REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1289 of 2005
State of M.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Ramesh & Anr. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh
against the judgment and order dated 31.3.2004 passed by the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (Gwalior Bench) in Criminal
Appeal No. 262 of 1997, reversing the judgment and order dated
16.8.1996 passed by the Sessions Court, Guna in Sessions Trial No.
155/1995, convicting the respondent No.1 under Section 302 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC') and respondent No.2
under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, and sentencing them
to life imprisonment.
2. FACTUAL MATRIX:
(A) Respondent No.2 Bhaggo Bai filed an FIR dated 31.1.1995 in
Police Station, Ashok Nagar, mentioning her name as Madhav Bai
stating that her husband Chatra died after falling during a spell of
giddiness at about 11.00 p.m. In respect of the same incident, another
complaint was lodged by Munna Lal (PW.2) along with Rannu Bai
(PW.1), daughter of deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai, aged about 8
years stating that both the respondents-accused had murdered Chatra.
After having a preliminary investigation, the Investigating Officer
arrested respondent No.2 Bhaggo Bai and lodged the FIR formally on
4.2.1995.
(B) After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed
against both the accused for committing the murder of Chatra. A large
number of witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Both the
respondents-accused examined themselves as defence witnesses
alongwith some other witnesses. After concluding the trial, both the
respondents-accused were convicted and sentenced, as mentioned
2
hereinabove, by the Sessions Judge vide judgment and order dated
16.8.1996.
(C) Being aggrieved, both the respondents -accused filed Criminal
Appeal No.262/1997 which has been allowed by the impugned
judgment and order and both of them stood acquitted. Hence, this
appeal.
3. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-State, has submitted that the judgment and order of the High
Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court has
gravely erred in showing unwarranted sympathy towards the accused
and dis-believed the prosecution case brushing aside the statement of
Rannu Bai (PW.1), merely being a child witness and pointing out that
there was contradiction in the medical and ocular evidence regarding
the injuries found on the person of Chatra, deceased. The High Court
further erred in holding that there was enmity between the accused
Bhaggo Bai and Ramesh. At the time of death of Chatra, Ramesh
accused was facing trial for committing rape on Bhagoo Bai; thus,
question of conspiracy between the said two accused could not arise;
several cases were also pending in different courts between Munna
Lal (PW.2) and his wife Kusum Bai on one hand, and Chatra and
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Bhaggo Bai on the other hand. Thus, there was a possibility of false
implication of Ramesh accused. Chatra died because of a fall when he
went to urinate, as he was suffering from giddiness all the time
because he used to take `dhatura' and had become a Lunatic. Chatra
used to eat soil etc. Rannu Bai (PW.1) though a child, was able to
understand the questions put to her and her duty to speak the truth.
She could not have any enmity with either of the accused. The rape
case filed by deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai against accused
Ramesh remained pending for a long time and Ramesh got acquitted
after the death of Chatra, deceased. The Trial Court after appreciating
the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that
accused Ramesh committed rape upon Bhaggo Bai during the period
between 24.6.1991 to 17.9.1994. In fact, they were having illicit
relationship for a period of more than 3 years. The High Court
brushed aside the said finding without giving any cogent reason. The
allegation that Rannu Bai (PW.1) had been tutored by Munna Lal
(PW.2) could not be spelled out from her statement. The neighbours
had come at the place of occurrence after being called by Rannu Bai
(PW.1) and Munna Lal (PW.2). In spite of the fact that some of them
had declared hostile, part of their evidence still could be relied upon in
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support of the prosecution case. Therefore, the judgment and order of
the High Court, impugned is liable to be set aside, and appeal deserves
to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Ms. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents, has submitted that the facts and circumstances of
the case do not warrant interference by this Court against the
judgment and order of acquittal by the High Court. The High Court
being the first appellate court and the final court of facts had
appreciated the entire evidence on record and came to the conclusion
that it was not possible that Bhaggo Bai could have hatched a
conspiracy with Ramesh accused for committing the murder of her
husband Chatra during the pendency of the case filed by her against
Ramesh under Section 376 IPC. Munna Lal (PW.2), his wife and son
had also assaulted the deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai, accused and
wanted to grab their property and so many civil and criminal cases
were pending between them, his evidence cannot be relied upon. As
per the medical evidence, it was possible that the injuries suffered by
Chatra could have been received by fall caused by giddiness. More
so, Chatra had become a lunatic and could not understand right or
wrong. The testimony of Rannu Bai (PW.1), has been rightly dis-
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believed by the High Court as she had been tutored by Munna Lal
(PW.2). Admittedly, she had been living with him since the death of
her father Chatra. The High Court has rightly believed the defence
version and appreciated the depositions of defence witnesses,
including Radha Bai (D.W.1), elder daughter of Bhaggo Bai accused,
in the correct perspective. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be
dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
CHILD WITNESS :
6. In Rameshwar S/o Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1952 SC 54, this Court examined the provisions of Section 5 of
Indian Oaths Act, 1873 and Section 118 of Evidence Act, 1872 and
held that every witness is competent to depose unless the court
considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to
him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme
old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of the
same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the Court
considers otherwise.
