br />
borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for<br />
realizing the secured asset. Therefore, the 'sale' contemplated under sub-<br />
section (8) of Section 13 is by way of transfer of the secured asset.<br />
14. Rule 8 of the Rules provide for sale of immovable secured assets. Sub-rule<br />
6 of Rule 8 provides that sale of secured asset shall be effected by either<br />
inviting tenders from the public or by holding public auction after serving a<br />
notice of thirty days on the borrower. However, sub-section (8) of Section 13<br />
provides that if the borrower tenders to the secured creditor all the dues of<br />
the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by<br />
him at any time before the date fixed for sale, then secured asset shall not be<br />
sold. If the borrower fails to repay dues together with all costs, charges and<br />
expenses incurred by the secured creditor before the date fixed for sale, then<br />
the secured creditor will proceed further in the matter. According to the<br />
learned counsel for the appellant, if the borrower has failed to redeem the<br />
secured asset before the date fixed for sale and the sale is concluded, the<br />
borrower has no further right to redeem the secured asset and sale is deemed to<br />
have been confirmed in favour of the auction purchaser. Learned counsel for the<br />
appellant vehemently contended that the intention of the Legislature in<br />
selectively using the words 'before the date fixed for sale' is that the<br />
borrower shall not be permitted to exercise his right after a particular date<br />
i.e the date fixed for sale. We are not inclined to accept such<br />
interpretation. If the sale is deemed to have been confirmed in favour of the<br />
purchaser on failure of the borrower to pay the amount before the date fixed for<br />
sale, then there is no need for the Legislature to incorporate the words<br />
'transfer' and 'transferred' in sub-section (8) of Section 13. If such a<br />
construction is accepted, incorporation of the words 'transfer' and<br />
'transferred" in sub-section (8) of Section 13 and 'confirmation of sale by the<br />
secured creditor' referred to in sub-rules (2) and (6) of Rule by the<br />
Legislature would be insignificant.<br />
Sub-section (8) of Section 13, in our view, permits two contingencies where the<br />
borrower has a right to redeem the property. "At any time before the date fixed"<br />
cannot be said to be exclusively intended for 'sale' only, it was intended to be<br />
applied to 'transfer' also. Otherwise, there is no meaning in employing the<br />
words 'transfer' and 'transferred' in sub-section (8). Under the first<br />
contingency, if the borrower tenders the dues of the secured creditor together<br />
with all costs, charges and expenses incurred at any time before the date fixed<br />
for sale, then the secured asset shall not be sold in the auction. However, if<br />
the borrower failed to tender the dues before the date fixed for sale, the<br />
authorized officer will proceed further in the matter. However, the right of the<br />
borrower to redeem the property thereafter is not extinguished. He has still<br />
the right to redeem the property but at any time before the date fixed for<br />
transfer of the property. So long as the sale is not confirmed by the secured<br />
creditor as required under the Rules, the right of the borrower to redeem the<br />
property under the second contingency is not taken away. He has a right to<br />
redeem the property before the confirmation of the sale by the secured creditor<br />
under the Rules. Mere sale is not enough to conclude that the property is<br />
transferred to the purchaser. From a reading of Clause (a) of sub-section (4)<br />
of Section 13, it is clear that the secured creditor has the right to transfer<br />
the secured asset by way of lease, assignment or sale. Therefore, sale will be<br />
complete by transfer of property either by confirmation of sale by written<br />
proceedings of the 'secured creditor' or by issuance of a sale certificate by<br />
the 'authorized officer' as required under sub-rule (6) of Rule 9 of the rules.<br />
Till the sale is confirmed by the 'secured creditor' as required under the<br />
Rules, it cannot be said that there is a valid transfer of property within the<br />
meaning of sub-section (8) of Section 13.<br />
15. No doubt the Supreme Court in Narandas Karsondas case held that issuance <br />
of sale certificate is a ministerial act. But, the Supreme Court in Arvind<br />
Kumar's case and Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya's case held that sale will be complete<br />
only when the property is transferred on confirmation of sale. If the borrower<br />
has been able to repay the dues of the secured creditor together with all costs,<br />
charges and expenses incurred at any time before the date of confirmation of<br />
sale by the secured creditor, then, in that event, the secured asset shall not<br />
be transferred by the secured creditor and no further steps be taken. This is<br />
the plain interpretation of the language employed in sub-section (8) of Section<br />
13.<br />
16. One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe<br />
them according to plain literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is<br />
contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of<br />
the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency,<br />
the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so as to<br />
avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the<br />
words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He<br />
must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction<br />
would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest<br />
absurdity (See Craies on Statute Laws, Seventh ed. Pages 83-85). In the well<br />
known treatise -Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,<br />
the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words of the<br />
Statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and<br />
phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning,<br />
unless that leads to some absurdity or suggest the contrary (See Chapter - The<br />
Rule of Literal Construction -page 78-Ninth Ed.). In Jugualkishore Saraf v. M/s<br />
Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.8 S.R. Das, J (as his Lordship then was) said:<br />
"The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally<br />
that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural<br />
and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the<br />
words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no<br />
such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary<br />
rule of literal interpretation."<br />
<br />
The ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the phrase 'at any time<br />
before the date fixed' employed in sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Act is<br />
clear that the Legislature has intended that the phrase has application both for<br />
'sale' and 'transfer' and not exclusively for 'sale' only and application of the<br />
phrase to the exclusion of 'transfer' is contrary to the intendment of the<br />
Legislature. From the language employed in the section, it is not possible to<br />
read down any other alternative construction.<br />
17. Assuming for argument sake that the phrase 'at any time before the date<br />
fixed' is relatable only to 'sale' and not 'transfer' even then it cannot be<br />
said that property would get transferred to the purchaser automatically after<br />
the bid was accepted by the authorized officer. The sale will be confirmed and<br />
the property would get transferred only when the sale is confirmed by the<br />
secured creditor as required under Rule 9(6) of the Rules and not by the<br />
authorized officer who conducts the auction proceedings and accepts the bid<br />
amount subject to confirmation by the secured creditor. The Legislature<br />
intended confirmation of sale by the 'secured creditor' and not by the<br />
'authorized officer'.<br />
18. We may also notice the definitions of the words 'sale' and 'transfer'. The<br />
words 'sale' and 'transfer' are not defined in the Act. Section 2(2) of the<br />
Securitization Act provides that words and expressions used and not defined in<br />
the Act but defined in the Indian Contract, 1872 (9 of 1872) or Transfer of<br />
Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) or the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the<br />
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992) shall have the<br />
same meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts.<br />
19. At the first instance, we may look into the dictionary meaning of the word<br />
'sale' to understand what 'sale' actually constitute in common parlance. As per<br />
The New International Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Deluxe Encyclopedic 2003 <br />
Edn. Page 1109 the word 'sale' means:<br />
"The act of selling, the exchange or transfer of property for money or its<br />
equivalent.<br />
<br />
Wests Legal Thesaurus Dictionary by W William Startsky, page 674 -1985 <br />
defines:<br />
A contract in which the seller in consideration of the payment of promise<br />
of payment of a certain price by the buyer transfers title and possession of the<br />
thing sold to the buyer.<br />
<br />
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines 'sale' to mean:<br />
<br />
"Transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and<br />
part-promised".<br />
<br />
Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act defines 'transfer of property' to<br />
mean an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future,<br />
to one or more other living persons, or to himself, and one or more other<br />
living persons; and 'to transfer property' is to perform such act.<br />
<br />
We may also look into the meaning of the word 'transfer'.<br />
<br />
Wests Legal Thesaurus Dictionary by W William Startsky, page 754 -1985 <br />
defines the word 'transfer':<br />
To convey or remove from place or person to another (transfer title). Deliver,<br />
assign, pass.<br />
<br />
According to the New International Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Deluxe<br />
Encyclopedic 2003 Edn. Page 1333 the word 'transfer' means:<br />
<br />
To make over possession of to another, the act of transferring or the state of<br />
being transferred, a delivery of title or property to another.<br />
<br />
Ramanath Aiyar's Law Lexicon, 1997 Edn. At page 1911 defines transfer:<br />
<br />
To convey, to make over from one to another, to remove. Document whereby one<br />
person transfers property, securities, or rights to another.<br />
<br />
Transfer, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means to make<br />
an alienation inter vivos.<br />
<br />
20. From the above definitions and dictionary meanings of 'sale' and<br />
'transfer', it is seen that 'sale' is not complete unless the property for which<br />
price was paid is transferred to the buyer by a written proceeding. In the<br />
instant case, though the bid of the auction purchaser was accepted by the<br />
authorized officer on 31.3.2012, the payments made on 13.4.2012 were received<br />
subject to the outcome of the proceedings before the DRT, Visakhapatnam. While<br />
accepting the Demand Drafts for Rs.11.70 cores dated 12.4.2012 and Rs.1.80<br />
crores dated 13.4.2012 sent by the appellant by letter dated 13.4.2012 addressed<br />
to the Authorized Officer, Dena Bank, Vijayawada the Authorized Officer, Dena<br />
Bank on the letter dated 13.4.2002 endorsed as under:<br />
"Acceptance of the D.D. towards the balance bid amount is subject to the<br />
outcome of S.A.139/2012 pending before the Hon'ble DRT, Vizag filed by M/s<br />
Sruthi Builders P. Ltd. challenging the sale proceedings held on 31.3.2012.<br />
Confirmation of sale shall also be only subject to the outcome of S.A.139/2012<br />
before DRT, Vizag."<br />
<br />
Therefore, the acceptance of the bid amount is subject to the outcome of the<br />
proceedings before the DRT. Further, the acceptance of the bid of the auction<br />
purchaser by the authorized officer, as per the conditions of auction, is<br />
subject to the confirmation by the banks and the same does not constitute<br />
confirmation of sale by the secured creditor. S.No.8 of the Terms and Conditions<br />
of Sale stated in the tender notification dated 27.2.2012 reads as under:<br />
"8. Sale is subject to confirmation by the banks".<br />
In the letter dated 31.3.2002 addressed to the appellant declaring the appellant<br />
as the highest bidder, the authorized officers of the banks clearly stated thus:<br />
"...The sale shall be confirmed in the name of M/s India Finlease Securities<br />
Ltd. on payment of the entire bid amount subject to confirmation by the Bank."<br />
<br />
The appellant, therefore, from time to time is informed that the acceptance of<br />
bid or sale shall be subject to confirmation by the secured creditor.<br />
Therefore, the acceptance of the bid by the Authorized Officer on 31.3.2012, in<br />
our considered view, would not amount to confirmation of sale by the secured<br />
creditor. It is a mere acceptance of bid of the appellant by the authorized<br />
officer and not confirmation of sale by the secured creditor. The confirmation<br />
stated in Rule 9(2) and 9(4) of the Rules is the confirmation by the authorized<br />
officer and not the secured creditor i.e banks. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 clearly<br />
provides that sale shall be "subject to confirmation by the secured creditor".<br />
Only after compliance of sub-rule (4), the secured creditor has to confirm the<br />
sale. It is only on confirmation of sale by the secured creditor sub-rule (6) of<br />
Rule 9 comes into operation and the authorized officer is empowered to issue a<br />
certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the purchaser in the<br />
form given in Appendix V to the Rules and to handover the delivery and<br />
possession of the property. Unless these formalities are complete, though the<br />
sale may be confirmed by the authorized officer, the property does not vest in<br />
the auction purchaser. Property would get transferred only after sale was<br />
confirmed by the secured creditor and not by the authorized officer. In the<br />
present case, the secured creditor has not confirmed the sale and the cheques<br />
issued on 13.4.2012 were received subject to the outcome of the proceedings<br />
pending before the DRT. Further, in the document "Details of auction<br />
participants" dated 31.3.2012 signed by the Authorized Officers and the<br />
authorized signatory of the appellant, it is mentioned as follows:<br />
<br />
"The sale in favour of the highest bidder shall be confirmed on payment of the<br />
entire bid amount of Rs.1800.00 lakhs (Rupees Eighteen crores only) and the Bank<br />
reserves its right to cancel/modify the sale before confirmation of the same."<br />
<br />
21. Therefore, it is clear that though the bid amount was accepted by the<br />
authorized officer, it does not amount to confirmation by the secured creditor<br />
and the bank has the right to cancel/modify the sale before confirmation of the<br />
same. The auction purchaser was under the impression that the moment it paid the<br />
total bid amount, it is deemed that the sale is confirmed. That is not the<br />
intention of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature is that sale has<br />
to be confirmed specifically by the "secured creditor" and not by the<br />
"authorized officer". There is no dispute that neither the sale was confirmed by<br />
the secured creditor by issuing any written communication nor a certificate of<br />
sale was issued by the authorized officer as required under sub-rule (6) of Rule<br />
9 of the Rules and delivery of possession of property was passed on to the<br />
auction purchaser.<br />
Therefore, the contention of the auction purchaser that since the balance amount<br />
of purchase price has been paid on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation<br />
of sale of the immovable property, it is deemed that the property vested in the<br />
auction purchaser has no merit. At the cost of repetition we may state that the<br />
confirmation of sale referred to in sub-rules (2) and (4) is the confirmation by<br />
the authorized officer and not by the secured creditor. Sub-rule (2) clearly<br />
mentions that the sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has<br />
offered the highest sale price to the authorized officer and the same shall be<br />
subject to confirmation by the secured creditor. So long as the sale is not<br />
confirmed by the secured creditor, transfer of secured asset is not effected.<br />
22. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decisions of<br />
the Supreme Court in B.Arvind Kumar v. Government of India and Sagar Mahila<br />
Vidyalaya, Sagar vs. Pandit Sadhashivrao Harse to contend that once the sale is<br />
confirmed by the Court the sale becomes absolute and the auction purchaser has<br />
got a vested right in the property whether sale certificate is issued or not. It<br />
was also held that issuance of sale certificate is only a ministerial act<br />
evidencing the transaction of sale that has already taken place and the sale<br />
certificate does not require any registration. In B.Arvind Kumar vs. Government<br />
of India it was held:<br />
When a property is sold by public auction in pursuance of an order of the Court<br />
and the bid is accepted and the sale is confirmed by the Court in favour of the<br />
purchaser, the sale becomes absolute and the title vests in the purchaser. A<br />
sale certificate is issued to the purchaser only when the sale becomes absolute.<br />
The sale certificate is merely the evidence of such title. It is well settled<br />
that when an auction-purchaser derives title on confirmation of sale in his<br />
favour and a sale certificate is issued evidencing such sale and title, no other<br />
deed for transfer from the court is contemplated or required. In this case, the<br />
sale certificate itself was registered, though such a sale certificate issued by<br />
a court or an officer authorized by the court does not require registration."<br />
<br />
From the above, it is clear that an auction purchaser derives title on<br />
confirmation of sale only. Though the above case arises under the provisions of<br />
Transfer of Property Act and deals with lease, the proposition can be made<br />
applicable to the cases arising under the Securitization Act as well. Even<br />
according to the respondent-banks, a sale certificate is not required to be<br />
registered nor were the banks required to execute a registered sale deed after<br />
the sale was confirmed by the banks and merely a sale certificate was required<br />
to be issued. It is the appellant who is insisting for registration of a sale<br />
deed. In the case before the Supreme Court, the sale was confirmed by the Court<br />
in favour of the purchaser and a sale certificate was issued. Be that as it<br />
may, in the present case, though the appellant has become the highest bidder and<br />
paid the amount, the sale was not confirmed by the banks i.e. the secured<br />
creditor which is mandatory and a pre-condition as per the terms and conditions<br />
of tender notification. Therefore, in the absence of confirmation of sale by the<br />
banks, as required under Rule 9(6), the appellant derives no title to the<br />
property in question. It is only on confirmation of the sale by the respondent-<br />
banks the property vests in the appellant.<br />
23. In Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya, Sagar v . Pandit Sadhashivrao Harse it was<br />
held:<br />
"It may be noted that once an order was made under Order XXI Rule 92 C.P.C.<br />
confirming the sale, the title of the auction purchaser related back to the<br />
date of sale as provided under section 65 C.P.C. The title in the property<br />
thereafter vests in the auction purchaser and not in the judgment debtor. The<br />
issue of sale certificate under Order XXI Rule 94 C.P.C in favour of the auction<br />
purchaser though mandatory but the granting of certificate is a ministerial act<br />
and not judicial. "<br />
<br />
In the above case also, the sale was confirmed by the Court and a sale<br />
certificate was issued. As already stated, in the present case, sale was not<br />
confirmed by the respondent-banks which is a pre-requisite as per the terms and<br />
conditions of the tender notification. Though the above decisions have no<br />
application to the facts of the present case but the Supreme Court categorically<br />
held that an auction purchaser derives title only on confirmation of the sale by<br />
the secured creditor. <br />
24. In K. Chidambhara Manickam v. Shakeena the Court has not taken into <br />
consideration the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar's case<br />
and Sagar Mahila Vidyalaya's case that only on confirmation of sale by the<br />
secured creditor, transfer would take place. In the view we have taken on the<br />
interpretation of sub-section(8) of Section 13 of the Act, we are unable to<br />
subscribe to the view taken by the Madras High Court that a borrower should<br />
approach the secured creditor or the authorized officer before the date fixed<br />
for sale and not after the sale. Even if the borrower has failed to redeem the<br />
property before the date fixed for sale, still the right of the borrower to<br />
redeem the property before the sale was confirmed by the secured creditor is not<br />
taken away. With great respect to the learned Judges, the Court has not<br />
correctly appreciated true implication of sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the<br />
Act. Further, in Manickam's case, a sale certificate was already issued and as<br />
such the Court has held that sale becomes complete and the property vests in the<br />
auction purchaser. In the instant case, the secured creditor has neither<br />
confirmed the sale nor issued any sale certificate. Therefore, the said<br />
decision has no application to the facts of the case.<br />
25. In Manoj D. Kapasi's case following the decision of the Supreme Court in<br />
Mardia Chemicals Ltd., it was held that the right of redemption was a statutory<br />
right available to the borrower till the transfer took place. In Mardia<br />
Chemicals Ltd.'s case, the Supreme Court following the decision in Narandas case<br />
held that the mortgagor has a right to redeem until the sale was complete by<br />
registration in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act. No<br />
doubt the requirement of registration is not necessary for the properties<br />
auctioned under the provisions of the Act as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court<br />
in B. Arvind Kumar's case. But, in the instant case, the sale was not confirmed<br />
by the secured creditor and as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Arvind<br />
Kumar's case unless the sale is confirmed the property is not said to be<br />
transferred to the auction purchaser. Therefore, in any event, the right of the<br />
borrower to redeem the property is not taken away so long as the sale is not<br />
confirmed by the secured creditor.<br />
26. As regards the contention that the proceedings initiated by the borrower<br />
before the DRT are without jurisdiction, <b><i>needless to state that against the sale</i></b><br />
<b><i>proceedings of the authorized officer, the borrower has a right to approach the</i></b><br />
<b><i>DRT under Section 17 of the Act. In the instant case, as already held, the sale</i></b><br />
<b><i>is not confirmed by the secured creditor and the borrower has approached the DRT</i></b><br />
<b><i>on 3.4.2012 and the Tribunal issued directions giving liberty to the borrower to</i></b><br />
<b><i>pay the amounts within five weeks which have been complied with by the borrower.</i></b><br />
<b><i>Therefore, it cannot be said that the proceedings before the DRT are without</i></b><br />
<b><i>jurisdiction. The DRT is well within its competence to take up the matter.</i></b><br />
Since we have dealt with the interpretation of sub-section (8) of Section<br />
13 in extenso we are not inclined to deal with the issue of maintainability of<br />
the writ petition.<br />
27. <b><i>We, therefore, hold that under the Securitization Act, a borrower has the</i></b><br />
<b><i>right to redeem the property under sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the Act at</i></b><br />
<b><i>any time before the date the property is transferred to the auction purchaser by</i></b><br />
<b><i>confirmation of sale by the secured creditor as required under sub-rule (6) of</i></b><br />
<b><i>Rule 9 of the Rules.</i></b><br />
<b><i>28</i></b><br />
<b><i>. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly</i></b><br />
<b><i>dismissed. No costs. </i></b><br />
<br />
<br />
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, ACJ <br />
<br />
VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J <br />
12.9.2012<br />
</div>
advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-18807607470725723262012-09-11T02:33:00.000-07:002012-09-11T02:33:13.301-07:00“1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble Tribunal is right in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who sustained an addition of Rs.50 lakhs under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the appellant has failed to prove the identity of the party and the genuineness of the transaction? 2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be concluded that the appellant has not discharged the primary onus cast on it by section 68 of the Act and no duty is cast on the assessing office to make further enquiries specially in the absence of any finding that the investor company was a mere name lender?” - When the existence of the creditor itself was not established by the appellant and when he has failed to discharge the primary burden, which lies on him, the question of conducting further enquiry or probe does not arise. Therefore, we do not see any substantial questions of law arising for consideration to admit the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. As the appeal is dismissed, miscellaneous petitions shall stand closed.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 17pt;">HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. ESWARAIAH<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 17pt;">ITTA NO. 110 OF 2012<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 17pt;">DATED 13.04.2012<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt;">M/s. Sri Chakra Cements Ltd<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">JUDGMENT:</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> (per Hon’ble Sri Justice V. Eswaraiah)<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> </span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">This Appeal, under Section 260A of the Income Tax, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) arising out of the assessment year 1996-97, is sought to be filed alleging that the following are the substantial questions of law that arise for consideration:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">“1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble Tribunal is right in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who sustained an addition of Rs.50 lakhs under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the appellant has failed to prove the identity of the party and the genuineness of the transaction?<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<b><i><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be concluded that the appellant has not discharged the primary onus cast on it by section 68 of the Act and no duty is cast on the assessing office to make further enquiries specially in the absence of any finding that the investor company was a mere name lender?”<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">The facts of the case are that the appellant is a company carrying on the manufacture of sale of cement. The appellant filed a return of income on 29.11.1996 admitting “Nil” income after setting off of brought forward losses. The Assessing Officer originally completed the assessment on 30.3.1999 under Section 143 (3) of the Act and determined the total income at Rs.3,96,59,292/-. Therefrom, the Assessing Officer reduced the unabsorbed depreciation of a similar amount. While determining the said income, the Assessing Officer added the increase in the share capital of Rs.3,19,50,000/-. The appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who set aside the assessment and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer completed the re-assessment on 28.10.2002 under Section 143 (3) r/w Section 251 of the Act. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">It is stated that on remand, the appellant was addressed various letters for furnishing the information about the investment and in response to the letters and notices issued to the Chartered Accountant and also to the Manager (Accounts) of the appellant, they appeared and furnished the details with regard to Rs.3,19,50,000/- of the share capital. The appellant was able to furnish the material about the investment in share capital through Demand Drafts, which were reflected in the books of accounts of the respective companies as well as the individuals, which were routed through official channels and accordingly the relief was granted to the appellant for investment of the share capital of Rs.2,69,50,000/-, but insofar as Rs.50,00,000/- is concerned, it was added as cash credit of the appellant on the ground that the investment of Rs.50,00,000/- is said to have been invested by Gold Crest Finance (India) Limited. With regard to the said investment by Gold Crest Finance (<st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country>) Limited, the appellant could not produce any information about the whereabouts of the said company in spite of addressing letters on 23.9.2002.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">In computing the said income of Rs.50 lakhs of the appellant, the appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) IV, Hyderabad, who by order dated 5.1.2004 held that the amount of Rs.50 lakhs by Demand Drafts said to have been received by the Gold Crest Finance (India) Limited towards inter corporate deposit payable on demand was not able to be established. It is stated that the said Rs.50 lakhs was said to have been received as inter corporate deposit payable on demand but not towards the share capital. The Commissioner also stated that the appellant also admitted that the whereabouts of the said investor M/s Gold Crest Finance (<st1:country -region="-region" w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">India</st1:place></st1:country>) Limited, are not known and the identity of the creditor has not been established by the appellant. The creditworthiness itself is not established. The appellant merely states that creditor is a limited company and assessed to tax but no evidence is furnished like P & L Account, balance sheet or evidence regarding creditworthiness of the creditor. Merely because the amount was received by way of Demand Draft through the banking channels, it cannot be said that the said amount is not a cash credit as the existence of the creditor itself is not established. Admittedly, the onus is on the appellant to prove the genuineness of the said transaction. The appellant has failed to establish the identity of the creditor and, it’s creditworthiness as well as the genuineness of the transaction.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">Accordingly, the Commissioner of Income Tax dismissed the appeal holding that the Assessing Officer correctly added Rs.50 lakhs as unexplained credit under Section 68 of the Act.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">As against the said order, the appellant filed ITA No.181/Hyd/2004, on the file of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hyderabad</st1:place></st1:city>, and the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 28.6.2006, dismissed the appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">After going through the facts and circumstances of the case, it is to be seen as to whether the questions raised by the appellant before this Court are the substantial questions of law that arise for consideration or not?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">We are of the opinion that insofar as the first question is concerned, we do not see any substantial question of law arising for consideration as admittedly the appellant failed to prove the identity of the party and the genuineness of the transaction and therefore the Assessing Officer, the Appellate Commissioner as well as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rightly sustained the addition of Rs.50 lakhs under Section 68 of the Act. Insofar as the second question is concerned, we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to discharge the primary onus cast on it by Section 68 of the Act and it cannot be said that a duty is cast on the Assessing Officer to make further enquiry, especially when the appellant has failed to discharge his initial burden. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">This Court is also of the opinion that when the existence of the investor-company itself is established, merely because the entry was entered in the books of accounts as if the amount was received by demand draft, it cannot be said that the appellant has no legal obligation to explain the nature and source of the credit. He failed to tender any evidence regarding the said cash credit and therefore the Assessing Officer is justified in rejecting the claim of the appellant as he has failed to discharge the burden in explaining the said investment. Further, mere furnishing of the particulars of the investor is not enough and payment of the said amount by way of demand draft is not sacrosanct nor can it make a non-genuine transaction as genuine. The onus is on the appellant to offer explanation as to the nature and source of the said credit and he has failed to establish the identify of the creditor and therefore we are of the opinion that the Tribunal rightly dismissed the appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">Under Section 68 of the Act, mere furnishing of the name of the creditor and the particulars of the demand draft to which the said amount of Rs.50 lakhs was received is not a sufficient explanation about the nature and source of the said Rs.50 lakhs and therefore the appellant has failed to explain the cash credit of Rs.50 lakhs and which was rightly charged to income tax as income of the assessee. The said investment of Rs.50 lakhs is rightly added as income of the previous years.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;">In our opinion, the Tribunal rightly rejected the contention of the appellant with regard to the contentions that the Assessing Officer ought to have conducted a further probe by issuing a notice or summons in examining the creditor. <i><b>When the existence of the creditor itself was not established by the appellant and when he has failed to discharge the primary burden, which lies on him, the question of conducting further enquiry or probe does not arise. Therefore, we do not see any substantial questions of law arising for consideration to admit the appeal.<o:p></o:p></b></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;"><i><b>The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.<o:p></o:p></b></i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 37.77777862548828px;"><i><b> As the appeal is dismissed, miscellaneous petitions shall stand closed.</b></i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">DATE: 13.04.2012<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-48744067630867175242012-09-11T02:15:00.001-07:002012-09-11T02:15:40.485-07:00 The petitioner was awarded compensation for acquisition of his land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’). The petitioner was also awarded interest on the compensation. 2. The revenue sought to deduct tax at source on the interest component. This was objected to by the petitioner and it is under these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed.Section 145(b) of the Income Tax Act has been introduced which provides that the interest component of the compensation will be the income of the year in which it is received. As such, the question of spread over will not arise and if that question does not arise, tax must necessarily be deducted at source.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">W.P. No.6425 of 2012<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">Writ Petition No.6425 of 2012<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<u><span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic'; font-size: 10pt;">ORDER:</span></u><span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic'; font-size: 10pt;"> (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri Madan B. Lokur)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">1. <b><i> The petitioner was awarded compensation for acquisition of his land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’). The petitioner was also awarded interest on the compensation.