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The Court further held as under:
".....It is desirable that Judges and magistrates
should always record their opinion that the child
understands the duty of speaking the truth and
state why they think that, otherwise the credibility
of the witness may be seriously affected, so much
so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject
the evidence altogether. But whether the
Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion
can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances
when there is no formal certificate...."
7. In Mangoo & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1995 SC
959, this Court while dealing with the evidence of a child witness
observed that there was always scope to tutor the child, however, it
cannot alone be a ground to come to the conclusion that the child
witness must have been tutored. The Court must determine as to
whether the child has been tutored or not. It can be ascertained by
examining the evidence and from the contents thereof as to whether
there are any traces of tutoring.
8. In Panchhi & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1998 SC 2726, this
Court while placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier
judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness must find
adequate corroboration before it is relied on. However, it is more a
rule of practical wisdom than of law. It cannot be held that "the
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evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably
stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence
shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence
of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater
circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what
others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring."
9. In Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1460, this Court dealing with the child
witness has observed as under:
"The decision on the question whether the
child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily
rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners,
his apparent possession or lack of intelligence,
and the said Judge may resort to any examination
which will tend to disclose his capacity and
intelligence as well as his understanding of the
obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial
court may, however, be disturbed by the higher
court if from what is preserved in the records, it is
clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This
precaution is necessary because child witnesses
are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world
of make-believe. Though it is an established
principle that child witnesses are dangerous
witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be
influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is
also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny
of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion
that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no
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obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a
child witness."
10. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern
between right and wrong and the court may find out from the cross-
examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to
indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong.
The court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting
questions to him and even if no such questions had been put, it may be
gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the
implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited
in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to
understand the sanctity of giving evidence on a oath and the import of
the questions that were being put to him. (Vide: Himmat Sukhadeo
Wahurwagh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC 2292).
11. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Ors., AIR 2010 SC
3071, this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is
inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to
recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to
abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget
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those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to
recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the
future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime
without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire
confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any
corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of
having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must
be something on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone
wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the
child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the
accused falsely in a case of a serious nature.
12. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be
relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from untutored part, in
case such remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such an
eventuality the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into
consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a
hostile witness. (Vide: Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab,
(2006) 13 SCC 516).
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13. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to
the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require
corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the
court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court
may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be
evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is
susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to
show that a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement
partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been
tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.
APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL:
14. We are fully alive of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal
against acquittal and in the absence of perversity in the said judgment
and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary
jurisdiction, is not warranted. It is settled proposition of law that the
appellate court being the final court of fact is fully competent to re-
appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own
decision. Law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to
arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides
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for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of
innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence
every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by
the competent court and there can be no quarrel to the said legal
proposition that if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of
the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal.
INJURIES:
15. Dr. D.K. Jain (P.W.8) has performed Post Mortem of Chatra,
deceased. He found following injuries on his person vide Post Mortem
Report Ex.P-8:
(i) A contusion of size 1 cm x 1 cm on the L of mandible on right
side with an abrasion on upper part of contusion 1 cm x 0.3 cm
obliquely. Sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.
(ii) An abrasion of size 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm 1-1/2" below the above
contusion over neck. Sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.