<o:p></o:p></i></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';"><b><i>2. The revenue sought to deduct tax at source on the interest component. This was objected to by the petitioner and it is under these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in <b>BIKRAM SINGH vs. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR & Others</b><a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_6425_2012.html#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a><b>. <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">4. In our opinion, that decision is not at all applicable to the facts of this case.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">5. That apart, <b><i>we find that Parliament has since introduced Section 145-A to the Income Tax Act. Clause(b) thereof provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 145 of the Income Tax Act, interest received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is received.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">6. <b><i>Section 194-A of the Income Tax Act is also of some importance and this deals with interest other than interest on securities. This Section provides that when there is a credit of income to the account of the payee or payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, income tax may be deducted thereon at the rates in force.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">7. The revenue was therefore, entitled to deduct tax at source from the interest component of the compensation received by the petitioner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">8. Paragraph-10 of the decision rendered in <b>Bikram Singh</b>’s case has to be read in the light of the facts of that case and the law as it stood then. <b><i>The Supreme Court held that the interest component of compensation is exigible to tax as a revenue receipt. However, the assessee was entitled to spread over the interest income over the period for which payment came to be made so as to compute the income for assessing tax. Under these circumstances, Section 194-A of the Income Tax Act had no application since it encompassed deduction of the tax at source.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">9. As mentioned above, <b><i>Section 145(b) of the Income Tax Act has been introduced which provides that the interest component of the compensation will be the income of the year in which it is received. As such, the question of spread over will not arise and if that question does not arise, tax must necessarily be deducted at source.</i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">10. We may note that a Division Bench of this Court has taken a similar view in <b>K. Siva Lingam Naidu vs. The Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Nandyal, Kurnool District</b> (W.P. No.30333 of 2010, decided on 11.4.2011).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">11. There is no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">12. The miscellaneous application is also dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Century Gothic';">MADAN B. LOKUR, CJ<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_6425_2012.html#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a>( 1997) 10 SCC 243</div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-70331946476021161972012-09-11T02:04:00.001-07:002012-09-11T02:04:30.766-07:00This matter arises under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short Act). The petitioner is a private limited company called Bharathi Cements Corporation Private Limited represented by its director G.Balaji and it is in the business of manufacture of cement. this is a case where the assessing authority has merely issued a notice earlier to the petitioner calling for certain information regarding valuation of the plant, but subsequently referred the matter to the fourth respondent valuation officer in order to take a decision in the matter. The third respondent is yet to take a decision and pass a final order regarding re-assessment and about the valuation of the investment in question and he may rest his decision on various factors and having regard to the language of Section 142A(1) it can be said that he has that power. Once a decision is taken by the third respondent in this matter and if it goes against the petitioner, it is always open for the petitioner to work out its remedies. Thus the writ petition can be said to be premature. <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.RAVI SHANKAR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">WRIT PETITION No.6260 of 2012<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">ORDER</span></u></b><b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">: </span></b><b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 8pt;">(Per THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR)</span></b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;"> <b><i>This matter arises under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short Act). The petitioner is a private limited company called Bharathi Cements Corporation Private Limited represented by its director G.Balaji and it is in the business of manufacture of cement. </i></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">2. When this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department took notice and subsequently the third respondent filed his counter and material papers. Thereafter both sides were heard in the matter at the admission stage itself.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">3. The point raised in this writ petition is whether a letter/ communication No.ACIT.2(3)/VAL/BHA/2011-12 dated 07.12.2011 of the third respondent (Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-2(3), Hyderabad) informing the petitioner that an earlier notice in File No.SE(V)/HYD/2485/ CG/895 dt.25.11.2011 given by the fourth respondent (District Valuation Officer of the Valuation Cell of the Income Tax Department, Hyderabad) and the earlier connected notices should be read as those issued under Section 142A are <i>ultra vires</i> the provisions of the Act and should be set aside. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">4. The fourth respondent had earlier issued a notice dated 25.11.2011 calling upon the petitioner to produce copies of certain documents to arrive at the fair market value of the petitioner’s plant at Nallalingayapalli village, Kamalapuram Mandal in Kadapa District. That notice was issued by the fourth respondent pursuant to the third respondent’s requisition dt.21.11.2011. In the notice dated 25.11.2011 it was mentioned that it was issued under Section 50C of the Act. Pursuant to the reply dated 05.12.2011 by the petitioner to the third respondent explaining that Section 50C was inapplicable, the latter issued the impugned notice informing the petitioner that it should be read as one issued under Section 142A of the Act and that Section 50C was mentioned by mistake. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">5. It is clear from the contentions that the petitioner is also questioning the validity of the fourth respondent’s notice dt.25.11.2011 and also the aforementioned requisition dt.21.11.2011 of the third respondent. It is also seen that the third respondent earlier during assessment proceedings for the assessment year (AY) 2009-10 issued a notice dated 21.10.2011 to the petitioner calling upon it to produce particulars relating to the investments and valuation of civil works and its plant. We will refer to these notices later.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">6. The point arises in the following circumstances. The petitioner for the AY 2009-10 submitted a return of income on 30.09.2009 declaring a total income of Rs.2,91,01,247/- comprising of interest on fixed deposits with banks and APSTDCL, as by the previous year it did not commence its business and the above income could not be capitalized. The third respondent who is also assessing officer by his assessment order dt.30.12.2011 after taking up scrutiny of the return and for reasons recorded added an income of Rs.69,84,11,520/- which was the amount shown as received through share premia from other investors in the petitioner company and a sum of Rs.94,28,904/- towards unexplained cash credits under the relevant provisions of the Act and assessed the income of the petitioner at Rs.73,69,41,671/- after the said additions and fixed the total tax inclusive of interest and after deducting the tax already paid determined the tax payable at Rs.32,09,48,108/-. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">7. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal before the concerned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) against the above assessment order. We are not, of-course, concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the said assessment order as its merits have to be decided in the statutory appeal. We mention the above facts as the petitioner has made the above assessment order also a basis, as will presently be seen, for questioning the impugned letters and notices. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">8. The first plea of the petitioner is that Section 50C of the Act deals with consideration received by an assessee while transferring a capital asset and provides for calling for valuation of the asset only to determine the correct capital gain when the assessee suppresses it and therefore the said provision was not applicable as no issue of capital gain arose in the assessment proceedings. It is also pointed out in this connection that noticing the above aspect which was canvassed by the assessee in its reply dt.05.12.2011, the third respondent sent the impugned letter dt.07.12.2011 to wriggle out of that situation and therefore the impugned notices are invalid. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">9. The petitioner’s second plea is that the assessing officer should first reject the books of account of the petitioner or for that matter any assessee to again go into the investment and valuation of an asset and as the third respondent did not reject the books of account regarding the valuation of the petitioner’s plant in the assessment proceedings, it was not open to him to go into this aspect. In support of this plea Sri C.P. Ramaswamy the learned counsel for petitioner also relied upon two decisions which we will refer to later.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">10. The third plea of the petitioner is that while conducting the assessment and passing the assessment order, the third respondent neither referred to nor expressed any doubt about the valuation of its plant; there was no reference to valuation and in fact he also accepted certain vouchers and other documents filed by it showing investments in the plant. Therefore the present notices amount to witch hunting and harassment. Section 142A is also not applicable to the petitioner’s case, to once again probe into the valuation of the petitioner’s plant or the investment made on it, is the contention. It is also pointed out that mere valuation cannot be the basis for taxation and it is only profits or income which can be taken into account for the purpose of assessing taxable income. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">11. The third respondent filed a counter affidavit supporting the letter and the stand of the Revenue. Sri J.V.Prasad, the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue, contends that under Section 142A(1) of the Act, it is open for the assessing officer to hold an enquiry into the valuation of any investment made by an assessee even after an assessment order is passed in order to assess the correct income from an unexplained investment or when the asset is deliberately wrongly valued for suppressing taxable income and the third and fourth respondents are therefore justified in issuing the impugned notices. Sri Prasad also pointed out that the third respondent has not yet taken any final decision in the matter regarding valuation and unexplained investment or income and that process has only been initiated. Ultimately if the third respondent takes any decision which goes against the petitioner, the petitioner can always work out his remedies and the present writ petition is premature. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">12. We will now take up the pleas of the petitioner and the stand of the Revenue for analysis. Regarding the first plea of the petitioner, it is true that Section 50C of the Act deals with assessment of capital gain when it is noticed or suspected that there is suppression of actual consideration received by the assessee on transfer of an asset. It may however be noted that Section 292B of the Act enacts no assessment, notice, summons or other proceedings taken by the authorities under the Act shall be invalid by reason of any mistake, defect or omission if such notice or proceedings or assessment is otherwise valid under the Act. This provision enacts the principle that mere non-mention or mention of a wrong provision of law in a proceeding or order cannot be a ground to invalidate it if that is otherwise permissible and valid under law. In fact, this was the answer of the third respondent in his counter to the first plea of the petitioner and it has to be accepted.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">13. Sub-section 1 of Section 142A enacts that for the purposes of making assessment or re-assessment, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in the various sections mentioned therein, the assessing officer may require the valuation officer concerned to make an estimate of such value and furnish his report to him. Section 142A (1) of the Act which is relied upon by the respondents clearly authorizes issuance of the impugned letter and the concerned notices; and they are permissible under the aforesaid provision even after an assessment is made. This aspect can as well fall under Section 69 of the Act which may deal with unexplained investment. Thus the first plea of the petitioner is rejected. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">14. Coming to the second plea of the petitioner, which is based upon the requirement of rejection of books of account of the petitioner regarding the valuation as a pre-condition for calling a report from the valuation officer, the position is this. Section 142A(1) of the Act which provides for probing into the valuation of investments and the source of money for such investments, has been introduced by Finance Act 2004 (Central Act 23 of 2004), with effect from 15.11.1972. This provision specifically empowers the concerned assessing authority to undertake re-assessment even after making an assessment. The provision does require that for exercise of power under Section 142A(1) of the Act (regarding ascertaining the value of investment), the assessing officer should first reject the books of account of the assessee in which he has shown the valuation of such investment, as a pre-condition for enquiring into the same. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">15. Basing upon the language of Section 142A(1) of the Act, a Division Bench of Uttarakhand High Court in CIT v. Bhawani Shankar Vyas<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_6260_2012.html#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 13pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a> (relied upon by Sri C.P. Ramasami) has also clearly held that rejection of books of account is not a pre-condition for enquiring into the valuation of an investment for the purpose of re-assessment under Section 142A(1). The Division Bench in that case was dealing with an appeal from the order of an appellate tribunal. It has also considered the scope and power of the authorities under Section 144 which deals with best judgment assessment, Section 144A which deals with the power of the Joint Commissioner in certain cases to issue directions and Section 131 which deals with the power regarding discovery and production of evidence and laid down the above proposition. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">16. As already mentioned, the above decision was rendered in an appeal under Section 260A of the Act from an order of the tribunal. There the tribunal independently considered the matter and reached its conclusions on facts. On the premise that findings of facts cannot be interfered with, the Division Bench in the aforesaid case however held that the tribunal’s view that the assessing officer should first reject the books of account of the assessee before calling for a valuation report was not correct. The Division Bench of the Uttarakhand High Court ultimately concluded that full powers have been given by Section 142A of the Act to the assessing officer and it was not necessary for him to first reject the books of account of the assessee. We respectfully agree with the above view of the Uttarakhand High Court. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">17. However, in Sargam Cinema v. CIT<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_6260_2012.html#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 13pt;">[2]</span></span></span></a> (another decision relied upon by Sri C.P. Ramasami) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in proceedings arising in statutory appeals under the Act did observe that the assessing authority could not have referred the matters to the departmental valuation officer without rejecting the books of account of the assessee. This judgment is a very short judgment and nothing is placed before us to infer that the matter pertains to a year after the amendment of Section 142A by Finance Act 2004. The relevant facts are not discernable from the judgment and in our opinion this decision cannot therefore come to the rescue of the petitioner. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">18. Even otherwise it may be noted here that in the course of previous assessment proceedings, as will be presently seen under the third plea, the third respondent did not accept the valuation shown by the petitioner in its balance sheet and accounts and he was asking for more information to arrive at the fair market value of the petitioner’s plant and civil works connected with it. In fact, that can be treated as amounting to rejecting the books of account of the petitioner by implication and no formal order rejecting the books of account is necessary. This is also a negative point for the petitioner and the petitioner’s contention under this point is liable to be rejected on the above ground.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">19. That takes us to the third plea of the petitioner. The third respondent has dealt with the same in his counter affidavit, in detail. The relevant plea in the counter is that earlier in the course of assessment proceedings for the AY 2009-10 he issued several questionnaires also. He pointed out that in the balance sheet as at 31.03.2009 the petitioner showed the aggregate value of the capital work in progress roughly at Rs.481.92 crores; the petitioner produced bills and vouchers roughly for about Rs.405.76 crores and has yet to produce bills roughly for the value of Rs.67 crores and more but failed to produce the same. It is also the case of the third respondent that he issued a notice dt.21.10.2011 to the petitioner calling for the above particulars to be produced by 10.11.2011 but the petitioner did not comply and went on furnishing information in a piece meal manner, which was incomplete. This notice dated 21.10.2011 was admitted by the petitioner in his reply affidavit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">20. The version of the third respondent is that despite reminders the petitioner did not produce the bills and vouchers necessary for correctly estimating the value of the investments in the plant and went on postponing the matter and as the time limit for completion of assessment was about to expire, he passed the assessment order dt.30.12.2011 without touching the valuation of the civil works including the plant. We mention the above facts only to indicate the situation or circumstances under which the third respondent says the impugned letter and connected notices were issued to the petitioner calling for all particulars of the valuation relating to the plant and its civil works. As noticed earlier, the conduct of the third respondent in calling for particulars relating to valuation of the plant would show that he did not accept the books of account of the petitioner filed in the initial assessment proceedings and this by implication amounts to rejection. It cannot therefore be said that the third respondent or the revenue were acting according to their whims and fancies.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">21. What should be noted is that the above circumstances would show that the third respondent had already referred to valuation of the plant and other civil works during assessment proceedings which culminated in the order dated 30.11.2011 and the petitioner did not fully comply with the notices issued by him in that behalf. In fact the third respondent did not go into valuation of the plant in the aforesaid assessment order and his plea was that since there was no full information, he refrained from going into the same. In such a situation, the third respondent claims that he took up the issue of valuation of the plant and called for particulars from the valuation officer also apart from issuing other communications to the petitioner for full information relating to valuation to take up re-assessment if necessary and the third respondent was within his power to do so under Section 142A of the Act. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">22. It is also settled now that an assessing authority under the Act is also given inquisitorial powers while making assessment or re-assessment. Thus it cannot be said that the third respondent had accepted the valuation given by the petitioner in his books of account and the other bills and vouchers filed by him with regard to its plant and its other civil works in the previous assessment proceedings. It therefore follows that the third respondent was well within his power under Section 142A to take up that issue of valuation of or investment in petitioner’s plant for a re-assessment if necessary. Hence we are not inclined to accept this third plea of the petitioner also.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">23. Further <b><i><u>this is a case where the assessing authority has merely issued a notice earlier to the petitioner calling for certain information regarding valuation of the plant, but subsequently referred the matter to the fourth respondent valuation officer in order to take a decision in the matter. The third respondent is yet to take a decision and pass a final order regarding re-assessment and about the valuation of the investment in question and he may rest his decision on various factors and having regard to the language of Section 142A(1) it can be said that he has that power. Once a decision is taken by the third respondent in this matter and if it goes against the petitioner, it is always open for the petitioner to work out its remedies. Thus the writ petition can be said to be premature. <o:p></o:p></u></i></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;">24. In the above circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that this writ petition must fail and it is accordingly dismissed at the admission stage with costs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">GODA RAGHURAM, J<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<st1:place w:st="on"><b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">N. RAVI</span></b></st1:place><b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;"> SHANKAR, J<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">20<sup>th</sup> JUNE 2012<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 28.88888931274414px;">CVRK/TJMR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">AND<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.RAVI SHANKAR<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">WRIT PETITION No.6260 of 2012<o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 8pt;"> (Per THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR)</span></b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt; line-height: 35.55555725097656px;"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 13pt;">20<sup>th</sup> JUNE 2012<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 28.88888931274414px;">CVRK/TJMR<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_6260_2012.html#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a> (2009) 311 ITR 8 (Uttarakhand)</div>
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<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_6260_2012.html#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[2]</span></span></span></a> (2010) 328 ITR 513 (SC)</div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-61030286306959185962012-09-11T01:47:00.001-07:002012-09-11T01:47:55.885-07:00 We see no justifiable reason to interfere with the order under challenge. However, we clarify that when a notice under s.148 of the IT Act is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for issuing notices. The AO is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. On receipt of reasons, the noticee is entitled to file objections to issuance of notice and the AO is bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. In the instant case, as the reasons have been disclosed in these proceedings, the AO has to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order, before proceeding with the assessment in respect of the abovesaid five assessment years.”<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR</span></u></b><b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">WRIT PETITION NO.3046 OF 2012<o:p></o:p></span></b></h1>
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<b><sup><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> </span></sup></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> <u>DATED 27<sup>TH</sup> MARCH, 2012</u></span></b><b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">M/s.Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation Ltd.,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">9 & 10, Eastern M.J.Road,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">Nampally, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hyderabad</st1:place></st1:city>,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">Dr.Sameer Sharma.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> …Petitioner</span><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">Basheerbagh, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Hyderabad</st1:place></st1:city>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B.LOKUR</span></u></b><b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">AND</span></u></b><b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE</span></u></b><b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> SANJAY KUMAR</span></u></b><b><u><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></u></b></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">WRIT PETITION NO.3046 OF 2012<o:p></o:p></span></b></h1>
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<b><u><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">ORDER</span></u></b><b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">:</span></b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> (</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 10pt;">PER HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B.LOKUR</span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">)</span><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> The Revenue sought to reopen the assessment of the petitioner for the assessment year 2005-06.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">2. The Revenue gave its reasons to the petitioner for reopening the assessment and the petitioner filed its objections.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">3. Without passing any speaking order on the objections, the Revenue straight away passed the impugned assessment order.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">4. This is clearly contrary to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in <b><i>GKN DRIVESHAFTS (INDIA) LTD. v. INCOME TAX OFFICER & OTHERS<a href="http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2012/wp/wp_3046_2012.html#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align: super;"><b><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></b></span></span></a>.</i></b></span><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> Paragraph 5 of the said decision reads as under:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style'; font-size: 11pt; line-height: 21.111112594604492px;">“5. <b><u> We see no justifiable reason to interfere with the order under challenge. However, we clarify that when a notice under s.148 of the IT Act is issued, the proper course of action for the noticee is to file return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for issuing notices. The AO is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. On receipt of reasons, the noticee is entitled to file objections to issuance of notice and the AO is bound to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order. In the instant case, as the reasons have been disclosed in these proceedings, the AO has to dispose of the objections, if filed, by passing a speaking order, before proceeding with the assessment in respect of the abovesaid five assessment years.”</u></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">5. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the Revenue says that a speaking order will be passed by the Revenue on the objections filed by the petitioner within a period of three weeks.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">6. In view of the above, the impugned assessment order is set aside and liberty is granted to the Revenue to pass a speaking order within four (4) weeks from today.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">7. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">8. Miscellaneous applications are also disposed of.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> <b>( MADAN B.LOKUR, CJ )<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';"> ( SANJAY KUMAR, J )<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Bookman Old Style';">27<sup>TH</sup> MARCH, 2012.<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-34741617380608755752012-05-06T20:59:00.000-07:002012-09-11T01:48:05.458-07:00Two cases - Two different views - What is the reason?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<div style="background-color: white; border: 0px; color: #333333; font-family: Helvetica, Arial, 'Lucida Grande', Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 1.6em; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px; text-align: justify; vertical-align: baseline;">
N THE <a class="zem_slink" href="http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=28.622237,77.239584&spn=0.01,0.01&q=28.622237,77.239584%20(Supreme%20Court%20of%20India)&t=h" rel="geolocation" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Supreme Court of India">SUPREME COURT OF INDIA</a><br />CRIMINAL <a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appellate_jurisdiction" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Appellate jurisdiction">APPELLATE JURISDICTION</a><br />CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 645 of 2012<br />Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel …Appellant<br />Versus<br />State of Gujarat & Anr.<br />…Respondents<br />J U D G M E N T<br />Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.<br />1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment<br />and order dated 18.8.2011 passed by the <a class="zem_slink" href="http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=1.28988611111,103.850377778&spn=0.01,0.01&q=1.28988611111,103.850377778%20(High%20Court%20of%20Singapore)&t=h" rel="geolocation" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="High Court of Singapore">High Court</a> of Gujarat at<br />Ahmedabad in Criminal Misc. Application No. 7807 of 2006, by which the<br />High Court has dismissed the application filed by the present appellant<br />under Section 482 of <a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_Procedure_Code%2C_1973_%28India%29" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (India)">Criminal Procedure Code, 1973</a> (hereinafter<br />referred as `Cr.P.C.’) for quashing the I.CR No. 18 of 2004 and<br /><a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_law" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Criminal law">Criminal Case</a> No. 5 of 2004 pending before the Chief Judicial<br />Magistrate, Patan, on the plea of double jeopardy for the reason that<br />the appellant has already been tried and dealt with under the<br />provisions of Section 138 of <a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negotiable_Instruments_Act%2C_1881" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881">Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881</a><br />(hereinafter referred as `N.I. Act’) for the same offence.<br />2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:<br />A. Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint dated 22.10.2003 i.e.<br />Criminal Case No. 1334 of 2003 under Section 138 of N.I. Act on the<br />ground that the appellant had taken hypothecation loan of Rs. 20 lakhs<br />and had not repaid the same. In order to meet the said liability, the<br />appellant issued cheque bearing no. 59447 and on being presented, the<br />cheque has been dishonoured.<br />B. Subsequent thereto on 6.2.2004, the respondent no. 2 filed an<br />FIR being I.C.R. No. 18 of 2004 under Sections 406/420 read with<br />Section 114 of <a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Penal_Code" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Indian Penal Code">Indian Penal Code</a>, 1860 (hereinafter referred as `IPC’)<br />with the Sidhpur Police Station for committing the offence of criminal<br />breach of trust, cheating and abetment etc.<br />C. In the criminal case No.1334 of 2003 filed under Section 138 of<br />N.I. Act, the trial court convicted the appellant. Aggrieved,<br />appellant preferred Appeal No. 12 of 2006, before the District Judge<br />wherein, he has been acquitted. Against the order of acquittal,<br />respondent no. 2 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1997 of 2008 before<br />the High Court of Gujarat which is still pending consideration.<br />D. <a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Appeal">Appellant</a> filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,<br />seeking quashing of ICR No. 18 of 2004 and Criminal Case No. 5 of 2004,<br />pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan, on the grounds,<br />inter-alia, that it amounts to abuse of process of law. The appellant<br />stood acquitted in criminal case under Section 138 of N.I. Act. Thus,<br />he cannot be tried again for the same offence. In the facts of the<br />case, doctrine of double jeopardy is attracted. The High Court<br />dismissed the said application.<br />Hence, this appeal.<br />3. Shri Abhishek Singh, learned counsel appearing for the<br />appellant, has submitted that the ICR as well as the criminal case<br />pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan, is barred by the<br />provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. and Section 26 of the General Clauses<br />Act, 1897 (hereinafter called ‘General Clauses Act’) as the appellant<br />has already been dealt with/tried under Section 138 of N.I. Act for the<br />same offence. Thus, the High Court committed an error in not quashing<br />the said ICR and the criminal case. It amounts to double jeopardy and,<br />therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.<br />4. On the contrary, Shri Rakesh Upadhyay, learned counsel<br />appearing for the respondent no. 2 and Mr. S. Panda, learned counsel<br />appearing for the State of Gujarat, have vehemently opposed the appeal<br />contending that the provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. i.e. `Doctrine of<br /><a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_jeopardy" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Double jeopardy">Double Jeopardy</a>’ are not attracted in the facts and circumstances of<br />the case, for the reason, that the ingredients of the offences under<br />Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC are entirely distinct from<br />the case under Section 138 of N.I. Act, and therefore, do not<br />constitute the same offence. The appeal is devoid of any merit and<br />liable to be dismissed.<br />5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned<br />counsel for the parties and perused the record.<br />The sole issue raised in this appeal is regarding the scope and<br />application of doctrine of double jeopardy. The rule against double<br />jeopardy provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois acquit and<br /><a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peremptory_plea" rel="wikipedia" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(238, 238, 238); border-bottom-style: solid; border-width: 0px 0px 1px; color: #3a6999; font-family: inherit; font-style: inherit; margin: 0px; outline: none; padding: 0px; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;" target="_blank" title="Peremptory plea">autrefois convict</a>. The manifestation of this rule is to be found<br />contained in Section 300 Cr.P.C; Section 26 of the General Clauses Act;<br />and Section 71 I.P.C.<br />Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. reads:<br />“A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent<br />jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such<br />offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in<br />force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence,<br />nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a<br />different charge from the one made against him might have been<br />made under sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he<br />might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.”<br />Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads:<br />“Provision as to offences punishable under two or more<br />enactments. – Where an act or omission constitutes an offence<br />under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable<br />to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those<br />enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for<br />the same offence.”<br />Section 71 of I.P.C. reads:</div>