(iii) An abrasion of size 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm 1.5 cm below and lateral to
L of mandible right on neck.
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(iv) An abrasion of size 3.5 cm x 0.5 cm over left side of neck
posterior laterally on upper part, transversely oblique going
upwards. Sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.
(v) A contusion over lower lip right side near to L of mouth of size
0.5 cm x 0.5 cm sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present.
(vi) An abrasion over right shoulder posterior laterally of size 4 cm
x 1.5 cm post mortem in nature.
Dr. D.K. Jain (P.W.8) opined that injury No.(vi) was after the
death. On internal examination, he found the right pleura adherent to
lung parietes. Both the lungs were enlarged. On further dissection, he
found a sub-cutaneous haemorrhage present in supra sternal notch
area. Blood mixed fluid with froth stood discharged through mouth
and noise. According to the doctor, cause of death was on account of
`asphyxia' as a result of throttling. No piece of cloth or thread was
found inside the mouth of the deceased. The deceased had an ailment
of the lungs.
16. The Trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record
came to the conclusion that the injuries found on the person of the
deceased could not have been received from a fall on the ground. The
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injuries found on his body are in consonance with the deposition of
Rannu Bai (P.W.1), who has stated that after hearing the noise, she
woke up and saw that accused Ramesh was beating her father with
"Gumma" (a hard object made of cloth), and her mother had caught
hold of the deceased by his legs. The doctor had found that blood had
oozed from his mouth and such injury could be possible as per the
case of the prosecution. Undoubtedly, Munna Lal (PW.2) has deposed
that Ramesh had caused injuries with the knife. The High Court has
given undue weightage to his statement. In fact, as per the prosecution
case, Munna Lal (PW.2) was not an eye witness. He was called by
Rannu Bai (PW.1) and reached the place of occurrence along with
some other persons.
17. In Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507, this Court has
explained the provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence Act, 1872
observing that it is an exception to the general rule whereunder the
hearsay evidence becomes admissible. However, such evidence must
be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an
interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be
admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been
made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The
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essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so
connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same
transaction" that it becomes relevant by itself.
18. Applying the ratio of the said judgment to the evidence of
Munna Lal (PW.2), we reach the conclusion that his statement
indicating that Rannu Bai (PW.1) had come to him and told that her
father was beaten by Ramesh with the help of her mother, is
admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
19. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents has drawn our attention to certain minor contradictions in
the statement of Rannu Bai (PW.1) and Munna Lal (PW.2). She has
placed a very heavy reliance on the statement of Rannu Bai (PW.1)
that first she had gone to the house of her grandfather Lala and the
trial Court committed an error reading it as Munna Lal (PW.2). In
view of the fact that Bhaggo Bai, respondent/accused herself stated in
her cross-examination while being examined under Section 315
Cr.P.C. that she had sent Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call Munna Lal
(PW.2), such argument looses the significance. Even otherwise, the
omissions/contradictions pointed out by Mrs. K. Sarada Devi are of
15
trivial nature and are certainly not of such a magnitude that may
materially affect the core of the prosecution case.
20. The witness examined by the prosecution supported its case to
the extent that the door of the room wherein the offence had been
committed was bolted from inside. It was only when Ram Bharose,
village Watchman (P.W.5) threatened Bhaggo Bai, accused saying
he would call the police, the door was opened and, by that time,
accused Ramesh had left the place of occurrence and Chatra had died.
Thus, there is no conflict between the medical and ocular evidence.
The prosecution case is fully supported by Ram Bharose (PW.5) and
partly supported by Hannu (PW.7) and Anand Lal (PW.3). Even the
part of the depositions of hostile witnesses, particularly Basori Lal,
Sarpanch (PW.4) can be relied upon to the extent that on being called,
he reached the place of occurrence and found that the room had been
bolted from inside. It is also evident from the evidence on record that
Rannu Bai (PW.1) and Munna Lal (PW.2) had called the persons from
their houses and after their arrival, they found that the room had been
bolted from inside. So to that extent, the version of these witnesses
including of the hostile witnesses, can be believed and relied upon.
The post mortem report clearly explained that Chatra died of
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`Asphyxia' and this version has been fully supported by Dr D.K. Jain
(PW.8).