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1 “Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. – Where<br />anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which<br />parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished<br />with the punishment of more than one of such his offences,<br />unless it be so expressly provided.</div>
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?6. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325, the<br />Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with the issue wherein the<br />central issue arose in the context of the fact that a person who had<br />arrived at an Indian airport from abroad on being searched was found in<br />possession of gold in contravention of the relevant notification,<br />prohibiting the import of gold. Action was taken against him by the<br />customs authorities and the gold seized from his possession was<br />confiscated. Later on, a prosecution was launched against him in the<br />criminal court at Bombay charging him with having committed the offence<br />under Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947<br />(hereinafter called `FERA’) read with the relevant notification. In the<br />background of these facts, the plea of “autrefois acquit” was raised<br />seeking protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India,<br />1950 (hereinafter called the ‘Constitution’). This court held that the<br />fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20 (2) enunciates<br />the principle of “autrefois convict” or “double jeopardy” i.e. a person<br />must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The doctrine is<br />based on the ancient maxim “nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto”,<br />that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence.<br />The plea of “autrefois convict” or “autrefois acquit” avers that the<br />person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the<br />same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The test is<br />whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same<br />ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are<br />sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts<br />relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials. A plea of<br />“autrefois acquit” is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of<br />acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of<br />the latter.<br />7. The Constitution Bench of this Court in S.A.Venkataraman v.<br />Union of India & Anr., AIR 1954 SC 375, explained the scope of<br />doctrine of double jeopardy, observing that in order to attract the<br />provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, there must have been<br />both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The<br />words ‘prosecuted’ and ‘punished’ are to be taken not distributively so<br />as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in<br />order that the operation of the clause may be attractive.<br />8. In Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 458; and<br />State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri, AIR 1957 SC 592,<br />this Court has held that prosecution and conviction or acquittal under<br />Section 409 IPC do not debar trial of the accused on a charge under<br />Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 because the two<br />offences are not identical in sense, import and content.<br />9. In Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar &<br />Anr., AIR 1958 SC 119, proceedings were taken against certain persons<br />in the first instance before the Customs Authorities under Section<br />167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and heavy personal penalties were imposed<br />on them. Thereafter, they were charged for an offence under Section 120-<br />B IPC. This Court held that an offence under Section 120-B is not the<br />same offence as that under the Sea Customs Act:<br />“The offence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a different<br />offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy<br />because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and<br />is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally<br />the crime attempted or completed does not require the element<br />of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore,<br />quite separate offences.”<br />(Emphasis<br />added)</div>
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10. In The State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 578,<br />the Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue of<br />double jeopardy under Article 20(2), held:<br />“To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the<br />consequential punishment thereunder, must be for “the same<br />offence”. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the<br />Article is that the offences are the same i.e. they should be<br />identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then<br />notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two<br />complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit of the<br />ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse<br />and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the<br />ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity<br />is made out.<br />xx xx xx xx xx xx<br />xx<br />The next point to be considered is as regards the scope of<br />Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Though Section 26 in its<br />opening words refers to “the act or omission constituting an<br />offence under two or more enactments”, the emphasis is not on<br />the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the<br />ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a<br />person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion<br />of the section which refers to “shall not be liable to be<br />punished twice for the same offence”. If the offences are not<br />the same but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision<br />also cannot be invoked.” (Emphasis added)<br />11. In Roshan Lal & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413, the<br />accused had caused disappearance of the evidence of two offences under<br />sections 330 and 348 IPC and, therefore, he was alleged to have<br />committed two separate offences under section 201 IPC. It was held<br />that neither section 71 IPC nor section 26 of the General Clauses Act<br />came to the rescue of the accused and the accused was liable to be<br />convicted for two sets of offences under section 201 IPC, though it<br />would be appropriate not to pass two separate sentences.<br />A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Kharkan &<br />Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 83.<br />12. In Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. The State of Maharashtra,<br />AIR 1965 SC 682, while dealing with the issue, held:<br />“The previous case in which this accused was convicted was in<br />regard to a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in<br />respect of the funds of the Jupiter and that case was finally<br />disposed of by this Court in Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of<br />Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 747. Therein it was found that Caveeshar<br />was a party to the conspiracy and also a party to the<br />fraudulent transactions entered into by the Jupiter in his<br />favour. The present case relates to a different conspiracy<br />altogether. The conspiracy in question was to lift the funds of<br />the Empire, though its object was to cover up the fraud<br />committed in respect of the Jupiter. Therefore, it may be that<br />the defalcations made in Jupiter may afford a motive for the<br />new conspiracy, but the two offences are distinct ones. Some<br />accused may be common to both of them, some of the facts proved<br />to establish the Jupiter conspiracy may also have to be proved<br />to support the motive for the second conspiracy. The question<br />is whether that in itself would be sufficient to make the two<br />conspiracies the one and the same offence….<br />The two conspiracies are distinct offences. It cannot even<br />be said that some of the ingredients of both the conspiracies<br />are the same. The facts constituting the Jupiter conspiracy are<br />not the ingredients of the offence of the Empire conspiracy,<br />but only afford a motive for the latter offence. Motive is not<br />an ingredient of an offence. The proof of motive helps a court<br />in coming to a correct conclusion when there is no direct<br />evidence. Where there is direct evidence for implicating an<br />accused in an offence, the absence of proof of motive is not<br />material. The ingredients of both the offences are totally<br />different and they do not form the same offence within the<br />meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and, therefore,<br />that Article has no relevance to the present case.”<br />(Emphasis added)<br />13. In The State of A.P. v. Kokkiligada Meeraiah & Anr., AIR 1970<br />SC 771, this Court while having regard to Section 403 Cr.P.C., 1898,<br />held:<br />“The following important rules emerge from the terms of Section<br />403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:<br />(1) An order of conviction or acquittal in respect of any<br />offence constituted by any act against or in favour of a person<br />does not prohibit a trial for any other offence constituted by<br />the same act which he may have committed, if the court trying<br />the first offence was incompetent to try that other offence.<br />(2) If in the course of a transaction several offences<br />are committed for which separate charges could have been made,<br />but if a person is tried in respect of some of those charges,<br />and not all, and is acquitted or convicted, he may be tried for<br />any distinct offence for which at the former trial a separate<br />charge may have been, but was not, made.<br />(3) If a person is convicted of any offence constituted<br />by any act, and that act together with the consequences which<br />resulted therefrom constituted a different offence, he may<br />again be tried for that different offence arising out of the<br />consequences, if the consequences had not happened or were not<br />known to the court to have happened, at the time when he was<br />convicted.<br />(4) A person who has once been tried by a Court of<br />competent jurisdiction for an offence and has been either<br />convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same offence<br />or for any other offence arising out of the same facts, for<br />which a different charge from the one made against him might<br />have been made or for which he might have been convicted under<br />the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (Emphasis added)<br />14. The Constitution Bench of this Court in The Assistant Collector<br />of the Customs, Bombay & Anr. v. L. R. Melwani & Anr. AIR 1970 SC 962,<br />repelled the contention of the respondents therein that their criminal<br />prosecution for alleged smuggling was barred because proceedings were<br />earlier instituted against them before Collector of Customs. It was<br />observed that neither the adjudication before the Collector of Customs<br />was a prosecution, nor the Collector of Customs was a Court. Therefore,<br />neither the rule of autrefois acquit can be invoked, nor the issue<br />estoppel rule was attracted. The issue estoppel rule is a facet of<br />doctrine of autrefois acquit.<br />15. This Court has time and again explained the principle of issue<br />estoppel in a criminal trial observing that where an issue of fact has<br />been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding<br />has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would<br />constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as<br />a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or<br />distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of<br />evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried<br />subsequently for a different offence. This rule is distinct from the<br />doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any<br />offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in<br />issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific<br />finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial. Thus, the rule<br />relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to<br />upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court in a previous<br />trial on a factual issue. (Vide: Pritam Singh & Anr. v. The State of<br />Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415; Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom<br />Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87; Workmen of the Gujarat Electricity Board,<br />Baroda v. Gujarat Electricity Board, Baroda, AIR 1970 SC 87; and Bhanu<br />Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 626).<br />16. In V.K. Agarwal v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia & Ors., AIR 1988<br />SC 1106, wherein the accused were prosecuted under Customs Act, 1962<br />(hereinafter referred to as `Customs Act’) and subsequently under Gold<br />(Control) Act, 1968, (hereinafter called as `Gold (Control) Act’) it<br />was held that the ingredients of the two offences are different in<br />scope and content. The facts constituting the offence under the Customs<br />Act are different and are not sufficient to justify the conviction<br />under the Gold (Control) Act. It was held that what was necessary is to<br />analyse the ingredients of the two offences and not the allegations<br />made in the two complaints.</div>
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17. In M/s. P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons v. Director of Enforcement<br />AIR 1993 SC 1188, it was held:<br />“The further contention that under the Sea Custom Act for the<br />self same contravention, the penalty proceedings terminated in<br />favour of the appellant, is of little avail to the appellant<br />for the reasons that two Acts operate in different fields, one<br />for contravention of FERA and the second for evasion of excise<br />duty. The mere fact that the penalty proceedings for evasion of<br />the excise duty had ended in favour of the appellant, does not<br />take away the jurisdiction of the enforcement authorities under<br />the Act to impose the penalty in question. The doctrine of<br />double jeopardy has no application.”</div>
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(See also: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 1;<br />Union of India etc. etc. v. K.V. Jankiraman etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC<br />2010; State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K.S. Murugesan & Ors., (1995) 3<br />SCC 273; and State of Punjab & Anr. v. Dalbir Singh & Ors., (2001) 9<br />SCC 212).<br />18. In A.A. Mulla & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 1997<br />SC 1441, the appellants were charged under Section 409 IPC and Section<br />5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for making false panchnama<br />disclosing recovery of 90 gold biscuits on 21-9-1969 although according<br />to the prosecution case the appellants had recovered 99 gold biscuits.<br />The appellants were tried for the same and acquitted. The appellants<br />were also tried for offence under Section 120-B IPC, Sections 135 and<br />136 of the Customs Act, Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act and<br />Section 23(1-A) of FERA and Section 5 of Import and Export (Control)<br />Act, 1947. The appellants filed an application before the Judicial<br />Magistrate contending that on the selfsame facts they could not be<br />tried for the second time in view of Section 403 of the Code of<br />Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 300 Cr.P.C.). This<br />Court held:<br />“After giving our careful consideration to the facts and<br />circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the<br />learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us<br />that the ingredients of the offences for which the appellants<br />were charged in the first trial are entirely different. The<br />second trial with which we are concerned in this appeal,<br />envisages a different fact-situation and the enquiry for<br />finding out facts constituting offences under the Customs Act<br />and the Gold (Control) Act in the second trial is of a<br />different nature……. Not only the ingredients of offences in the<br />previous and the second trial are different, the factual<br />foundation of the first trial and such foundation for the<br />second trial is also not indented (sic). Accordingly, the<br />second trial was not barred under Section 403 CrPC of 1898 as<br />alleged by the appellants.” (Emphasis added)</div>
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19. In Union of India & Ors. v. Sunil Kumar Sarkar, AIR 2001 SC<br />1092, this Court considered the argument that if the punishment had<br />already been imposed for Court Martial proceedings, the proceedings<br />under the Central Rules dealing with disciplinary aspect and misconduct<br />cannot be held as it would amount to double jeopardy violating the<br />provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. The Court explained<br />that the Court Martial proceedings deal with penal aspect of the<br />misconduct while the proceedings under the Central Rules deal with the<br />disciplinary aspect of the misconduct. The two proceedings do not over-<br />lap at all and, therefore, there was no question of attracting the<br />doctrine of double jeopardy. While deciding the said case, the court<br />placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in R. Viswan & Ors. v. Union<br />of India & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 658.<br />20. In Union of India & Anr. v. P.D. Yadav, (2002) 1 SCC 405, this<br />Court dealt with the issue of double jeopardy in a case where the<br />pension of the official, who stood convicted by a Court-Martial, had<br />been forfeited. The Court held:<br />“This principle is embodied in the well-known maxim nemo debet<br />bis vexari si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa,<br />meaning no one ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the<br />court that it is for one and the same cause. Doctrine of double<br />jeopardy is a protection against prosecution twice for the same<br />offence. Under Articles 20-22 of the Indian Constitution,<br />provisions are made relating to personal liberty of citizens<br />and others….. Offences such as criminal breach of trust,<br />misappropriation, cheating, defamation etc., may give rise to<br />prosecution on criminal side and also for action in civil<br />court/ other forum for recovery of money by way of damages<br />etc., unless there is a bar created by law. In the proceedings<br />before General Court Martial, a person is tried for an offence<br />of misconduct and whereas in passing order under Regulation 16<br />(a) for forfeiting pension, a person is not tried for the same<br />offence of misconduct after the punishment is imposed for a<br />proven misconduct by the General Court Martial resulting in<br />cashiering, dismissing or removing from service. Only further<br />action is taken under Regulation 16 (a) in relation to<br />forfeiture of pension. Thus, punishing a person under Section<br />71 of the Army Act and making order under Regulation 16 (a) are<br />entirely different. Hence, there is no question of applying<br />principle of double jeopardy to the present cases.”</div>
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21. In State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 791, this<br />Court held that as the offence of glorification of Sati under Section 5<br />of the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, is different from the<br />offence of violation of prohibitory order issued under Section 6<br />thereof, the doctrine of double jeopardy was not attracted for the<br />reason that even if prohibitory order is promulgated, a subsequent<br />criminal act even if falls under Section 5 could not be covered under<br />Section 6(3) of the said Act. Doctrine of double jeopardy is<br />enshrined in Section 300 Cr.P.C. and Section 26 of the General Clauses<br />Act. Both the provisions employ the expression “same offence”.<br />22. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in State of<br />Haryana v. Balwant Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1253, observing that there may be<br />cases of misappropriation, cheating, defamation etc. which may give<br />rise to prosecution on criminal side and also for action in civil<br />court/other forum for recovery of money by way of damages etc.<br />Therefore, it is not always necessary that in every such case the<br />provision of Article 20(2) of the Constitution may be attracted.<br />23. In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. C.B.I., New Delhi, AIR 2003 SC<br />2545, this Court while considering the case for quashing the criminal<br />prosecution for evading the customs duty, where the matter stood<br />settled under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme 1988, observed that once<br />the tax matter was settled under the said Scheme, the offence stood<br />compounded, and prosecution for evasion of duty, in such a<br />circumstance, would amount to double jeopardy.<br />24. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order to<br />attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e.<br />doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 Cr.P.C. or Section 71 IPC<br />or Section 26 of General Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in<br />the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not<br />different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same<br />is not identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients<br />of the offence. Motive for committing offence cannot be termed as<br />ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois<br />acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal<br />in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter<br />charge.<br />25. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal & Anr., (2011) 3<br />SCC 581, while dealing with the proceedings under the provisions of<br />Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, this Court quashed the<br />proceedings (by a majority of 2:1) under Section 56 of the said Act<br />because adjudication under Section 51 stood finalised. The Court held :<br />“The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can<br />broadly be stated as follows:<br />(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be<br />launched simultaneously;<br />(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary<br />before initiating criminal prosecution;<br />(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are<br />independent in nature to each other;<br />(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in<br />the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding<br />for criminal prosecution;<br />(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate<br />is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the<br />provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300<br />of the Code of Criminal Procedure;<br />(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour<br />of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend<br />upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication<br />proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit,<br />prosecution may continue; and<br />(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the<br />allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person<br />held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts<br />and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying<br />principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal<br />cases.”<br />The ratio of the aforesaid judgment is not applicable in this<br />case for the reason that proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act are<br />still sub judice as the appeal is pending and the matter has not<br />attained finality.<br />26. Learned counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance<br />on the judgment in G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.,<br />(2000) 2 SCC 636, wherein during the pendency of the proceedings under<br />Section 138 N.I. Act, prosecution under Sections 406/420 IPC had been<br />launched. This Court quashed the criminal proceedings under Sections<br />406/420 IPC, observing that it would amount to abuse of process of law.<br />In fact, the issue as to whether the ingredients of both the offences<br />were same, had neither been raised nor decided. Therefore, the ratio of<br />that judgment does not have application on the facts of this case.<br />Same remained the position so far as the judgment in Kolla<br />Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao & Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 703,<br />is concerned. It has been held therein that once the conviction under<br />Section 138 of N.I. Act has been recorded, the question of trying a<br />same person under Section 420 IPC or any other provision of IPC or any<br />other statute is not permissible being hit by Article 20(2) of the<br />Constitution and Section 300(1) Cr.P.C.<br />27. Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the<br />offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 N.I. Act and<br />the case is sub judice before the High Court. In the instant case, he<br />is involved under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC. In the<br />prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent<br />or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of cheque is not<br />required to be proved. However, in the case under IPC involved herein,<br />the issue of mens rea may be relevant. The offence punishable under<br />Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be<br />imposed. In the case under N.I. Act, there is a legal presumption that<br />the cheque had been issued for discharging the antecedent liability and<br />that presumption can be rebutted only by the person who draws the<br />cheque. Such a requirement is not there in the offences under IPC. In<br />the case under N.I. Act, if a fine is imposed, it is to be adjusted to<br />meet the legally enforceable liability. There cannot be such a<br />requirement in the offences under IPC. The case under N.I. Act can<br />only be initiated by filing a complaint. However, in a case under the<br />IPC such a condition is not necessary.<br />28. There may be some overlapping of facts in both the cases but<br />ingredients of offences are entirely different. Thus, the subsequent<br />case is not barred by any of the aforesaid statutory provisions.<br />The appeal is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.<br />……..…….……………………..J.<br />(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)<br />…….……………………………J.<br />(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)<br />New Delhi,<br />April 23, 2012</div>
<br />
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________<br />
<br />
REPORTABLE<br />
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<br />
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br />
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1160 OF 2006<br />
Kolla Veera Raghav Rao ..Appellant<br />
versus<br />
Gorantla Venkateswara Rao & Anr. ..Respondents<br />
O R D E R<br />
Heard learned counsel for the parties.<br />
This Appeal has been filed against the impugned<br />
judgment and order dated 07th October, 2005 passed by the<br />
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 1581 of<br />
1999 and Criminal Revision Case No. 312 of 1999.<br />
The facts have been set out in the impugned judgment<br />
and hence we are not repeating the same here except wherever<br />
necessary.<br />
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the<br />
appellant was already convicted under Section 138 of the<br />
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and hence he could not be<br />
again tried or punished on the same facts under Section 420<br />
or any other provision of IPC or any other statute. We find<br />
force in this submission.<br />
It may be noticed that there is a difference between<br />
the language used in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of<br />
India and Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C.. Article 20(2) states:“no person shall be prosecuted and punished for<br />
the same offence more than once.”<br />
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1160 OF 2006<br />
-2-<br />
On the other hand, Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. States:<br />
“300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to<br />
be tried for same office__<br />
(1) A person who has once been tried by a<br />
Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence<br />
and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall,<br />
while such conviction or acquittal remains in<br />
force, not be liable to be tried again for the<br />
same offence, nor on the same facts for any other<br />
offence for which a different charge from the one<br />
made against him might have been made under subsection (1) of section 221 or for which he might<br />
have been convicted under sub-section (2)<br />
thereof.”<br />
Thus, it can be seen that Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C.<br />
is wider than Article 20(2) of the Constitution. While,<br />
Article 20(2) of the Constitution only states that 'no one<br />
can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more<br />
than once', Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. states that no one can<br />
be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a<br />
different offence but on the same facts.<br />
In the present case, although the offences are<br />
different but the facts are the same. Hence, Section 300(1)<br />
of Cr.P.C. applies. Consequently, the prosecution under<br />
Section 420, IPC was barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C.<br />
The Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of<br />
the High Court is set aside............................J.<br />
[MARKANDEY KATJU]<br />
NEW DELHI; ...........................J.<br />
FEBRUARY 01, 2011 [GYAN SUDHA MISRA]<br />
</div>advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-49904542905503651472012-05-02T07:15:00.000-07:002012-05-02T07:15:19.583-07:00WHEN THE DISPUTED SIGNATURE IS A THUMB IMPRESSION, THE COURT HAS NO DISCRETION EXCEPT TO SEND THE SAME FOR EXPERT OPINION, IN OTHER CASE, THE COURT CAN COMPARE IT.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
The Hon'ble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy<br />
<br />
Civil Revision Petition No.4458 of 2011<br />
<br />
20-01-2012<br />
<br />
Gowri Shankar<br />
<br />
J.L.Babu and another<br />
<br />
^Counsel for the petitioner: Mr.P.Ramachandran <br />
<br />
!Counsel for the respondents: ---<br />
<br />
? Cases referred:<br />
2010 (5) ALD 795<br />
<br />
Order:<br />
This Civil Revision Petition arises out of Order, dated<br />
29-08-2011, in IA.No.1711 of 2010 in OS.No.1401 of 2007, on the file of the<br />
Court of the learned V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.<br />
I have heard Sri P.Ramachandran, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and perused<br />
the record.<br />
The petitioner is defendant No.1 in OS.No.1401 of 2007 filed by respondent No.1<br />
for specific performance of an agreement of sale. The petitioner has been<br />
resisting the suit mainly on the plea that respondent No.1/plaintiff has forged<br />
his signature on the agreement of sale. The petitioner has earlier filed<br />
IA.No.1011 of 2008 with a request to send the disputed signatures for comparison<br />
with his admitted signatures, to the handwriting expert for his opinion. The<br />
said application was allowed by the Court below. Respondent No.1 filed<br />
CRP.No.2199 of 2009 before this Court against the said order. The said CRP was<br />
allowed by this Court by setting aside the order of the lower Court, however,<br />
giving liberty to the petitioner to move the lower Court at appropriate stage<br />
after completion of trial if it is felt that such comparison is necessary.<br />
Taking a cue from those observations, the petitioner filed IA.No.1711 of 2010<br />
before the lower Court after completion of the trial and at the stage of the<br />
arguments. The lower Court rejected the said application by opining that, in<br />
view of the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short<br />
'the Act'), the Court itself can undertake the exercise of comparison of the<br />
signatures and that there is no necessity of sending the signatures for the<br />
opinion of the handwriting expert.<br />
At the hearing, Sri P.Ramachandran, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has<br />
strenuously contended that the Court below has committed a serious error in<br />
rejecting the petitioner's application. He also submitted that this Court has<br />
given liberty to the petitioner to move the lower Court after completion of<br />
trial for sending the disputed signatures for the opinion of the handwriting<br />
expert and that the lower Court has failed to follow the observations of this<br />
Court.<br />
Under Section 73 of the Act, the Court is empowered to ascertain whether a<br />
signature, handwriting or seal is that of the person, by whom it purports to<br />
have been written or made, and compare any signature, writing or seal, admitted<br />
or proved to the satisfaction of the Court, to have been written or made by that<br />
person with the one, which is to be proved. This provision, thus, enables the<br />
Court to undertake the exercise of comparison of the signature, writing or seal<br />
without need for sending the same to the opinion of the handwriting expert.<br />
Section 45 of the Act recognized the opinions of the experts in handwriting or<br />
finger impressions as relevant facts. In my opinion, Section 45 does not cast<br />
an obligation on the Courts to send a disputed document for expert's opinion as<br />
a matter of course. It is only when the Court forms an opinion that, having<br />
regard to the facts of the particular case, it is necessary for ascertaining the<br />
opinion of the expert, that it can send the handwriting or finger impression for<br />
an expert opinion. Therefore, if the Court below, having regard to the facts of<br />
the case, exercises its discretion not to send the document for the opinion of<br />
the expert, the party has no right to insist that such document should be sent<br />
for the opinion of the expert. The judgment in Thumu Srikanth vs. Akula Babu1,<br />
on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, does not<br />
advance the case of the petitioner because in that case this Court has opined<br />
that, having regard to the fact that the thumb impression as well as signature<br />
were disputed, it is appropriate that the same should have been sent for the<br />
opinion of the expert. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard<br />