21. Bhaggo Bai, accused/respondent has admitted in her statement
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called as `Cr.P.C.') that Rannu Bai (PW.1) was present
inside the room/place of occurrence and she further admitted that
Rannu Bai, (PW.1) had gone to call Munna Lal (PW.2) at the relevant
time. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid admission of the said
accused itself that both the persons were present inside the room and
are well aware of the incident.
22. Undoubtedly, there had been some minor contradictions in the
statements of witnesses in regard to the fact as to who had reached the
place of occurrence first. All the witnesses have affirmed in one voice
that Munna Lal (P.W.2) had entered the room and after coming out,
he disclosed that Chatra has died. In fact, this fact had been affirmed
by all the witnesses. In view of the contradictions in the statements of
witnesses as to whether torch was used to create artificial light in the
room or not to find out the scene therein, becomes immaterial. It is
evident from the material available on record that there was only one
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room house where the incident took place and no other space was
available. Thus, in case the other witnesses had not deposed that
Radha Bai (D.W.1) was also present in the house along with accused
Bhaggo Bai, remains immaterial for the reason that her presence is
natural.
23. The Trial Court after taking note of rulings of various
judgments of this Court as what are the essential requirements to
accept the testimony of a child witness held as under:
"In the present case, statement of child witness
gets affirmed by the circumstances of the incident, facts
and from the activities of the other witnesses carried out
by them on reaching at the place of occurrence. Thus,
on the basis of above-said law precedents, statement of
witness Rannu Bai not being unreliable in my opinion
are absolutely true and correct......Statement of child
witness Rannu Bai gets affirmed by the statements of
Munna and witness Hannu and from the medical
evidence. Therefore, facts of the above-stated law
precedents are not applicable to the present case."
In view of the above, it is evident that the statement of Rannu
Bai (P.W.1) is affirmed by the statements of other witnesses, proved
circumstances and medical evidence. Her deposition being precise,
concise, specific and vivid without any improvement or embroidery is
worth acceptance in toto.
18
24. A very heavy reliance has been placed by defence counsel Ms.
K. Sarada Devi on the statements of defence witnesses, particularly,
Radha Bai (D.W.1). However, it may be relevant to point out the
initial part of her statement made in examination-in-chief:
"In view of the witness's age before she was sworn
she was asked as under:
Q. Are you literate? Have you gone to school
for reading?
A. No.
Q. Do you understand right or wrong?
A. I do not understand.
Q. Do you understand Saugandh or Sau (Oath
or hundred)
A. I do not know.
Considering the said answers of the witness it
appears that the witness does not understand right,
wrong or oath, therefore the witness was not sworn."
(Emphasis added)
In view of the above, we are of the view that it cannot be safe to
rely upon her evidence at all.
25. So far as the deposition of Budha (DW.2), father of Bhaggo
Bai, accused, is concerned, he was 80 years of age at the time of
examination and not the resident of the same village. He has deposed
only on the basis of the information he had received from his daughter
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Bhaggo Bai, accused. Thus, he is not of any help to the defence as
we see no reason to believe the theory put forward by the defence.
26. Complaint was lodged promptly at 6.00 a.m. on 1.2.1995 in the
Police Station, Ashok Nagar at a distance of 8.00 K.Ms. It may also
be relevant to mention herein that formal FIR was lodged on 4.2.1995
after having preliminary investigation and arresting Bhaggo Bai
accused. Bhaggo Bai herself has reached the Police Station and
lodged the complaint that her husband Chatra died because of falling
from giddiness when he went to ease himself outside the house. This
version has been dis-believed by the I.O. as well as by the Trial Court.
In our considered opinion, Bhagoo Bai would not have moved in the
night for 8 K.Ms. to lodge the FIR, if she was not at fault or having a
guilty mind. Secondly, she lodged the complaint in the name of
Madhav Bai and not in her own name Bhaggo Bai.
27. The cumulative effect of reading the provisions of Article 20(3)
of the Constitution with Sections 161(2); 313(3); and proviso (b) to
Section 315 Cr.P.C. remains that in India, law provides for the rule
against adverse inference from silence of the accused.