and the Court has to exercise its discretion in a sound and rational manner<br />
having regard to the facts involved in the case brought before it.<br />
Since the Court below has formed an opinion that it can by itself undertake the<br />
exercise of comparison, of the signatures, between the admitted and disputed<br />
documents, it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the Court below is<br />
either unsound or irrational calling for interference of this Court in exercise<br />
of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.<br />
The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, dismissed.<br />
As a sequel to dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition, CMP.No.6335 of 2011,<br />
filed by the petitioner for interim relief, is disposed of as infructuous.<br />
______________________ <br />
(C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J)<br />
20th January, 2012<br />
</div>advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-55866199828233713432012-05-02T07:07:00.000-07:002012-05-02T07:09:45.408-07:00WHEN AN AMENDMENT PETITION FILED FOR ADDING ANOTHER RELIEF OF REFUND OF PAID AMOUNT FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANTS HAVE PURCHASED THE PROPERTIES IN THEIR NAME BUT NOT IN THE NAME OF THE PLAINTIFF AS PURCHASED FOR THE PART OF THE AMOUNT, CAN BE ALLOWED AS IT DOES NOT CAUSE ANY NEW CASE AS IT IS ONLY AN EXPLANATION OF TOTAL AMOUNT, AND FOR RECOVERY OF THE SAME.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY <br />
<br />
C.R.P.No.1649 of 2011<br />
<br />
23-1-2012<br />
<br />
Perim Janardhana Rao s/o. Perim Raja <br />
<br />
Malepati Balaji s/o. M.Pushpaiah Naidu and others <br />
<br />
Counsel for petitioner : Sri V. Jagapathi<br />
<br />
Counsel for respondents : Sri Dammalapati Srinivas<br />
<br />
?CASES REFERRED: <br />
1. (1978) 10 Ch.D. 393 : (1874-80) All.E.R. Rep.Ext 1612 (CA)<br />
2. (1884) 26 Ch.D. 700 (CA)<br />
3. AIR 1961 S.C. 325<br />
4. (1978) 2 SCC 91<br />
5. (2009) 10 SCC 84 <br />
<br />
<br />
JUDGMENT: <br />
The plaintiff in O.S.No.107/2007 is the revision petitioner. He filed the<br />
said suit against the respondents for declaring that the suit schedule property<br />
is nominally purchased in the name of defendant Nos.1 and 2 from out of the<br />
amounts received by defendant Nos.1 and 3 from him and for granting permanent<br />
injunction restraining defendant Nos.1 and 2 and persons claiming through them<br />
from in any manner alienating the suit schedule properties.<br />
The plea of the petitioner was that he has in all paid Rs.3,20,45,826-50<br />
ps. to defendant Nos.1 to 3 for purchase of properties in his name and that the<br />
suit schedule property was purchased in the name of defendant Nos.1 and 2<br />
nominally from out of the monies advanced by him. The petitioner filed<br />
I.A.No.1913/2008 on 26-12-2008 before the court of V Additional District Judge,<br />
Tirupati, seeking amendment of the pleadings and the prayer in the suit. The<br />
said application was transferred to the court of the learned III Additional<br />
District Judge, Tirupati and the same was renumbered as I.A.No.504/2010. The<br />
petitioner sought for amendment of the plaint by adding para Nos.7(a) to (d) and<br />
certain additions to paras 10 and 11. The petitioner also sought for additional<br />
relief of directing respondent Nos.1 and 3 to pay a sum of Rs.2,88,19,538/- with<br />
interest at 12% p.a. from the date of suit till the date of realization. The<br />
said application was resisted by the respondents. The lower court, by order<br />
dated 30-3-2011 dismissed the said application. Assailing the said order, the<br />
petitioner filed the present Civil Revision Petition.<br />
I have heard Sri V. Jagapathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri<br />
Dammalapati Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondent.<br />
While it is the pleaded case of the petitioner in the plaint, as<br />
originally presented, that from out of the amount advanced to defendant Nos.1<br />
and 3, the property was purchased in the name of defendant Nos.1 and 2 nominally<br />
instead of in his name, in the application for amendment, the petitioner wanted<br />
the plaint to be amended to the effect that from out of the sum of<br />
Rs.3,20,45,826-50 advanced to defendant Nos.1 to 3, the property worth<br />
Rs.1,02,00,146/- was purchased in the name of the plaintiff and the property<br />
worth Rs.2,18,45,680/- was purchased in the name of defendant Nos.1 and 2<br />
nominally. The petitioner therefore sought for amendment of the pleadings to<br />
that effect and also addition of prayer to direct respondent Nos.1 to 3 to pay<br />
him a sum of Rs.2,88,19,538/-. In the order under revision, the lower court<br />
observed that if the petitioner proves that he has paid the said amount to the<br />
defendants for purchasing property, he will succeed in the suit in obtaining the<br />
declaration as sought for by him and conversely if he fails to prove the same,<br />
his claim will be defeated. The court below further observed that the proposed<br />
amendment is only to insert additional pleading with regard to the details of<br />
the amounts which were already mentioned in the plaint and that the additional<br />
relief sought was only for recovery of the part of the amount allegedly advanced<br />
by the plaintiff to defendant Nos.1 and 2. Having so held, curiously, the court<br />
below has rejected the application for amendment by purporting to test the<br />
veracity of the pleas raised by the petitioner on merits.<br />
Perhaps, the earliest of Judgments on the law governing amendment of<br />
pleadings, is in Tidesley Vs. Harper1, wherein Bramwell, L.J., exemplifying his<br />
deep humility, rendered his opinion, as under:<br />
"....I have had much to do in Chambers with applications for leave to<br />
amend, and I may perhaps be allowed to say that this humble branch of learning<br />
is very familiar to me. My practice has always been to give leave to amend<br />
unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or<br />
that, by his blunder, he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be<br />
compensated for by costs or otherwise."<br />
<br />
In Cropper Vs. Smith2, Browen, L.J. in his illuminating exposition of the legal<br />
proposition relating to amendment of pleadings, held as under:<br />
".....it is a well-established principle that the object of courts is to<br />
decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make<br />
in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with<br />
their rights. ... I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not<br />
fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can<br />
be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake<br />
of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy and I do not<br />
regard such amendment as a matter of favour or grace. ... It seems to me that<br />
as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not<br />
lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of<br />
right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as<br />
anything else in the case is a matter of right."<br />
<br />
Dealing with this aspect, the Supreme Court in Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala Vs.<br />
Nanabhai Chunnilal Kabrawala3, held that leave to amend the pleadings under<br />
Order 6 Rule 17 will ordinarily be refused if such amendment would be to take<br />
away from a party a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time. This<br />
statement was qualified by stating that this rule can apply only when fresh<br />
allegations are added or fresh reliefs are sought by way of amendment. The<br />
Supreme Court illustrated an instance where an amendment was sought merely <br />
clarifying the existing pleading and had not in substance added to or altered<br />
it, and observed that it has never been held that the question of bar of<br />
limitation is one of the questions to be considered in allowing such<br />
clarification of a matter already contained in the original pleading.<br />
Further elucidating on the legal position on the subject, the Supreme Court in<br />
Ganesh Trading Co. Vs. Moji Ram4 held that if the plaintiff seeks to alter the<br />
cause of action itself and to introduce indirectly, through an amendment of his<br />
pleadings, an entirely new or inconsistent cause of action amounting virtually<br />
to the substitution of a new plaint or a new cause of action in place of what<br />
was originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it amounts to<br />
depriving the party against which a suit is pending of any right which may have<br />
accrued in its favour due to lapse of time and that mere failure to set out even<br />
an essential fact does not, by itself, constitute a new cause of action. The<br />
Supreme Court further observed that defective pleadings are generally curable if<br />
the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio completely absent<br />
and that every defective pleading may be permitted to be cured so as to<br />
constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions<br />
such as payment of either any additional court fees, which may be payable, or,<br />
of costs of the other side are complied with. It was further held that it is<br />
only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a newly constituted cause of<br />
action that the Courts will ordinarily refuse prayers for amendment of<br />
pleadings.<br />
I do not intend to burden this Judgment with several subsequent judicial<br />
pronouncements of the Apex Court rendered on similar lines. However, I will be<br />
failing in my effort if I do not refer to one of its recent Judgments in<br />
Ravejeetu Builders & Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons5, wherein, Dalveer <br />
Bhandari, J., speaking for the Bench, in his pains-taking Judgment, reviewed the<br />
entire case law on the subject and tried to conceptualize the principles<br />
governing amendment of pleadings, illustratively and not exhaustively. They are<br />
as under:<br />
"(i) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper or effective<br />
adjudication of the case;<br />
(ii) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide;<br />
(iii) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which<br />
cannot<br />
be compensated adequately in terms of money;<br />
(iv) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple<br />
litigation;<br />
(v) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes<br />
the<br />
nature and character of the case; and<br />
(vi) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on<br />
the<br />
amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application."<br />
<br />
<br />
It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor any finding is rendered by<br />
the Court below that by permitting the amendment sought by the petitioner either<br />
a new cause of action is sought to be introduced or the nature and character of<br />
the suit will undergo a change. On the contrary, as noted above, the Court<br />
below itself observed that the petitioner has mentioned all the details and that<br />
he only sought for addition of pleadings and the prayer for recovery of the<br />
amount. It is also not the pleaded case of the respondents that the relief<br />
sought to be claimed by way of amendment is barred by limitation.<br />
In my opinion, the Court below ought not to have delved into the merits of the<br />
pleas of the petitioner and rejected the amendment on the ground that the<br />
petitioner has failed to produce acknowledgement of receipt of the amounts by<br />
defendant Nos.1 and 3. Such an exercise can be undertaken only in the suit.<br />
The Court below has failed to assign legally sustainable reasons for rejecting<br />
the amendment sought by the petitioner.<br />
For the above mentioned reasons, the order under revision is set-aside.<br />
I.A.No.504/2010 in O.S.No.107/2007 on the file of the learned III Additional<br />
District Judge, Tirupati, is allowed. The Civil Revision Petition is<br />
accordingly allowed.<br />
As a sequel, CRP.M.P.No.2351/2011 is disposed of as infructuous.<br />
<br />
________________________ <br />
Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy<br />
Date : 23-1-2012<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-7190389028026241962012-05-02T06:58:00.000-07:002012-05-02T06:58:04.684-07:00PENDING FINAL DECREE OF PARTITION SUIT, WHEN THE PROPERTY WAS ACQUIRED BY GOVT. SEC.30[1] REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE, THIS SUIT SHOULD ALSO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE SAME COURT FOR AVOIDING CONFLICT DECISIONS.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY <br />
<br />
WRIT PETITION NO.14808 OF 2011 <br />
<br />
18.01.2012<br />
<br />
Sri Guruvammagari Santhosh Reddy and two others. <br />
<br />
The State of A.P., rep.by its Secretary, Municipal Administration and Urban<br />
Development, SecretariatHyderabad and two others.<br />
<br />
Counsel for PETITIONERS: MR. M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO <br />
<br />
Counsel for RESPONDENT No.2: G.P. FOR LAND ACQUISITION <br />
Counsel for RESPONDENT No.3: SRI B.VIJAYSEN REDDY. <br />
<br />
? Cases referred<br />
1991 (1) ALT 176 (DB)<br />
<br />
ORDER: <br />
Petitioners 1 and 2 are minor children of the third petitioner.<br />
Petitioners 1 and 2 filed O.S.No.1037 of 2000 through their mother, in the Court<br />
of Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy<br />
District, for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties,<br />
against their father and paternal grand mother. The suit schedule property<br />
included Acs.7.19 gts of land including Acs.4.06 gts situated in Survey No.436/A<br />
and 438/A of Vattinagulapally Village of Rajendranagar Mandal. A preliminary<br />
decree was passed on 16.08.2005 directing that petitioners 1 and 2 are entitled<br />
for 2/6th share in the suit schedule properties. I.A.No.341 of 2008 is pending<br />
for final decree.<br />
The first respondent issued notification, dated 13.12.2005, under Section<br />
4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 {"the Act" for brevity}, proposing to<br />
acquire Acs.11.31 gts land in Survey No.438/A of Vattinagulapally Village for<br />
the purpose of laying outer ring road around Hyderabad. Declaration under<br />
Section 6 of the Act was published on 20.06.2006. The petitioners were issued<br />
notice under Sections 9 (3) and 10 of the Act and they participated in the award<br />
enquiry. The Land Acquisition Officer, the second respondent, however, passed<br />
an award, dated 14.11.2007, paying the entire compensation for the land in<br />
Survey No.438/A to the third respondent.<br />
The petitioners contend that there was absolutely no justification on the<br />
part of the second respondent in passing an award without issuing notice to them<br />
under section 12 (2) of the Act and paying the entire compensation to the third<br />
respondent. It is stated that even if there exists any rival claim from the<br />
third respondent, the only course open to the second respondent was to refer the<br />
matter to the Civil Court under Section 30 of the Act. They seek the relief in<br />
the form of direction to the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioners<br />
apart from referring the matter to Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act for<br />
enhancement thereof.<br />
The second respondent filed counter affidavit admitting the fact that the<br />
notification under Sections 4 (1) and 6 of the Act was issued for declaration of<br />
land in Survey No.438/A of Vattinagulapally Village. It is, however, stated<br />
that the Revenue records reveal that the compensation was paid to the third<br />
respondent. They denied their obligation to issue notice under Section 12 (2)<br />
of the Act or to refer the matter under Section 30 of the Act.<br />
The third respondent filed counter narrating the manner in which the land<br />
was acquired in Survey No.438/A.<br />
Heard Sri M.S.Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners,<br />
learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition and Sri B.Vijaysen Reddy,<br />
learned counsel, for the respondents.<br />
Thousands of acres of land in several villages around the city of<br />
Hyderabad were acquired for the purpose of laying outer ring road.<br />
Notifications were issued separately for different extents. Notification as<br />
regards the land in Survey No.438/A of Vattinagulapally is one such.<br />
The family of which the petitioners herein are members, held an extent of<br />
Acs.4.06 gts in Survey No.438/A. Obviously, on the basis of the information<br />
received in the course of verification, the second respondent issued<br />
notification under Sections 9 (3) and 10 of the Act to the petitioners. The<br />
third petitioner, representing her minor children, submitted a detailed claim<br />
before the second respondent. As a matter of fact, in his award dated<br />
14.11.2007, the second respondent made a detailed reference to the claim made by<br />
the petitioners. However, he paid the compensation to the third respondent, by<br />
simply making a reference to a claim made by it.<br />
This Court takes serious exception to the manner in which the second<br />
respondent, the then Land Acquisition Officer, has proceeded in the matter. It<br />
hardly needs any mention that if there exist rival claims for compensation, the<br />
only option open to the Land Acquisition Officer is to refer the matter under<br />
Section 30 of the Act. There may be instances where more than one claim is made<br />
for compensation, but the title of one of them is so clinching and absolute that<br />
hardly can be doubted and the claim made by the other claimants is too feeble.<br />
In such a case, compensation can be paid to the party whose title is almost<br />
proved. However, in such rare cases, the Land Acquisition Officer must<br />
demonstrate the absolute nature of the title of the person whom he proposes to<br />
pay compensation and the feebleness of the one whose claim has to be rejected<br />
illumine.<br />
In the instant case, the claim of the petitioners was supported by a<br />
preliminary decree passed by the competent Court of law. The second respondent<br />
has also taken note of the same. When it came to the question of claim made by<br />
the third respondent, hardly any discussion was made about the source of its<br />
title or the manner of its title. The relevant paragraph reads as under.<br />
"M/s.Krishna Greenlands Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad has filed claim petition for<br />
an extent of Ac.11-31 gts in respect of Sy.No.438 of Vattinagulapally Village<br />
coming under acquisition for Outer Ring Road. As per the documents furnished by<br />
above firm they are the pattedars and possessors of land under acquisition. As<br />
the above firm has not filed consent affidavit for sanction of compensation<br />
under package deal they are eligible for payment of compensation U/s.11(1) of<br />
the L.A. Act. Accordingly M/s. Krishna Greenlands Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad, is<br />
awarded compensation of Rs.1,18,77,443/- (Rupees One Crores Eighteen Lakhs <br />
Seventy Seven Thousand Four Hundred Forty Three Only) for an extent of Ac.f11-31<br />
gts in Sy.No.438."<br />
<br />
Added to this, the petitioners were not put on notice under Section 12 (2)<br />
of the Act. The procedure adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer was totally<br />
objectionable and serious doubts arise as to his impartial approach to the<br />
matter. It is on account of his lopsided approach that the petitioners, who are<br />
minors, were deprived of what was due to them.<br />
In Shyam Rao v. LAO (Spl.)1, a Division Bench of this Court took the view<br />
that in matters of this nature, reference under Section 18 can be required to be<br />
made and the compensation paid contrary to law, to one of the parties must be<br />
recovered.<br />
In the ordinary course of things, reference to a Civil Court, in the event<br />
of there being rival claims is to be made under Section 30 of the Act. That,<br />
however, is when the Land Acquisition Officer himself feels the necessity. The<br />
remedy provided for under Section 30 of the Act cannot be said to be the sole<br />
repository for determination of rival claims under the Act. Section 18 of the<br />
Act also provides for reference being made for determination of the entitlement<br />
of the various claimants, to receive the compensation. That would be in<br />
addition to the determination of adequacy or otherwise of the compensation.<br />
One aspect, which needs to be taken into account is that the petitioners<br />
herein and in particular petitioners 1 and 2 are not declared as the absolute<br />
owners of any definite extent of land in Survey No.438/A. It is only in the<br />
final decree proceedings, that their definite extent of property would be<br />
determined. In a given situation, equities are to be worked out. This Court is<br />
of the view that a reference to be made under Section 18 of the Act and<br />
adjudication thereof, along with the pending final decree proceedings would meet<br />
the ends of justice. Further, the third respondent can be required to furnish<br />
bank guarantee for an amount representing the value of Ac.1.16 gts of the<br />
acquired land, to the satisfaction of the concerned Court. The reference needs<br />
to be dealt with by a Court which has pecuniary jurisdiction as regards both the<br />
matters. Further, the pending final decree proceedings need to be transferred<br />
to the same court.<br />
For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is allowed directing that<br />
(a) The second respondent shall make a reference to Civil Court, in respect of<br />
award, dated 14.11.2007, as regard the claims between the petitioners on the one<br />
hand and the third respondent on the other hand, by addressing a letter to the<br />
learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District;<br />
(b) The learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, shall allot the<br />
reference to a Court of competent pecuniary jurisdiction and he shall also<br />
direct to transfer I.A.No.341 of 2008 in O.S.No.1037 of 2000 to the same Court<br />
to which reference is made; and ensure that both the proceedings are heard<br />
together;<br />
(c) The third respondent shall furnish bank guarantee representing the<br />
compensation for Ac.1.16 gts of land within four {4} weeks from the date on<br />
which notice is issued to it in the reference; and<br />
(d) The fourth respondent is entitled to participate in the final decree<br />
proceedings limited to working out the equities. It shall be open to the<br />
petitioners to put forward their contention as to entitlement as well as for<br />
enhancement of compensation. <br />
There shall be no order as to costs. <br />
_____________________ <br />
(L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J) <br />
<br />
18th January 2012<br />
</div>advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6026075523581369771.post-82322035074079570062012-05-02T06:52:00.000-07:002012-05-02T06:52:03.686-07:00EARLIER PARTITION NOT PROVED, EXCLUSION OF COPARCENARE NOT PROVED Once the properties were acquired by the father and grand father of the parties to the suit, both of them are entitled to equal shares therein. If there existed any arrangement that has the effect of excluding the appellant from succession, the respondent was under obligation to plead and prove it. As observed earlier, he did not choose to enter the witness box at all. No other document that has the effect of stopping the succession was placed before the Court. Some doubt exists as to the property that is acquired through Ex.A.5 by P.W.2. However, that witness categorically stated that the item was acquired at a time when himself and his brother i.e., father of plaintiff and defendant were joint and that he does not have any share in it. The inescapable conclusion is that items 1 to 3 are available for partition. the suit schedule properties were acquired by the ancestors of the appellant and the respondent and that there is noting on record to suggest that the succession was in any way scuttled. Therefore, the appellant on the one hand and the respondent on the other hand are entitled for equal shares in the suit schedule properties. An objection as to bar of a subsequent suit that can be raised under Rule 2 of Order 2 C.P.C., would heavily depend upon the facts that are pleaded. The defendant who raises such an objection must plead necessary facts and adduce evidence. It is only then that the Court would be in a position to examine it and record its finding. In the instant case, the respondent did not raise the plea at all, much less did he supplement the details. No evidence was adduced on this aspect.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<br />
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY <br />
<br />
A.S.No.972 of 2004<br />
<br />
03.01.2012<br />
<br />
Patchala Sriramulu.<br />
<br />
Patchala Pola Rao.<br />
<br />
Counsel for the Appellant: Sri M.S.Ramachandra Rao<br />
<br />
Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 4: Sri M.Sivananda Kumar<br />
<br />
JUDGMENT: <br />
<br />
This appeal is filed against the dismissal of O.S.No.16 of 2002 filed by<br />
the appellant herein in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Pithapuram. The sole<br />
defendant is his brother. The suit was filed for partition of the suit schedule<br />
properties viz., a rice mill and vacant plots. He pleaded that some of the suit<br />
schedule properties were acquired by their father, and others, by their<br />
grandfather, and that they have devolved upon himself and the respondent, in<br />
equal shares. He made a reference to O.S.No.94 of 1993 filed by him in the<br />
Court of Junior Civil Judge, Pithapuram for dissolution of partnership firm and<br />
stated that a specific finding was recorded therein to the effect that the rice<br />
mill is not part of any partnership business at all. He has also stated that the<br />
respondent filed O.S.No.85 of 1992 against him for the relief of perpetual<br />
injunction in respect of item No.1 of the suit schedule property and that the<br />
suit was dismissed as not pressed. He prayed for the relief of partition of the<br />
suit schedule properties into two parts and allotment of one part to him.<br />
The respondent filed written statement opposing the suit. He denied the<br />
various allegations made by the appellant. He admitted that he filed O.S.No.85<br />
of 1992 for the relief of injunction, but stated that it was dismissed as not<br />
pressed. He too made a reference to O.S.No.94 of 1993 and the result that<br />
ensued therein. Anther plea raised by him was that the family properties were<br />
divided about 15 yeas prior to the filing of the present suit between himself<br />
and the respondent and that it is not maintainable. According to him, there is<br />
nothing joint between himself and the appellant.<br />
<br />
Through judgment, dated 13.10.2003, the trial Court dismissed the suit.<br />
<br />
Sri M.S.Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the appellant submits that<br />
the trial Court rendered conflicting and contradictory judgments as regards the<br />
status of item 1 of the suit schedule viz., rice mill. He submits that being<br />
under the impression that the rice mill is an asset of the firm comprising of<br />
himself, the respondent and certain others, the appellant filed O.S.No.94 of<br />
1993 for dissolution and the respondent has taken the stand and convinced the<br />
trial Court that the rice mill was not the property of the partnership firm at<br />
all and got the suit dismissed. Learned counsel submits that AS.No.21 of 2003<br />
filed against the decree in O.S.No.94 of 1993 was heard by the learned Senior<br />
Civil Judge, Pithapuram and it was dismissed by upholding the findings as<br />
regards the rice mill. He submits that on the one hand O.S.No.16 of 2002 was<br />
dismissed by the Court of Senior civil Judge, Pithapuram holding that the rice<br />
mill is not the joint family property of the appellant and the respondent and on<br />
other hand, about one year thereafter, the same Presiding Officer took exactly<br />
the opposite view in A.S.No.21 of 2003 that arose out of O.S.No.94 of 1993.<br />
Learned counsel further submits that once the relationship is not disputed, and<br />
the respondent did not enter the witness box, much less did he plead and prove<br />
that the suit schedule properties exclusively belong to him, there was no<br />
alternative for the trial Court except to pass a preliminary decree as prayed<br />
for. He submits that the respondent has been enjoying the suit schedule<br />
property to the exclusion of the appellant, for over a decade, after the death<br />
of their father.<br />
<br />
Sri M.Sivanand Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand<br />
submits that it was for the appellant to prove that the suit schedule properties<br />
were held by the joint family and on finding that the evidence on record does<br />
not support his plea, the trial Court dismissed the suit. He contends that the<br />
appellant filed O.S.No.94 of 1993 almost for the same relief though in a<br />
different form and O.S.No.16 of 2002 was barred under Order 2 C.P.C. Certain<br />
other contentions are also urged.<br />
<br />
The suit was filed for the relief of partition and separate possession of<br />
the suit schedule properties. The relationship between the parties is not<br />
disputed. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration:<br />
1. Whether there is any family arrangement as alleged?<br />
2. Whether the principle of res judicata applies to the present case?<br />
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any share and whether the schedule<br />
properties are joint family properties?<br />
<br />
<br />
The appellant deposed as P.W.1 and his uncle by name P.R.K.S. Bhagawanlu <br />
deposed as P.W.2. Exs.A.1 to A.14 were filed. The respondent did not enter the<br />
witness box. Exs.B.1 to 9 were taken on record and the suit was dismissed by<br />
the trial Court.<br />
The points that arise for consideration in this second appeal are;<br />
(a) Whether the suit schedule properties are available for partition? and<br />
(b) If so, whether the appellant is entitled to half share in them?<br />
The suit schedule comprises of three items of property. The first is a<br />
rice mill. Items 2 and 3 are vacant sites. Out of them, item 2 is said to be<br />
consisting of three separate bits.<br />
<br />
The appellant and the respondent are the sons of late Patchala Subba Rao.<br />
He died in the year 1981. Normally, the elder son would assume the management<br />
of the family on the death of father. In the instant case, the respondent, who<br />
is younger to the appellant, has assumed possession and management of the <br />
properties. The person, who is in management, is expected to take stand, truly<br />
reflecting the facts pertaining to the family. In case, the properties are held<br />
in joint, he must agree for and effect partition and if according to him, all or<br />
some of the items are owned by him exclusively, the same can be made known to <br />
the person demanding partition.<br />
<br />
In the instant case, the appellant was not sure as to how and in what<br />
manner, the respondent is in management of the properties. He was under the<br />
impression that there exists a partnership firm in which himself, the<br />
respondent, their uncle-P.W.2 and some others are partners. Obviously because<br />
he was not getting any returns from the properties and the respondent was<br />
enjoying them exclusively, the appellant filed O.S.No.94 of 1993 in the Court of<br />
Junior Civil Judge, Pithapuram for dissolution of the partnership firm and<br />
rendition of accounts. The respondent contested the suit and pointed out<br />
several alleged discrepancies as regards description of the firm, the method of<br />
their registration etc. Ultimately, he was able to convince the trial Court, to<br />
dismiss the suit, on the ground that the there did not exist any partnership<br />
firm at all and the rice mill, which is item 1 in the present suit schedule, was<br />
never held by the firm. The appellant filed A.S.No.21 of 2003 in the Court of<br />
Senior Civil Judge, Pithapuram. At the same time, reconciled to the fact that<br />
the mill is not the property of any partnership firm, the appellant filed the<br />
present suit for partition in the same Court i.e., Senior Civil Judge,<br />
Pithapuram. The parties ought to have taken steps to get the suit clubbed with<br />
A.S.No.21 of 2003. <br />
<br />
Except denying the plea of the appellant, the respondent did not assert<br />
that any of the suit schedule properties belongs to him exclusively. In the<br />
course of his evidence, the appellant filed Ex.A.1 dated 02.09.1957, through<br />
which his father purchased item 1, Ex.A.2, dated 21.08.1961, under which his<br />
father purchased first bit of item 3, Ex.A.3, dated 08.02.1964 through which<br />
their grand father purchased item 2 and Exs.A.4 and A.5, sale deeds dated<br />
19.06.1966 and 21.06.1966 respectively, through which their father and uncle<br />
(P.W.2) purchased bits 2 and 3 of item 3. As observed earlier, the respondent<br />
did not choose to enter the witness box at all.<br />
<br />
Once the properties were acquired by the father and grand father of the<br />
parties to the suit, both of them are entitled to equal shares therein. If<br />
there existed any arrangement that has the effect of excluding the appellant<br />
from succession, the respondent was under obligation to plead and prove it. As<br />
observed earlier, he did not choose to enter the witness box at all. No other<br />
document that has the effect of stopping the succession was placed before the<br />
Court. Some doubt exists as to the property that is acquired through Ex.A.5 by<br />
P.W.2. However, that witness categorically stated that the item was acquired at<br />
a time when himself and his brother i.e., father of plaintiff and defendant were<br />
joint and that he does not have any share in it. The inescapable conclusion is<br />
that items 1 to 3 are available for partition. Hence, point No.1 is answered in<br />
favour of the appellant.<br />
<br />
The discussion on point No.1 would in fact cover substantial part of point<br />
No.2 also. It has already been found that the suit schedule properties were<br />
acquired by the ancestors of the appellant and the respondent and that there is<br />
noting on record to suggest that the succession was in any way scuttled.<br />
Therefore, the appellant on the one hand and the respondent on the other hand<br />
are entitled for equal shares in the suit schedule properties.<br />
<br />
A plea is raised on behalf of the appellant for the first time before this<br />
Court to the effect that the suit was barred under Rule 2 of Order II C.P.C.<br />
The said provision prohibits splitting of the reliefs that are available to a<br />
plaintiff in a suit, on the basis of the same cause of action. If a plaintiff<br />
intends to relinquish part of a claim that is based on the same cause of action,<br />
he can do so only with the permission of the Court. In such a case, subsequent<br />
suit for the left over claim is permissible. In the absence of such permission,<br />
he becomes handicapped. <br />
<br />
An objection as to bar of a subsequent suit that can be raised under Rule<br />
2 of Order 2 C.P.C., would heavily depend upon the facts that are pleaded. The<br />
defendant who raises such an objection must plead necessary facts and adduce<br />
evidence. It is only then that the Court would be in a position to examine it<br />
and record its finding. In the instant case, the respondent did not raise the<br />
plea at all, much less did he supplement the details. No evidence was adduced<br />
on this aspect.<br />
<br />
Assuming that the plea is otherwise permissible, a subsequent suit can be<br />
barred, only when the relief claimed in it was available on the basis of the<br />
cause of action, which constituted the basis in an earlier suit. O.S.No.94 of<br />
1993 was filed for the relief of dissolution of partnership firm. The relief of<br />
partition of joint family properties between two brothers can, by no stretch of<br />
imagination, be said to be available on the basis of facts that constitute the<br />
basis for a cause of action to file a suit for dissolution of partnership.<br />
There are no merits in the contention of the respondent.<br />
<br />
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs through out.<br />
There shall be a preliminary decree as prayed for.<br />
<br />
__________ <br />
03.01.2012<br />
</div>advocatemmmohanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07338404357741706945noreply@blogger.com