20
Statement of the accused made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can
be taken into consideration to appreciate the truthfulness or otherwise
of the prosecution case. However, as such a statement is not recorded
after administration of oath and the accused cannot be cross-
examined, his statement so recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can
not be treated to be evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Evidence Act, 1872.
Section 315 Cr.P.C. enables an accused to give evidence on his
own behalf to disprove the charges made against him. However, for
such a course, the accused has to offer in writing to give his evidence
in defence. Thus, the accused becomes ready to enter into the witness
box, to take oath and to be cross-examined on behalf of the
prosecution and/or of the accomplice, if it is so required. (Vide:
Tukaram G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukla & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1050;
and Dehal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 9 SCC 85).
In such a fact-situation, the accused being a competent witness,
can depose in his defence and his evidence can be considered and
relied upon while deciding the case.
28. Bhaggo Bai, accused examined herself as a defence witness
(DW.3) and entered into the witness box. She has also been cross-
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examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as on behalf of co-
accused Ramesh. Bhaggo Bai/accused (DW.3) deposed that accused
Ramesh had committed rape upon her 6 years ago and in that case,
criminal prosecution was launched against him. She has further
deposed that after her husband Chatra fell from giddiness, she had
brought him inside the room with the help of her elder daughter Radha
Bai (DW.1) and put him on the bed. She herself sent her younger
daughter Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call Munna. Munna came and saw
Chatra. The relevant part of her deposition reads as under:
"...Then he (Munna) bolted the door from outside. He
called the watchman. The watchman and Munna seeing
me in the room went to the police station.....It is right
that for the last 8-10 years, I, Chatra and Munna had no
contact with Ramesh.....I got my name to be written as
Bhaggo Bai at the time of report Ext.D-7. My name is not
Madhav Bai. The Policemen recorded the report in the
name of Madhav Bai. I sent Rannu Bai to call Munna
because Munna was my husband's elder brother.
.................
Q.17 Had you illicit and immoral relations with the
accused Ramesh when Chatra was alive?
A. What can I say?
..............
Q. We are saying that you had given twisting
statement in a rape case on which the accused
Ramesh was acquitted?
A. I gave statement."
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Her aforesaid statement is not worth acceptance for the reason
that all the witnesses including those who turned hostile had admitted
that the room was bolted from inside and her statement that Munna
had bolted the room from outside has not been corroborated by any
person. In case she and her husband Chatra were not having any
relation with Munna (PW.2) for the last 8-10 years, it would be un-
natural that she would send her daughter Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call
Munna because he was her husband's elder brother. While lodging
report Ext. D-7 she told her name as Madhav Bai. However, in cross-
examination she has stated that police men recorded her name as
Madhav Bai though her name is Bhaggo Bai. More so, she has not
specifically denied having illicit relationship with Ramesh accused,
nor she has denied that she made a twisting statement to help the
accused Ramesh to get acquitted in the rape case.
29. The Trial Court after examining the entire material on record,
particularly the documentary evidence came to the conclusion as
under:
"43....It appears on viewing all the above documents
Exh. D-8 to D-42 that all these documents are related to
incident of rape of Bhaggo Bai committed by accused
Ramesh for the period 24.6.1991 to 17.9.1994..."
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The High Court did not deal with this aspect at all.
30. All the witnesses examined by the prosecution including those
who have turned hostile are admittedly the neighbours of Chatra
deceased and Munna Lal. Thus, they are the most natural witnesses
and the Trial Court has rightly placed reliance on their testimonies.
31. After appreciating the entire evidence on record, we came to
the inescapable conclusion that the High Court has completely
ignored the most material incriminating circumstances which
appeared against the respondents/accused. The findings so recorded
by the High Court are contrary to the evidence on record and thus, are
held to be perverse.
32. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to be allowed and it is
hereby allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated
31.3.2004 in Criminal Appeal No.262 of 1997 is hereby set aside and
the judgment and order of the trial Court dated 16.8.1996 convicting
the respondents/accused under Section 302 IPC in Sessions Trial
No.155/1995 is hereby restored. A copy of the judgment be sent to
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guna, M.P. to take the said respondents
24
into custody and to send them to jail to serve the remaining part of the
sentence.
....................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
....................................J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
New Delhi,
March 18, 2011
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